A game theory problem: Two lawyers, Elizabeth Hasenpeffer (EH) and Joseph Fargillio (JF) decide on one of two legal strategies: A and Bfor EH, /and I/ for JF. They then write a brief and submit them simultaneously to three judges (X, Y, and Z) Suppose, at the start of the game, it is known by all that Judge Z will read only the brief of Ms. Hasenpeffer. Required: Write down the corresponding extensive form game. You may exclude payoffs.

A game theory problem: Two lawyers, Elizabeth Hasenpeffer (EH) and Joseph Fargillio (JF) decide on one of two legal strategies: A and Bfor EH, /and I/ for JF. They then write a brief and submit them simultaneously to three judges (X, Y, and Z) Suppose, at the start of the game, it is known by all that Judge Z will read only the brief of Ms. Hasenpeffer. Required: Write down the corresponding extensive form game. You may exclude payoffs.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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a) Write out the extensive form of a game between a farmer (playing in the first round) and nature (playing a mixed strategy in the second round). Assume that the farmer can either pay a cash rent of $1500 for land (English system) or 1/2 of crop production to the landlord (sharecropping). Assume the farmer is planting corn and will produce 2 tons of corn. Assume that nature has a 50% chance of playing a strategy in which the price of corn is $3500/ton and a 50% chance of playing a strategy in which the price of corn is $500/ton. The farmer keeps any money left after paying cash rent and sells any corn left after paying the landlord in sharecropping. b)What is the most that a risk neutral farmer would be willing to pay for an accurate prediction of the price of corn in problem 1 before choosing whether to pay cash rent or sharecrop?
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Consider the following game: Player 2 In Out Player 1 In -2,-2 2, 0 Out 0, 2 0, 0 (a) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game, or what are the Nash equilibriaof this game? (b) Does either firm have a dominate strategy (a strategy that is always abest response)? Which? (c) Suppose Player 1 could move before Player 2 and Player 2 could observe Player 1’s move. What do you think would happen?
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38. Consider the following game. There are ten churches in town: nine are Catholic and one is Eastern Orthodox. All churches conduct their divine services at 10am on Sunday morning. You and your friend, without communication, agree to meet at a church service. If you fail to meet at the same church, then you are sad and become a Doomer. What is this game's focal point? Remember that you cannot communicate about this. (A) You meet at any of the Catholic churches. (B) You meet at any of the churches – denomination does not matter. We're all the same bro. (C) You meet at the Orthodox church. (D) There is no focal point. 39. Consider a fractional-reserve banking system in which an initial deposit of $1,000 can generate up to $4,000 in money. What is the reserve ratio? (A) 4 percent. (B) 5 percent. (C) 25 percent. (D) 75 percent.
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Economic
3.Students A and B decide whether to clean the dormitory. Regardless of whether the other party participates, the cleaning cost for each student to clean the dormitory is $ 8; and the benefit for each student from cleaning is $5 times the number of participants. (hint: if both of them clean the dormitory together, A and B benefit. If one cleans while the other does not, A and B benefit too) (a) Please use a game theory to briefly describe the above scenario, (that is to calculate the revenue for different strategies) (b) Draw the payoff matrix, find the Nash equilibrium.