Given the industry demand function X(p) = 100 - 2p, consider the following scenario: 1) The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12, but the monopolist now uses third degree pricing. Assume the firm can distinguish between low-demand consumers on the weekday and high-demand consumers on the weekend such that Qh = 55 - (1/2)Ph and Ql= 45 - (3/2)Pl. The monopolist charges a difference price, Pl and Ph, in each distinct market.
Given the industry demand function X(p) = 100 - 2p, consider the following scenario: 1) The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12, but the monopolist now uses third degree pricing. Assume the firm can distinguish between low-demand consumers on the weekday and high-demand consumers on the weekend such that Qh = 55 - (1/2)Ph and Ql= 45 - (3/2)Pl. The monopolist charges a difference price, Pl and Ph, in each distinct market.
Given the industry demand function X(p) = 100 - 2p, consider the following scenario: 1) The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12, but the monopolist now uses third degree pricing. Assume the firm can distinguish between low-demand consumers on the weekday and high-demand consumers on the weekend such that Qh = 55 - (1/2)Ph and Ql= 45 - (3/2)Pl. The monopolist charges a difference price, Pl and Ph, in each distinct market.
Given the industry demand function X(p) = 100 - 2p, consider the following scenario:
1) The market is dominated by one monopolist with a marginal cost of 12, but the monopolist now uses third degree pricing. Assume the firm can distinguish between low-demand consumers on the weekday and high-demand consumers on the weekend such that Qh = 55 - (1/2)Ph and Ql= 45 - (3/2)Pl. The monopolist charges a difference price, Pl and Ph, in each distinct market.
2) The market is dominated by one monopolist that is not able to price discriminate.
Please calculate 1) Profits; 2) CS; 3) PS; 4) DWL; and 5) Quantity Sold in the market; for 1) Third Degree Pricing; 2) No Price Discrimination; and then 3) In this setting, if the monopolist has the opportunity to go from no price discrimination to first degree pricing for a fee of 800, should it make the switch? Why or why not?
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