An increase in firm I's marginal cost will cause: Group of answer choices a downward shift in firm 2's reaction function, resulting in a new Cournot equilibrium where firm 1 is producing a higher quantity and firm 2 is producing a lower quantity. an upward shift in firm I's reaction function, resulting in a new Cournot equilibrium where firm 1 is producing a higher quantity and firm 2 is producing a lower quantity. an upward shift in firm 2's reaction function, resulting in a new Cournot equilibrium where firm 1 is producing a lower quantity and firm 2 is producing a higher quantity. a downward shift in firm I's reaction function, resulting in a new Cournot equilibrium where firm 1 is producing a lower quantity and firm 2 is producing a higher quantity.

An increase in firm I's marginal cost will cause: Group of answer choices a downward shift in firm 2's reaction function, resulting in a new Cournot equilibrium where firm 1 is producing a higher quantity and firm 2 is producing a lower quantity. an upward shift in firm I's reaction function, resulting in a new Cournot equilibrium where firm 1 is producing a higher quantity and firm 2 is producing a lower quantity. an upward shift in firm 2's reaction function, resulting in a new Cournot equilibrium where firm 1 is producing a lower quantity and firm 2 is producing a higher quantity. a downward shift in firm I's reaction function, resulting in a new Cournot equilibrium where firm 1 is producing a lower quantity and firm 2 is producing a higher quantity.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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