7 This figure below shows the payoffs involved when Sarah and Joe work on a school project together for a single grade. They both will enjoy a higher grade when more effort is put into the project, but they also get pleasure from goofing off and not working on the project. The payoffs can be thought of as the utility each would get from the effort they individually put forth and the grade they jointly receive. Serah points Lew Effon High Eert 8 00.40 25 Lew Effert Hgh fert The outcome of the game in the figure shown will be: Multiple Choice Joe puts forth high effort and Sarah puts forth low effort. Joe puts forth low effort and Sarah puts forth high effort. Joe and Sarah both put forth low effort. Joe and Sarah both put forth high effort.

7 This figure below shows the payoffs involved when Sarah and Joe work on a school project together for a single grade. They both will enjoy a higher grade when more effort is put into the project, but they also get pleasure from goofing off and not working on the project. The payoffs can be thought of as the utility each would get from the effort they individually put forth and the grade they jointly receive. Serah points Lew Effon High Eert 8 00.40 25 Lew Effert Hgh fert The outcome of the game in the figure shown will be: Multiple Choice Joe puts forth high effort and Sarah puts forth low effort. Joe puts forth low effort and Sarah puts forth high effort. Joe and Sarah both put forth low effort. Joe and Sarah both put forth high effort.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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In the game below, there are two equilibriums: both players play conserve or both players play plunder. If the game is repeated multiple times, players can maintain equilibrium in which conserve is played if: Player 2 Player 1 Conserve Plunder Select one: a. Conserve 100, 100 50,-100 Plunder -100, 50 0,0 Game is repeated many times and discount rates are high O b. Game is repeated few times and discount rates are low O c. Game is repeated few times and discount rates are high O d. Game is repeated many times and discount rates are low
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2.19. Standard setting. Suppose Apple and Samsung are in the process of negotiating a common standard for a new 3D camera tech- nology they plan to introduce in the next generation of smartphones. Apple has a preference for standard A, whereas Samsung has a pref- erence for standard S. However, both recognize that multiple stan- dards are a worse outcome for all. Specifically, Apple gets 240 if it selects A and Samsung does so too, but only 20 if Samsung does not adopt A. If Apple adopts standard S and Samsung does so too, then Apple gets a payoff of 190. If, however, Samsung chooses A then Ap- ple gets zero. For Samsung, the situation looks similar: If Samsung chooses standard S and Apple does the same then Samsung gets 210, but if Apple chooses A the Samsung's payoff is only 30. If Samsung opts for standard A and Apple does so too then Samsung gets a pay- off of 110, whereas if Apple chooses standard S then Samsung gets a payoff of zero. (a) Suppose that both Apple and Samsung…
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31 Joe Low Effort Sarah Low Effort High Effort 7 7 High Effort 15 5 13 6 10 9 The figure shown represents the payoffs involved when Sarah and Joe work on a school project together for a single grade. They both will enjoy a higher grade when more effort is put into the project, but they also get pleasure from goofing off and not working on the project. The payoffs can be thought of as the utility each would get from the effort they individually put forth and the grade they jointly receive. What payoff can we predict Joe will receive as the outcome of this game? Multiple Choice О О 5 7 О 13