5. In the lecture, we have shown the following: Theorem: Suppose strategy s, (in a finite game) is strictly dominated by strat- egy ŝ; when opponents are restricted to using pure strategies. That is, Then strategy s, will never be in the support of a best response. That is, for all 0-i o; €BR;(G-;) = 0;(s})=0. (a) Use this result to find all the Nash equilibria (including mixed strategy ones) of the following game. player 2 L R T 10,5 4,1 player 1 M 6,1 8,8 B 5,0 0,10

5. In the lecture, we have shown the following: Theorem: Suppose strategy s, (in a finite game) is strictly dominated by strat- egy ŝ; when opponents are restricted to using pure strategies. That is, Then strategy s, will never be in the support of a best response. That is, for all 0-i o; €BR;(G-;) = 0;(s})=0. (a) Use this result to find all the Nash equilibria (including mixed strategy ones) of the following game. player 2 L R T 10,5 4,1 player 1 M 6,1 8,8 B 5,0 0,10

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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PART C D
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