This is the entire problem using the Hamilton voting method. 3. Find the apportionment under the Hamilton method if there are 50 seats to be apportioned.Lower Quota(Step 2)FractionalPartStateABCDETotalPopulation SQ (Step 1)15078173204295900SurplusSeatsFinalApportionment

Concept/Formulas to be used: In Hamilton Voting Method, firstly we calculate the 'Standard Divisor'.…

Answered: 3. Find the apportionment under the…

Advanced Engineering Mathematics

10th Edition

ISBN:9780470458365

Author:Erwin Kreyszig

Publisher:Erwin Kreyszig

Chapter2: Second-order Linear Odes

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1RQ

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Discuss the following problems as a cooperative effort. Seventeen people serve on a board and are considering three alternatives: A, B, and C. Here are the choices followed by vote: (ABC) = 8 (ACB) = 4 (BAC) = 3 (BCA) = 0 (CAB) = 2 (CBA) = 5 Determine the winner, if any, using the voting methods in Problems A-G. D. Majority rule E. Plurality method F. Borda Count method G. Hare Method
A group of fun-loving people have decided to play a practical joke on one of their friends, but they can't decide which friend, Alice (A), Betty (B), or Connie (C). Their preferences are: (ABC) (CBA) (BCA) 9 ,10, 4 Who wins the election using the Hare method
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The weighted voting systems for the voters A, B, C, ... are given in the form {q: w1, w2, w3, w4, ..., wn}. The weight of voter A is w1, the weight of voter B is w2, the weight of voter C is w3, and so on.Consider the weighted voting system {73: 4, 69, 71}. (a) Compute the Banzhaf power index for each voter in this system. (Round your answers to the nearest hundredth.) BPI(A) = BPI(B) = BPI(C) = (b) Voter B has a weight of 69 compared to only 4 for voter A, yet the results of part (a) show that voter A and voter B both have the same Banzhaf power index. Explain why it seems reasonable, in this voting system, to assign voters A and B the same Banzhaf power index: a) Despite the varied weights, in this system, all of the voters are needed for a quota. b) Despite the varied weights, this is a dictator system. Voter C controls the outcome, while voters A and B are dummy voters. c) Despite the varied weights, in this system, all voters are dummy voters. No voter…
Consider the weighted voting system [q: 13, 11, 10, 8, 4]. Assume that this system has no dictators and is not subject to gridlock. (a) What is the weight of the coalition formed by P,, P3, and P? (b) For what values of the quota q is the coalition formed by P,, Pa, and P, a winning coalition? (c) For what values of the quota q is the coalition formed by P,, P3, and Pa a losing coalition? (a) What is the weight of the coalition formed by P2, Pa, and P? The weight of the coalition (P2, P3, Pa) is. (b) For what values of the quota q is the coalition formed by P2, P3, and Pa a winning coalition? The coalition {P2, P3, Pa) is a winning coalition for all values of q from through . (c) For what values of the quota q is the coalition formed by P,, Pa, and P a losing coalition? The coalition {P2, P3, Pa) is a losing coalition for all values of q from through . MacBook Air F2 G00 F4 FS F9 @ #3 2$ % * 3 4 8 9. Q Y A S D K V alt option command comm ర N
Use Plurality Runoff to determine the winner of the following election: Number of Voters (13) 3 2 C D A B D E First Second Third Fourth Fifth 4 A B C D E 3 B A с D E B C A E 1 E D C B A Now, use this election to show that Plurality Runoff FAILS to satisfy Monotonicity. By this, we mean to move the winning candidate to a higher position on one of the preference lists so that the candidate no longer wins.
The weighted voting systems for the voters A, B, C, ... are given in the form q: w1, w2, w3, w4, ..., wn . The weight of voter A is w1, the weight of voter B is w2, the weight of voter C is w3, and so on.

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3. Find the apportionment under the Hamilton method if there are 50 seats to be apportioned. Lower Quota (Step 2) Fractional Part State A B C D E Total Population SQ (Step 1) 150 78 173 204 295 900 Surplus Seats Final Apportionment