Which one of following statements is false? * Consider the following game. B D E F There are 7 subgames in this extensive-form game. There are 6 proper subgames in this extensive-form game. (BK, CE) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. (BK, DE) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. G H I J K L M N 3,4 4,3 1,2 5,7 6,5 2,8 9,1 3,6

Which one of following statements is false? * Consider the following game. B D E F There are 7 subgames in this extensive-form game. There are 6 proper subgames in this extensive-form game. (BK, CE) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. (BK, DE) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. G H I J K L M N 3,4 4,3 1,2 5,7 6,5 2,8 9,1 3,6

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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3.Students A and B decide whether to clean the dormitory. Regardless of whether the other party participates, the cleaning cost for each student to clean the dormitory is $ 8; and the benefit for each student from cleaning is $5 times the number of participants. (hint: if both of them clean the dormitory together, A and B benefit. If one cleans while the other does not, A and B benefit too) (a) Please use a game theory to briefly describe the above scenario, (that is to calculate the revenue for different strategies) (b) Draw the payoff matrix, find the Nash equilibrium.
Consider the following game. Which one of the following statements is FALSE? 1. There are 7 subgames in this extensive-form game. 2. There are 6 proper subgames in this extensive-form game. 3. (BK, CE) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. 4. (BK, DE) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
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PART C D
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