1) A firm produces two products (A and B) jointly. Every time a unit of A is produced, a unit of B is also produced as a byproduct. The demand functions for A and B are: QA = 600-4PA QB = 100-2PB. Disposal is costless and the firm's marginal cost of producing a unit of joint output is MC = 0.5Q. a) How many units of A and B should the firm produce? b) How many units of A and B should the firm sell? c) What price should be charged for each of the products? PLEASE

1) A firm produces two products (A and B) jointly. Every time a unit of A is produced, a unit of B is also produced as a byproduct. The demand functions for A and B are: QA = 600-4PA QB = 100-2PB. Disposal is costless and the firm's marginal cost of producing a unit of joint output is MC = 0.5Q. a) How many units of A and B should the firm produce? b) How many units of A and B should the firm sell? c) What price should be charged for each of the products? PLEASE

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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