3) A chemical company can produce Q units of a chemical H, with marginal costs of MC = 9+ Q. and can distribute the chemical at marketing marginal costs of MC = 1. The demand for H is given by P= 30-1.5Q. If an external market exists where H can be bought or sold without marketing expenses for $13, how much H should the firm produce? 00 units 4 units 05 units 07 units 10 units

3) A chemical company can produce Q units of a chemical H, with marginal costs of MC = 9+ Q. and can distribute the chemical at marketing marginal costs of MC = 1. The demand for H is given by P= 30-1.5Q. If an external market exists where H can be bought or sold without marketing expenses for $13, how much H should the firm produce? 00 units 4 units 05 units 07 units 10 units

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Similar questions

The market for plasticans is perfectly competitive. Market Supply is givenby Q=3P and Market Demand is given by Q=469-3P. Each extra unit ofplastican produced imposes a negative externality of $9. What is the totalsurplus at the market quantity?
Please answer part c and provide steps
2) Suppose the demand curve for a rubber-based product is Q_D=225-0.5P, and the supply curve is Q_S=0.5P-15. If the external cost of the suit from the waste produced by the factory producing the item is MEC-Q, calculate: (a) Competitive price and quantity when there is no control over the waste disposal of the factory. (b) Price and quantity at the socially optimal level.
1
Consider the market for good x for which there is one firm controlling the market.D(q)=165-10qMC(q)=5q+15MR(q)=165-20qC(q)=2.5q^2+15q+8 (a) Find the point of equilibrium. (b) How many units must the firm produce and sell to maximize its profits? (c) What will be the price the firm will charge to consumers?
In a market with 2 firms, the government has decided that 12 units of pollution must be abated and allocates each firm 6 units of pollution to abate. The total cost of pollution abatement for firm A is TCĄ = 9% and the total cost of pollution abatement for firm B is TCB B. If a market for pollution abatement was created, how much pollution would each firm abate in equilibrium? Firm A: 11 units; Firm B: 1 units O Firm A: 6 units; Firm B: 6 units Firm A: 4 units; Firm B: 8 units O Firm A: 1 units; Firm B: 11 units Firm A: 8 units; Firm B: 4 units
MC ATC AVC $10 $9 D=AR=MR $6. 1,000 Note: D=AR=MR on this graph is what we marked in class as "market price" – it is the revenue per unit.
only typed solution
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Example: Question 4a.) Arthur’s demand to reduce electric and magnetic fields (EMFs) is P = 20 – 2 Q, whileRonald’s demand is P = 15 – 3 Q. If the marginal cost of reducing emissions is equal to$15 and is constant, what is the optimal amount of EMF reduction? b.) What Lindahl prices would you charge Arthur and Ronald? What might prevent you fromcollecting these prices?c.) How would your answers change if the marginal cost of reducing emissions was equal to$10 and is constant?d.) What are the consumer surpluses of Arthur and Ronald in c.)?
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