Alice (A) and Bob (B) have an endowment of goods 1 and 2, with Alice's endowment being (wf, wg) = (1, 2) and Bob's endowment equals (wf, wf) = (1,3). Alice's utility is given by ua(zf, z4) = 2 In z4 + In zg, while Bob's utility is up(zf, zf) = In zf + 2 In zf. Find the %3D competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium prices in this pure exchange economy. Select one: O a. Pi = 5, P2 = 3 %3D Ob. P1 = 3, P2 = 7 %3D O . Pi = 7, P2 = 3 O d. Pi = 1, P2 = 4 %3D
Alice (A) and Bob (B) have an endowment of goods 1 and 2, with Alice's endowment being (wf, wg) = (1, 2) and Bob's endowment equals (wf, wf) = (1,3). Alice's utility is given by ua(zf, z4) = 2 In z4 + In zg, while Bob's utility is up(zf, zf) = In zf + 2 In zf. Find the %3D competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium prices in this pure exchange economy. Select one: O a. Pi = 5, P2 = 3 %3D Ob. P1 = 3, P2 = 7 %3D O . Pi = 7, P2 = 3 O d. Pi = 1, P2 = 4 %3D
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Transcribed Image Text:QUESTION 1
Alice (A) and Bob (B) have an endowment of goods 1 and 2, with Alice's endowment being (wt, wg) = (1,2) and Bob's endowment equals
(wf, wk) = (1,3). Alice's utility is given by u4(x4, x4) = 2 ln xt + In æf , while Bob's utility is up(af, æ}) = In xf + 2 ln æ. Find the
competitive (Walrasian) equilibrium prices in this pure exchange economy.
Select one:
Pi = 5, p2 = 3
O b. Pi = 3, p2 = 7
О а.
O c.
Pi = 7, p2 = 3
O d. Pi = 1, P2 = 4
Assume the setting outlined in Question 1. Suppose that the social planner considers it to be imperative that agent B consumes exactly one unit
of good 1 and four units of good 2. Although the social planner can not force the individuals to a particular consumption, they can enforce
transfers of good 1 between the consumers (transfers of good 2 are not enforceable by the social planner). What transfer of good 1 would
guarantee that in the resulting competitive Walrasian equilibrium consumer B consumes one unit of good 1 and four units of good 2?
Select one:
One half unit of good 1 has to be transferred from agent A to agent B.
Ob.
There is no endowment for which agent B would consume xf = 1 and a = 4 in the corresponding competitive equilibrium.
Therefore, no such transfers exist.
Oc.
One unit of good 1 has to be transferred from agent A to agent B.
Od.
Transferring good 1 is not sufficient. It is necessary to transfer one unit of good 2 from agent A to agent B.
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