Given the industry demand function X(p) = 100 - 2p, consider the following scenario: 1) The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12, but the monopolist now uses third degree pricing. Assume the firm can distinguish between low-demand consumers on the weekday and high-demand consumers on the weekend such that Qh = 55 - (1/2)Ph and Ql= 45 - (3/2)Pl. The monopolist charges a difference price, Pl and Ph, in each distinct market.

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Given the industry demand function X(p) = 100 - 2p, consider the following scenario:

1) The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12, but the monopolist now uses third degree pricing. Assume the firm can distinguish between low-demand consumers on the weekday and high-demand consumers on the weekend such that Qh = 55 - (1/2)Ph and
Ql= 45 - (3/2)Pl. The monopolist charges a difference price, Pl and Ph, in each distinct market.

2) The market is dominated by one monopolist that is not able to price discriminate.

Please calculate 1) Profits; 2) CS; 3) PS; 4) DWL; and 5) Quantity Sold in the market; for 1) Third Degree Pricing; 2) No Price Discrimination; and then 3) In this setting, if the monopolist has the opportunity to go from no price discrimination to first degree pricing for a fee of 800, should it make the switch? Why or why not?

Given the industry demand function X (p) = 100 – 2p, consider the following scenarios:
• The market is a perfectly competitive market. Assume there are identical firms with marginal
cost of 12 in this perfectly competitive market.
• The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12. This monopolist is
able to achieve 1st degree pricing.
• The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12, but the monopolist
is able to achieve only 2nd degree pricing. Assume the menu offers only 2 choices:
(Qi = 30, pi = 35), and (Q; = 60, p = 20).
• The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12, but the monopolist
now uses 3rd degree pricing. Assume the firm can distinguish between low-demand consumers
on the weekday and high-demand consumers on the weekend such that Qh = 55 - ph and
Qe = 45 – Pe. The monopolist charges a difference price, pe and ph, in each distinct market.
• The market is dominated by one monopolist that is not able to price discriminate.
Calculate the following values and fill in the table according to the 5 scenarios above
1st Deg.
2nd Deg. | 3rd Deg. No Price Discrim.
Profits T
CS
PS
DWL
Quantity Sold
in Market
In this setting, if the monopolist has the opportunity to go from no price discrimination to 1st
degree pricing for a fee of 800, should it make the switch? Why or why not?
Transcribed Image Text:Given the industry demand function X (p) = 100 – 2p, consider the following scenarios: • The market is a perfectly competitive market. Assume there are identical firms with marginal cost of 12 in this perfectly competitive market. • The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12. This monopolist is able to achieve 1st degree pricing. • The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12, but the monopolist is able to achieve only 2nd degree pricing. Assume the menu offers only 2 choices: (Qi = 30, pi = 35), and (Q; = 60, p = 20). • The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12, but the monopolist now uses 3rd degree pricing. Assume the firm can distinguish between low-demand consumers on the weekday and high-demand consumers on the weekend such that Qh = 55 - ph and Qe = 45 – Pe. The monopolist charges a difference price, pe and ph, in each distinct market. • The market is dominated by one monopolist that is not able to price discriminate. Calculate the following values and fill in the table according to the 5 scenarios above 1st Deg. 2nd Deg. | 3rd Deg. No Price Discrim. Profits T CS PS DWL Quantity Sold in Market In this setting, if the monopolist has the opportunity to go from no price discrimination to 1st degree pricing for a fee of 800, should it make the switch? Why or why not?
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