and Leona were each presented with the following independent offers. If one confesses and the other doesn't, the one who confesses will go free and the other will receive a 20-year prison sentence; if both confess, each will receive a 10-year prison sentence. Bernie and Leona both know that without any con- fessions, the police only have enough evidence to convict them of the lesser crime of tax evasion, and each would then receive a 2-year prison sentence. m. Use the information to construct a payoff matrix for Bernie and Leona. b. What is the dominant strategy for Bernie and for Leona? Why? c. Based on your response to the previous question, what prison sentence will each receive?

and Leona were each presented with the following independent offers. If one confesses and the other doesn't, the one who confesses will go free and the other will receive a 20-year prison sentence; if both confess, each will receive a 10-year prison sentence. Bernie and Leona both know that without any con- fessions, the police only have enough evidence to convict them of the lesser crime of tax evasion, and each would then receive a 2-year prison sentence. m. Use the information to construct a payoff matrix for Bernie and Leona. b. What is the dominant strategy for Bernie and for Leona? Why? c. Based on your response to the previous question, what prison sentence will each receive?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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