17. Two firms, A and B, each currently dump 50 tonnes of chemicals into the local river. From now on both firms willrequire a pollution permit for each tonne of pollution dumped. The government gives each firm 20 tonnes' worth ofpollution permits, which it can either use or sell to the other firm. It costs Firm A $100 for each tonne of pollution that iteliminates before it reaches the river, and it costs Firm B $50 for each tonne of pollution that it eliminates before itreaches the river. After the two firms buy or sell pollution permits from each other, what would we expect that Firm A andFirm B will dump?a Firm A will dump 10 fewer tonnes of pollution into the river, and Firm B will dump 50 fewer tonnes ofpollution into the tiver.b. Firm A will dump 50 fewer tonnes of pollution into the iver, and Firm B will dump 10 fewer tonnes ofpollution into the river.c. Firm A will dump 50 fewer tonnes of pollution into the river, and Firm B will dump 10 more tonnes ofpollution into the river.d. Firm A will dump 10 more tonnes of pollution into the river, and Firm B will dump 50 fewer tonnes ofpollution into the river.18. You are the mayor of a small town with 2000 residents. The head of your economic development agency recentlyconducted a survey in which the 2000 residents said that a public concert in the centre of town would be worth $20 toeach of them. Since it costs only $5000 to hold the concert, you organızed and held the concert, which everyone in townenjoyed. But when you asked for donations to pay for the concert, you only collected $30 in total What do you know?a The survey certainly overstated how much the concert was worth to each resident.b. From the standpoint of total costs and benefits, the cost of the concert certainly exceeded the benefit.c The concert was an example of the Tragedy of the Commons.d. Residents of the town were probably free tiders.19. What is the difference between technological knowledge and general knowledge?a. General knowledge creation is usually more profitable for the creator.b. Technological knowledge is excludable and general knowledge is not.c. General knowledge is excludable and technological knowledge is not.d. General knowledge is rival in consumption and technological knowledge is not.20. Assuming that everyone prefers to live in a society without poverty, what do we know about people who do not donateto private charity?a They receive no external benefit from private antipoverty programs.b. They decrease the reliance of individuals on antipoverty programsc They free-ride on the generosity of others.d. They are most likely to be in favour of government-sponsored programs21. Why is simply askıng people how much they value a highway not a reliable way of measurıng the benefits and costs?a. Those who stand to gain have an incentive to tell the truth.b. Those who stand to lose have an incentive to exaggerate their true costs.c. Answers to the survey questions relating to cost will always be downwardly biased.d Not everyone asked will be using the highway.

Hi! thank you for the question but as per the guidelines, we can answer only one question at one…

17. Two firms, A and B, each currently dump 50 tonnes of chemicals into the local require a pollution permit for each tonne of pollution dumped. The government gives each firm 20 tonnes' worth of pollution permits, which it can either use or sell to the other firm. It costs Firm A $100 for each tonne of pollution that it eliminates before it reaches the river, and it costs Firm B $50 for each tonne of pollution that it eliminates before it reaches the river. After the two firms buy or sell pollution permits from each other, what would we expect that Firm A and Firm B will dump? a. Firm A will dump 10 fewer tonnes of pollution into the river, and Firm B will dump 50 fewer tonnes of pollution into the tiver. b. Firm A will dump 50 fewer tonnes of pollution into the iver, and Firm B will dump 10 fewer tonnes of pollution into the river. e. Firm A will dump 50 fewer tonnes of pollution into the river, and Firm B will dump 10 more tonnes of pollution into the river. d. Firm A will dump 10 more tonnes of pollution into the river, and Firm B will dump 50 fewer tonnes of pollution into the river.

17. Two firms, A and B, each currently dump 50 tonnes of chemicals into the local require a pollution permit for each tonne of pollution dumped. The government gives each firm 20 tonnes' worth of pollution permits, which it can either use or sell to the other firm. It costs Firm A $100 for each tonne of pollution that it eliminates before it reaches the river, and it costs Firm B $50 for each tonne of pollution that it eliminates before it reaches the river. After the two firms buy or sell pollution permits from each other, what would we expect that Firm A and Firm B will dump? a. Firm A will dump 10 fewer tonnes of pollution into the river, and Firm B will dump 50 fewer tonnes of pollution into the tiver. b. Firm A will dump 50 fewer tonnes of pollution into the iver, and Firm B will dump 10 fewer tonnes of pollution into the river. e. Firm A will dump 50 fewer tonnes of pollution into the river, and Firm B will dump 10 more tonnes of pollution into the river. d. Firm A will dump 10 more tonnes of pollution into the river, and Firm B will dump 50 fewer tonnes of pollution into the river.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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