final iac104 prep

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SELF 104

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Psychology

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Oct 30, 2023

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-allow the young kids to deal with their emotional to encourage build self-strategize to resolve issues. Depression - Mind-brain problem - Gene-brain problem • Genetic component: - Much unknown : the expression and transference of genes for the subsequent generation - Genes impact neural activity in the brain • Raphe nucleus : secretion and distribution of serotonin throughout the brain to modulate level of neural activity • Polymorphism: “higher incidence of…polymorphism coding for a specific substance that transports serotonin, called promoter polymorphism of the serotonin transporter gene when compared to non-depresses patients.” • Amygdala activity: genes(polymorphism: S-allele ) predispose abnormal neuronal activity in specific stressful environments/situations = genetic-neural predisposition [ Amygdala- related emotions, can no longer be regulated that impede normal functioning of emotion- collaborated to over activity of AMYGDALA -hyperactive-- genetic predisposition] then hyperactive amygdala malfunction in may not fuction ideally in certain environment- STRESS - the exact mechanism unknow - The exact neural-mental transformation unclear • Philosophical implication : the mind is just the brain? – leaving out genetic and environmental component. - no: gene-brain linkage? - gene-brain- and mental linkage is needed Clinical depression is when one has the no argue or motivative to do things for a prolong period of time. - Not ware of specific gene to specific mutation, polymorphism is correlated with more cases of depression. Specific mutation of gene and development of depression. - it can be recurring re - must live through the hardship, keep real live ideal and real world in close proximity- be honest with self and or when the gap prolongs creating more space of pathology, The world-brain problem • Defects in copies of genes: deletions, insertions and duplications: ongoing research on the genome and its relation to depressions and schizophrenia • Environmental stressors: war, trauma, sexual, physical and psychological abuse affect the duplication of genes and their abnormal expression. = Gene x environment interaction Environmental can increase / decrease -H2O, relationships, food, direct or indirect effect on the way out genome forms – determined how one North off question only mind and genetic component – re emphasis on component of gene and environment of self – of what is actually happing and helps to understand the effect of the interplay of gene – environment and , • Philosophical implications: - **genes: polymorphisms and copy number variants - ***neurons: heavily influenced by gene duplications and expressions - **gene expression: strongly dependent on environmental context Mental activity = gene-neural and neural-ecological interactions - So: gene-brain and world-brain problems, not mind-body(brain) problem. Time and the brain • Glutamate excited neurons: [GOOOD GOOD GOOOD GOOOD GOOD] - Depression: excitation is high and overly active resting-state [Amygdala is hyperactive along with cortical area, gets in a cycle with the negative conversation within self – destructive] - Ketamine blocks glutamate receptors, so it modulates the action of glutamate on the brain - Ketamine acts very fast, unlike drugs that modulate serotonin, adrenaline and noradrenaline • Neural brain mechanisms operate in different time scales. - Ketamine affects very short time scales - Neural time scales and their integration : a new frontier in neuroscience Addiction mechanism is highest before one open social media- and opening phone reestablishes – affirms expectations/ confirmation, Culturally women have more expectation of the society than men, which is highlighted through social media

- nural mechanism works with a time cycle – sleep and awake cycle – day light and darkness of night - Time and Bain – time via some mechanism that represent the existing world, we represent time objectively – our objectiv of the world- subjectily within the brain – and object The time-brain problem • Depression: - life events - Timing of stressful events - Interpretation of events is subjective - Sleep deprivation in Judy’s case and insomnia - Time scales in the brain - Circadian rhythms: nucleus suprachiasmaticus: match objective time scales - The time-brain problem Increased self and body-focus • Clinical depression: - Very negative emotions, suicidal thoughts, hopelessness, diffuse bodily symptoms, stress sensitivity, rumination, lack of pleasure. - Increased self-focus over environment-focus - Body-focus that is subjective(lived) and abnormal *Some argue that the mind is the lived body (Christoff et al., 2011)- through the subjective nature of the lived body - Northoff thinks this is confused: The lived body is an effect, not the course of the subjective mind • Foreground: self-focus: excess rumination or self-reflection(or self-consciousness): an attempt to cope • Background: environment-focus: very limited, but relief and improvement lies in the change of focus. • Mania is the opposite of depression: excess environment-focus over self and body-focus • Triangular reciprocal relation/balance: (with content over) self, body and environment * The brain is the seat of the above balance, not the mind . The brain • The brain drives the balance: - Medial regions: hyperactive - Lateral regions (DLPFC): hypoactive = medial – lateral neuronal activity balance: based on meta-analyses (And animal studies: activation of genes and effect on neuronal activity) - Studies on train adjectives: show abnormal stimulus-induced activity to self-specific items, like emotional photos or words, which correlated with medial-lateral resting state activity in depressed patients versus non-depressed. • Philosophical implication: Northoff: “minding the brain” over “minding the mind” - There seems to be an intrinsic and inherent reciprocal neuronal balance (environmental or genetic) - And their respective self and environmental- related contents Relational self • Depression teaches us about the nature of self: - The subject of experience is relational – reciprocal dependence(or negative correlation) between self-focus and environment focus - Highly decreased embeddedness: the self is isolated from its immediate physical, familial and professional environment - the relational self (as a concept) needs to be further explored and studied, empirically and conceptually Mind-brain versus world-brain problem • Depression: a phenomenal imbalance - And resting-state activity is also relational, neither purely intrinsic nor extrinsic, as it underpins the relation between brain, body, and environment. - Hence consciousness is relation, just as resting-state is relational in its support of brain, body, and environment relations • Mind-brain problem is substituted by the world-brain problem - As consciousness and self are deeply relational not strictly mental entities.

Emotions and the world-brain problem Emotions versus emotional feelings • Emotional feelings are embodied : sensorimotor and behavioral output • James-Lange theory : feelings are perceptions of physiological changes in body - Anxiety: racing heart - Depression: abnormal somatic perception of body and interoceptive input as pain and anxiety, while heart rate is normal. Damasio’s theory: two–stage processing • Follows James-Lange and adds from neuroscientific studies: - Feelings: perceptions of bodily changes - ( unconscious ) Emotions : first-order neural representations in brainstem and midbrain (e.g., periaqueductal gray, tectum, amygdala ) of bodily inputs to brain - ( conscious emotional feelings ) second-order representations: cingulate gyrus, thalamic nuclei, somatosensory cortex, superior colliculi. - The second-order representations assign conscious feelings or “feeling of emotion” Panksepp’s theory - First-order neuronal representations: enough to trigger emotional feelings - Somatic and environmental input linked to motor output - Any neuronal representation based on sensory input from body and environment generates feelings. Damasio vs. Panksepp: - Damasio: feelings not directly related to body - Panksepp: feelings directly related to body and vegetative states • Panksepp : emotional feelings represent the relation between brain, body and world. - Feelings are existential (e.g., pandemic) - Heidegger: Dasein: our being is existential in a given world - Think about living(existing) on Mars? • Damasio : emotional feelings represent how the brain generates subjective feelings based on first-order representations. This tells us more about the brain than the brain’s relations to its immediate environment . Arousal in context • Criticism of James Lange theory: How do you distinguish emotions based on vegetative or bodily input • Schachter and Singer (1962): epinephrine + actors (context) determine emotional state or emotions Feeling and cognition • Cognitive: higher-order processing (in prefrontal and parietal lobes) lifts unconscious neuronal processing(e.g., amygdala) to consciousness via cognitive functions, such as working memory, language and attention • How do you distinguish between emotions? - Via evaluation and appraisal by higher cognitive functions of context. - And depression, Judy? Does it follow? - Sadness not limited to her but the whole world around her The role of insula in feelings • Where are emotions? - Interception - Exteroception - Cognition? Or cognitive functions • Judy: abnormal somatic sensations in depression (e.g., chest pain, stomach pressure, tightness when breathing) - The right insula’s neural activity is low during depression, and normal in healthy subjects - When low, it leads to anxiety. Why ? - “Mental image of a physical state” (Craig, 2011) - A subjective feeling of “material me” or “bodily me” - It interprets or re-represents interoceptive input from the spinal cord, through hypothalamus, and thalamo-cortical pathway

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to the right insula - Study patients: focused on heartbeat (interoceptive) or tone(exteroceptive): interoceptive attention correlates with high insular activity, DMPFC, and vice versa - Depressed patients : do poorly on heartbeat detection tests and exaggerate their (objective) symptoms • Insula : seems to mediate the attentional balance between internal and external inputs - Receives (interoceptive) input from subcortical regions and the five senses: auditory, tactile, gustatory, somatosensory & olfactory - mediates (as a subjective feeling) our bodily relation with our interoceptive and exteroceptive environments - Judy: the shift is to interoceptive input (brain-self relationship) and isolation from exteroceptive input - Depression : In tone detection test: insular and auditory cortices showed lower activity =Judy’s self-focus and isolation. - Somatoform and depressed patients have similar symptoms without underlying objective factors Relationality of emotional feelings • Insula: Represents the body in relation to the environment, not strictly the body - There is a synchrony between the two : the balance tilts as our attention or awareness tilts, or shifts, between interoceptive and exteroceptive content (e.g., Judy) - Emotional feelings : a representation of the relation of neurocognitive, intero- and exteroceptive inputs - Mediated by the brain but not reduced to the brain only - An EF is our relation to the world and ourselves at the same time Emotional feelings are existential • Against the backdrop of the world around us - Being-in-the-world (Heidegger) - Separation, belonging, control, power, anxiety : experiential belonging through emotional feelings - EF “are place-holders for the brain-world relation and ground our existence” (Northoff, 2016) - Depression alters our relation to the world and to ourselves at the same time - EF are intentional : they are about something (e.g., claustrophobia): dark, narrow rooms .

Enlightenment’s Evil Twin: Depersonalization How do you asses this claim? “A mother comes to me and says, 'I received a letter from my son in prison. Please prescribe me something to cry.” • Depersonalization versus derealization - What is common and what is not? • Could anyone suffer from depersonalization? • Is it common? “Research suggests that areas of the brain that are key to emotional and physical sensations, such as the amygdala and the insula , [interoceptive and exteroceptive] appear to be less responsive in chronic depersonalization sufferers. You might become less empathetic; your pain threshold might increase. These numbing effects mean that it’s commonly conceived as a defense mechanism ; Hunter calls it a “psychological trip switch” which can be triggered in times of stress.” • Depersonalization: Loss of mine-ness or “painful absence of feeling” - Sense of ownership, richness or familiarity of sensations is missing or impoverished. Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists, etc. • Philosophers : what is the self ? Is it a unity or is it not ? Is it real or is it not? And what do we mean by “real” when we refer to self? • Psychologists : what are the symptoms? What are the causes? How can it be helped? • Neuroscientists : are there any changes in the brain? What kind and where? • Neuro-philosophers ? -Are there any changes in the brain in relation to change of self (existential feelings)? -experience is vital to self Unusual response: “Alice is a 59-year-old ex-accountant living in Australia who has had depersonalization for more than 18 years (her name has been changed). However, for her, the experience is pleasant. “It’s helped me in my life,” she says. Over the past few years, she has learned to interpret her experiences in a Buddhist context, and she describes depersonalization as a “deconditioning” of sorts: “The significance I place on the world is all in my mind,” she tells me. While Alice doesn’t exactly equate depersonalization with enlightenment, she sees it as a sort of halfway, formless state. “I believe I am on the path to enlightenment,” she says.” Enlightenment? “Theravadin Buddhist tradition, which are anicca , or impermanence ; dukkha , or dissatisfaction ; and anatta , or not-self . Shinzen Young, a Buddhist teacher working with the department of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, refers to depersonalization as “enlightenment’s evil twin.” As in depression ,… “The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) notes that depersonalization must cause the patient distress and have an impact on her daily functioning for it to be classified as clinically significant . In this sense, it seems inappropriate to call Alice’s experiences pathological . “We have ways of measuring disorders, but you have to ask if it’s meaningful. It’s an open question,” Bezzubova says. “But [depersonalization] certainly has the quality of being ill . It’s certainly a lack of order —especially in acute depersonalization. People cannot manage their daily activities .”

Important point: Medford is wary of fruitless philosophizing around unanswerable questions. “It’s like picking a scab,” he says. Obsessive questioning is a common trait in people with depersonalization, often perpetuating anxiety instead of providing insight. “I think calling it a loss of self is maybe a convenient shorthand for something that’s hard to capture ,” he says. “I prefer to talk about experience—because that’s what’s important in psychiatry.” What an individual feels in a given environment and what motivate a given individual in such circumstances Depersonalization: Neglecting interceptive and exteroceptive world, BLUNTING removal of expected human emotions, it is dialed down so much that it created stress and gives raise to questions in regards to why do I do not have a FAMILIAR reaction to the world. Onset: prolong stress, drugs/alcohol, sleepless nights Derealization: when the subjects or the person say they do not feel that the world’s external to them is real, They don’t feel real to themselves – amygdala and insula goes though abnormal activities Buddhisim: live a less attached life related to the world using meditations, when we get overly invested in the world emotionally we get invested emotionally to the people in our life – which influences us to experience positive and negative emotions (TAKES EMOTIONAL TOLL ON US) when overly attach disappointment and suffer (DUKKHA) is apparent, therefore, to lessen the suffer and to be a happier person at the end of the day – practice partial removal of/from the world

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Discussion Board 11 Schizophrenia and the world-brain problem Social disconnection • Brain, body, and world input confusion • Genetic factors: family - Not clear on the exact markers • Biological, developmental(18-25 years old-outbreak) and environmental factors • “deafferentiated” from environment - Dominated by internal content, like clinical depression - “ Loss of common sense ” Sensory overload • Developmental: 14-18: massive brain reorganization • Neuronal excitation-inhibition - Pyramidal neurons: glutamate - Interneurons : GABA: inhibition (and abnormalities in schizophrenia) - DLPFC: Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: reduced(deficit) GABA and altered interneurons - Could explain sensory intensity and overload: lack of neuronal filtering or inhibition - New York City or Montreal analogy: dams, wells and canals=neuronal inhibition-excitation navigation and balance Cont’d: Andrew • Andrew: severe or complete breakdown of the neuronal dams, wells and canals in the sensory cortices. - Breakdown of input differentiation: body, brain and environment - World-brain relation: boundaries - Overloaded or overflooded resting-state Delusions, voices, and novel identity • Delusions : attribution of abnormal meanings to environment(e.g., people’s eyes) - “Messages to leave Cambridge; teach mathematics” - Mostly negative and persecutory - Related to oneself and as away of making sense - “ voices ”: violent if ignored - resting-state activity abnormally high in auditory cortex - No external input necessary to be high • Internal-external input lopsided - External downplayed - Resting-state: high internal variability Additional symptoms: - racing, confused and chaotic thoughts - “thought disorder” - Overwhelming abundance • “Ego or identity disturbance”: alternative identity: the son of Albert Einstein - “Confusion about what is world and what is self; what is inside and what is outside” - A compensatory strategy to make sense of the world Estrangement of the self from the world • Kraeplin: “disunity of consciousness; destruction of the inner coherence of personality; orchestra without conductor” • Bleuler: “disorder of the personality by splitting, dissociation…where the I is never intact.”

• Jaspers: “intra-psychic ataxia [IMBALENCE OF THE PSYCHIC WORLD]” or paralysis; “fragmentation of consciousness”- of self • Parnas: pre-reflective self-awareness is missing; the inner and immediate sense of self is missing or delayed • Sass: ”disorder of self-affectivity”: the typical feeling of oneself is out of place “diminished self-affection”: the self is no longer affected by its own experiences, hence it stands apart from the world - Loss of intuitive sense of self - A phenomenological gulf between the world and the self - One’s own sense of self almost objective or mechanical in its experience and perception of the world - Self becomes alienated from the world Resting state • Healthy: ongoing activity changes or variability • Functional connectivity: overly synchronized in a CMS, PCC and precuneus - Higher f-hyperconnectivity= severe auditory delusions and hallucinations - Hence decreased variability in resting-state - Abnormal activity from anterior to posterior CMS- cortical mid-line structures and insula Cont’d • Temporal fluctuations: dominant low frequency cycles: integration of stimuli that don’t belong together: delusions • Structural integration : hyper (tight) functional connectivity : inflexible to external stimuli • Rest-stimulus interaction is abnormal : RS no longer updated and modulated by the environment: the world-brain interaction suffers and lose connection to the world - Hence: the brain changes its activity devoid of timely external stimuli • Northoff’s position: resting state and its spatio-temporal structure (p. 169) Schizophrenia and our existence • Deeply embedded: adopting to and matching our environments - Schizophrenia=breakdown of world-brain relation - Self + embodiment= world-brain relation= our existence • World-brain relation= our existential and philosophical boundaries - The rest is speculative and delusional - Just like Andrew’s world is delusional - Disturbance of self – think they are someone else [alter ego / disturbance], or have auditory hallucination

Identity and time The paradox • Everything in the body changes over time • Sleep=change in resting state • Morning regain your normal sense of self - How do you reconcile the two? • Resting- state variability: healthy, ongoing change - Lack of variability(amplitude) : vegetative state - Change in the brain=persistence of identity or self - Andrew(schizophrenia): discontinuity in brain=discontinuity in self or identity Diachronic and synchronic identity • What accounts for continuity over time? - body, memory, mind(entity )? = a mixed bag of problems • What accounts for psychological continuity over time? Diachronic identity - If memory accounts for episodes/events over time, does it constitute personal identity? • What accounts for personal identity at a time: synchronic identity - Dissociative identity disorder= more than one identity at a time Memories and identity • Locke: memory tracks identity over time; consciousness tracks subjectivity over time, yes? No? • Neuro-philosophy: which kind of memory? LTM, STM, episodic/autobiographical, procedural ? - Which brain parts? Prefrontal cortex, somatosensory, motor, hippocampus, CMS-middle of brain • Which best tracks personal identity? • Is memory a solid candidate for tracking personal identity? - Is it reliable enough? • Interestingly: Resting-state’s functional connectivity and its entropy correlates with the degree of stressful or traumatic experiences - Amygdala (emotions) and midline regions related to sense of self (p. 183) Body and mind • Other criteria than memory? Body? Brain? Mind? Schizophrenia? Am I my brain or not? • “I am my brain”(Nagel, 1974) - Damage to brain? - Damage to liver? • Midline structures: variability (activity levels) and functional connectivity with many brain other parts = continuity of change - Correlated with self-related information & continuous sense of self (over time) - Paradox? Discontinuity and variability mediates continuity of personal identity ? • Parfit : survival mediates identity - Psychological continuity based on survival - Or : psychological connectedness: memories - Parfit disagrees with Nagel’s brain claim too. - Is this sound? - What did we learn from schizophrenic patients and brain variability ? – low resting state activity – low variability of the RSA

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Time and self-continuity • Self continuity is a function of time : time determines the balance between continuity and discontinuity . - More time less self-continuity or self- identity over time - 100% continuity =brain death: death of self and personhood - 100% discontinuity =schizophrenia: complete disconnection from the world . Time, brain, self-continuity • Perigenual anterior cingulate cortex(PACC): mediating self-continuity and temporal discounting (TD): the longer the delay in reward($ for correct answer) the less interest in obtaining the reward, and less value placed on the stimulus. Negative correlation - PACC: self-relatedness - Personal identity=linking self to time - Brain(resting state) mediates self(psychologically) and time(world and brain based) - Resting-state= neural discontinuity - Schizophrenia= lack of normal discontinuity= disruption in psychological continuity Schizophrenia and more • Do changes in brain cause changes in self-continuity or identity over time? - DBS and injection of fetal cells in Parkinson’s - Schizophrenia - DBS in depression, close to PACC, it works Time and brain • CMS: involved in time perception and sense of time(past and future) -ventro-and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, PACC and PCC(p. 201) * Resting state: broad spectrum of frequency ranges(variability) - longer time scale in slow frequency: 0.001-0.1 Hz - shorter in faster: 1-180 Hz - Lloyd: midline regions as “dynamic temporal network” - Resting-state activity includes different time scales that relate to each other= cross frequency coupling - If not= temporal parallelism • ( hypothesis )Temporal parallelism=neuronal discontinuity in resting state=schizophrenia: psychological discontinuity or identity - schizophrenia: brain-based time is decoupled from world—based time= world-brain relation disrupted * Testimony: temporal gaps: lack of seamless transitions (p. 204, 205) - analogy : pearls on a chain - Pearls: mental content - Chain: spatio-temporal continuity of the resting-state - Lack of order and continuity in consciousness (we take for granted) Testimony • p. 205 and bottom

Coda • We are “beings in time” or our existence is temporal (Heidegger) • Our (healthy) brains(resting-state) mediate self-continuity and world-based time - The reverse spells pathology