1. There are two airline carriers, Delta and American, that are deciding how many flights to run from New York (JFK) to Houston (IAH) per day. Delta can run a morning flight (M), an afternoon flight (A), both flights or nothing. American can run an Evening (E) flight or nothing. The two firm's profits corresponding to each possible scenario of available flights is given below: Product (Flight) Selection Delta profit American profit 13 M M,A M,A,E A,E 20 8 -4 4 1 E 12 M,E A 11 8 9 a. Set up the payoff matrix for when the two firms simultaneously choose which flights to run. What is the Nash Equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game?

1. There are two airline carriers, Delta and American, that are deciding how many flights to run from New York (JFK) to Houston (IAH) per day. Delta can run a morning flight (M), an afternoon flight (A), both flights or nothing. American can run an Evening (E) flight or nothing. The two firm's profits corresponding to each possible scenario of available flights is given below: Product (Flight) Selection Delta profit American profit 13 M M,A M,A,E A,E 20 8 -4 4 1 E 12 M,E A 11 8 9 a. Set up the payoff matrix for when the two firms simultaneously choose which flights to run. What is the Nash Equilibrium (or equilibria) of this game?

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5PA

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

5. To advertise or not to advertise Suppose that Fizzo and Pop Hop are the only two firms that sell orange soda. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn depending on whether or not it advertises: Рop Hop Advertise Doesn't Advertise Advertise 10, 10 18, 2 Fizzo Doesn't Advertise 2, 18 11, 11 For example, the upper right cell shows that if Fizzo advertises and Pop Hop doesn't advertise, Fizzo will make a profit of $18 million, and Pop Hop will make a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Fizzo and Pop Hop are both profit-maximizing firms. If Fizzo decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ million if Pop Hop advertises and a profit of $ million if Pop Hop does not advertise. If Fizzo decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of S million if Pop Hop advertises and a profit of $ million if Pop Hop does not advertise. If Pop Hop advertises, Fizzo makes a higher profit if it chooses If Pop Hop…
2. Using a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcome Please help
A producer of manure is located next to a bakery. The producer of manure produces M pounds of manure daily and earns profits of 156M - M². The bakery sells C' cakes daily, and it earns profits of 312C-C²-MC (the strong smell of manure drives away the appetite of many would-be customers of the bakery). In a competitive equilibrium solution, where each business seeks to maximize profits, a total of if be sold daily. From a social point of view, the producer of manure should not produce at all. Choose one: A. true B. false pounds of manure will
Pls help with below homework.
J 4
Save Answer Consider two cigarette companies, PM Inc. and Brown Inc. If neither company advertises, the two companies spit the market and earn $60 million each. If they both advertise, they again split the market, but profits are lower by $20 million since each company must bear the cost of advertisirlg. Yet if one company advertises while the other does not, the one that advertises attracts customers from the other. In this case, the company that advertises earns $70 million while the company that does not advertise earns only $30 million. What will these two companies do if they behave as individual profit maximizers? Neither company will advertise, and PM Inc. earns $60. One company will advertise, the other will not. Brown Inc. earns $70. Both companies will advertise, and PM Inc. earns $40. Both companies will advertise, and PM Inc. earns $60.
Q² 4 PROBLEM (4) Firm A and Firm B with identical total costs TCA (QA) related goods and competing in prices (Bertrand competition), with demands: QA = 510 - 2PA + pв and Qв= 510 - 2pв+ pa, respectively. = and TCB (QB) Q² 4 are producing (a) Calculate the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices. (b) Calculate the prices they charge when A is the leader and sets its price first, anticipating B's best response and taking it into account (like in Stackelberg competition). (c) Calculate the prices they charge when they collude, in order to maximize sum of their profits.
10 logging firms use a forest to collect timber. Each firm i must choose how many trees to cut, gj The benefit of cutting a tree is 1000 -2G per tree, where G is the total quantity of trees cut in the forest. The marginal cost of cutting a tree is 10G. Firms do not face any fixed costs. In a Nash Equilibrium, O Each firm cuts 125 trees O Each firm cuts 125/10 trees O Each firm cuts 125/4 trees O Each firm cuts 5 trees
The following graph depicts the costs incurred by a Local egg seller, Rahim. Rahim is faced with strong competitors who are selling exactly the same product. Use the graph to answer the following questions- Price/Cost per egg MC 12 ATC 8 MR3 AVC 6. MR2 MR1 Quantity 100 200 300 400 a)At what price will Rahim try to minimize loss by selling eggs in the market? b)At what price will there be a break-even point?
Economics Bidding for Bookstore Licenses. Paige initially has the only license to operate a bookstore in Bookville. She charges a price of $13 per book, has an average cost of $3 per book, and sells 1,501 books per year. When Paige's license expires, the city decides to auction two bookstore licenses to the highest bidders. Suppose the relevant variables (price, average cost, and output per firm) take on only integer valueslong dash—no fraction or decimals. a. Suppose Paige is optimistic and imagines the best possible outcome with a two-firm market. What is the maximum amount she is willing to pay for one of the two licenses? $ nothing (Hint: How will the relevant variables change? What is the smallest possible change in their values?) b. Suppose Paige is pessimistic and imagines the worst possible outcome with a two-firm market. What is the maximum amount she is willing to pay for one of the two licenses? $ nothing (Enter your response as an integer.)
6. Using a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcome Suppose there are only two firms that sell tablets: Padmania and Capturesque. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn, depending on whether it sets a high or low price for its tablets. Padmania Pricing High Low Capturesque Pricing High LOW 8,8 13,4 4, 13 7,7 For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Padmania prices low and Capturesque prices high, Padmania will earn a profit of $13 million, and Capturesque will earn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Padmania and Capturesque are both profit-maximizing firms. If Padmania prices high, Capturesque will make more profit if it chooses a profit if it chooses a price. If Capturesque prices high, Padmania will make more profit if it chooses a profit if it chooses a ▼price. Considering all of the information given, pricing low If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up…
Think about firms such as the Coca Cola Company and PepsiCo who competeagainst each other in the monopolistically competitive market for soft drinks. Eachfirm produces a unique product, but each of these unique products is to some extenta substitute for the soft drinks produced by rival companies.Now imagine a situation where the firms within such a market are facing suchextreme competition that they are unable to make an operating profit. Characterisethis situation diagrammatically and explain what will happen to the market, payingparticular attention to the exit or entry of firms out of (or into) the market.