Ann, Bob, Carl, Dora, Eddy and Frank are the contestants in a new TV show. They are placed on an island. The rules of the game are as follows. Ann goes first. She is given a bag that everyone knows contains six gold coins. Ann makes a proposal of how to allocate the six coins among the six contestants including herself. The contestants (including Ann) then vote "yes" or "no" on the proposal. If the proposal gets more than half the votes then the coins are allocated according to the proposal and everyone leaves the island. If the proposal gets half or fewer than half the votes then Ann has to leave the island empty-handed and she is out of the game. In this case, the bag of six gold coins passes to Bob. He gets to make a proposal of how to allocate the coins among the remaining contestants (i.e., including Bob but excluding Ann) and the remaining contestants (i.e., including Bob but excluding Ann) then vote. As before, if the proposal gets more than half the votes then the coins are allocated according to the proposal and everyone leaves the island. If the proposal gets half or fewer than half the votes then Bob has to leave the island empty-handed and is out of the game. In this case, the bag of six gold

Ann, Bob, Carl, Dora, Eddy and Frank are the contestants in a new TV show. They are placed on an island. The rules of the game are as follows. Ann goes first. She is given a bag that everyone knows contains six gold coins. Ann makes a proposal of how to allocate the six coins among the six contestants including herself. The contestants (including Ann) then vote "yes" or "no" on the proposal. If the proposal gets more than half the votes then the coins are allocated according to the proposal and everyone leaves the island. If the proposal gets half or fewer than half the votes then Ann has to leave the island empty-handed and she is out of the game. In this case, the bag of six gold coins passes to Bob. He gets to make a proposal of how to allocate the coins among the remaining contestants (i.e., including Bob but excluding Ann) and the remaining contestants (i.e., including Bob but excluding Ann) then vote. As before, if the proposal gets more than half the votes then the coins are allocated according to the proposal and everyone leaves the island. If the proposal gets half or fewer than half the votes then Bob has to leave the island empty-handed and is out of the game. In this case, the bag of six gold

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Kimberly's sister would like to start a business with her brother selling simple T-shirts that are green in color at all stores in the area. Her brother disagrees and thinks that the shirts should have a special logo on them and should be sold only at specific stores. As the deciding vote, what should Kimberly choose and why? Choose one: A selling green T-shirts because prices will be higher as the number of stores increases B. selling green T-shirts because prices will be higher as the shirt becomes more commonplace OC. selling shirts with a special logo because prices will be higher as the shirts becomes more unique OD. selling shirts with a special logo because prices will be higher as the shirts are sold in fewer stores OE. both C and D
Answer 4 to 6. Thank you
The ultimatum game is a game in economic experiments. The first player (the proposer) receives a sum of money and proposes a fair proposal (F - 5;5) or unfair proposal (U - 8;2). The second player (the responder) chooses to either accept (A) or reject (R) this proposal. If the second player accepts, the money is split according to the proposal. If the second player rejects, neither player receives any money. 1 A 5:5 2 F R 0:0 U A 8:2 2 1. Find the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium using backward induction. R 0;0
Two players bargain over $20. Player 1 first proposes a split of(n, 20 - n), where n is an integer in {0, 1, ..., 20}. Player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal. If player accepts it, player 1 obtains $n and player 2 obtains $(20 - n). If player 2 rejects it, the money is taken away from them and both players will get $0. Question: Find two subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and state clearly each player's equilibrium strategies (recall that in a dynamic game, a player's strategy is a complete-contingent plan). Explain why the strategy profiles form a subgame perfect equilibrium.
In a sideshow game. A player gets 3 balls to place into a Clown's mouth. Each ball is swallowed by the Clown and is then deposited into slots that can hold only 1 ball. Slots are numbered 1 to 9 and prizes are allocated to a player depending on the slot value of the three balls. If for example the first ball landed in slot 8, the second in slot 2 and the third in slot 1, the resulting prize number would be 821 as shown in Figure 3. 3rd 2nd 1st dol 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Figure 3: A prize number of 821 is shown for a side show game. a) How many resulting prize numbers are possible in this game? b) How many resulting prize numbers are possible that end with the number 1?
Tom and Jerry are contestants on Jeopardy. Tom is leading with an accumulation of $12000, while Jerry trails closely at $10000. In the final segment of the show, contestants must wager an amount not exceeding their current accumulation that they will answer the last question of the night correctly. Wagers are made before the question is revealed. If the contestant answers correctly, they have their wager added to their accumulation. Otherwise, it is deducted. Jerry is a game show master and expects to answer correctly with 90% certainty. Tom is less experienced and only has a 55% chance. Their utilities of wealth are given by uT (x) = x1 and u' (x) 50xi a) How much should Tom wager to maximise his expected utility? b) How much should Jerry wager to maximise his expected utility? c) In expectation, how much money the expected winner of the show is going to win?
The last four questions, not the first four.
(a) Stan and Ollie are two students who share a flat. Both of them prefer to live in a clean flat. However, neither is too fond of housecleaning. Each of them receives a payoff of 12 if they both clean the flat. If neither person cleans the flat, they receive a payoff of 6 each. If one person cleans the flat but the other person does not, then the payoff for the person who does the cleaning is 5 and the payoff for the person who doesn't do any cleaning is 15. (i) Write down the payoff matrix of this game. Derive the dominant strategy equilibrium. Is this also a Nash equilibrium? (ii) Expiain your reasoning. Consider a game with N players. Each player chooses Black or White. If a player (b) chooses Black, she gets 100 if everyone else also chooses Black, and she gets 0 if any of the other players does not choose Black. If a player chooses White, she always gets 50. Show that everyone choosing Black and everyone choosing White are both Nash equilibria of this game.
A cool kid is willing to rename himself for a profit. He decides to auctionoff the naming right. Two bidders show interest. Their valuations for thenaming right are independently and uniformly distributed over [0,100].There are several possible ideas to design the auction.(a) The auction runs as follows. Both bidders are invited to the sameroom; an auctioneer will start the auction with an initial price 0, and increase it by $1 every minute. The bidders are not allowed to say anything during the process, but they can walk out of the room at any moment. If one bidder walks out of the room when the price increases to p (the bidder does not need to pay), the remaining bidder will be awarded the naming right for a price of p. If both walk out when the price reaches p, the naming right is not assigned and the two bidders do not need to pay. What should the bidders do? Explain your answer. (b) Both bidders are invited to submit their bids covertly (bids are non-negative real…
Player 1 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) If the game has a dominant strategy, what is it? There is none. If the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it? There is none. Cooperate (C) 3,3 8,0 Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for both players. Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for both players. Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for 1, and Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for 2. C, C is the only Nash equilibrium. D, D is the only Nash equilibrium. C, C and D, D are both Nash equilibria. Player 2 Defect (D) 0,8 1,1
Please help with the two questions
$11. Anne and Bruce would like to rent a movie, but they can't decide what kind of movie to get: Anne wants to rent a comedy, and Bruce wants to watch a drama. They decide to choose randomly by playing "Evens or Odds." On the count of three, each of them shows one or two fingers. If the sum is even, Anne wins and they rent the comedy; if the sum is odd, Bruce wins and they rent the drama. Each of them earns a payoff of 1 for winning and 0 for losing "Evens or Odds." (a) Draw the game table for "Evens or Odds." (b) Demonstrate that this game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.