An efficient market for risk, such as an insurance market, is MOST likely to exist: a. when the sellers of insurance are risk- averse but the purchasers are not. O b. when there is a level playing field so that all participants have approximately the same wealth and the same degree of risk aversion. c. in the presence of private, or asymmetric, information. d. when there are significant differences between individuals' wealth levels and attitudes toward risk.

An efficient market for risk, such as an insurance market, is MOST likely to exist: a. when the sellers of insurance are risk- averse but the purchasers are not. O b. when there is a level playing field so that all participants have approximately the same wealth and the same degree of risk aversion. c. in the presence of private, or asymmetric, information. d. when there are significant differences between individuals' wealth levels and attitudes toward risk.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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