PLSC Paper 1
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Political Science
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Feb 20, 2024
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In an era characterized by shifting global power dynamics, the specter of a hegemonic war
looms large on the international stage. The rivalry between the United States and China has emerged as a defining feature of the 21st century, capturing the attention of scholars, policymakers, and strategists worldwide. As these two superpowers navigate a complex web of economic interdependence, military competition, and ideological divergence, the potential for a hegemonic war
between them stands as a stark reminder of the enduring relevance of international power politics. Hegemonic war
, also known as Thucydides’ trap, occurs when a rising power poses too much of a threat to the declining power. Despite the established declining power still having the upper hand, it knows that the rising power will eventually surpass it. Fearing losing its position as the dominant power, the declining state attacks the rising state to obstruct it from overtaking it (Lecture, 9/13). With China’s economic boom over the past 40 years, scholars believe they could be entering into a Thucydides trap with the United States. Since 1979, China has seen its GDP grow by an average of 9% per year, much faster than that of the United States (Lecture, 9/25). Although their economy would have still excelled, China would not have seen close to the amount of growth that they did without the United States taking
an engagement approach to their international relations. China’s rapid economic growth is not the only concern the U.S. has about them. Expansive military modernization, an aggressive foreign policy especially with Taiwan, and nuclear weapons all give the United States genuine concerns (Lecture, 9/25). China’s authoritarian government often clashes with democratic states like the U.S. shown recently by the ongoing trade war. All of these factors make a war sound imminent, however, this is not the case. A hegemonic war
between the United States and China is avoidable as long as both sides engage in diplomacy, promote economic interdependence, and
build conflict prevention mechanisms so they can build off of one another rather than try to contain the opposition. Despite its immense human and material cost, countries persist in engaging in war as opposed to diplomatically resolving their disputes through negotiation. States go to war for a plethora of different reasons. Ultimately it can be boiled down to one state trying to obtain something of value that belongs to another state. “War [is] a problem of bargaining over objects or issues that are of value to more than one state” (FLS p. 97). Although conflicting interests are the reason why wars occur, it does not give any indication as to why wars come to fruition. To avoid war, countries must bargain to determine the division of whatever the dispute is over. Agreeing on a dispute between countries is extremely difficult as both countries often feel that they could have gotten more. “In many cases, states assume all-or-nothing bargaining positions” (FLS p. 101). While bargaining may seem like a waste of time for countries that are staunch in their beliefs of what is theirs, it is always the better and more economically viable option. The reason that bargaining will always trump war, is that it eliminates the costs of war. A war between the U.S. and China would have enormous costs to both sides. Since both states have large nuclear arsenals, the cost of war spans almost the entire width of the bargaining range
(Lecture, 9/25). Countries try to skate the fine line of trying to get the best deal they can in bargaining, while also trying to minimize war breaking out, this is called “risk-return trade-off” (FLS p. 111). When states test their luck either by underestimating the capabilities of the rival state or overestimating their own, they greatly increase the chances of war breaking out. Bargaining is a delicate balance of risk-return trade-off. States that take a no-war approach or “peace at any price,” find themselves giving up large amounts of demands with the benefit of never engaging in war (FLS p. 111). On the opposite end of the spectrum, having too much
stubbornness when it comes to bargaining can land states in unnecessary wars. When bargaining,
states not only look at what they are conceding in the short run but also the long run and how the opposing state will capitalize off of that. Although a deal might be more appealing than war for the U.S. now, conceding so much to the rising power of China may be extremely costly in the future. To prevent this, the United States could declare preventive war on China to try and limit its growth before it becomes too powerful and go back on its bargain (FLS p. 126). Preventive war is only successful if one state can significantly cripple the other's long-term economic growth. If this was not the outcome of the war, then a bargain would have been more advantageous (FLS p. 127). In 1982, Israel launched an airstrike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor.
This attack was aimed at disarming Iraq of any nuclear threat that they could pose on Israel [Chat-GPT-3. (9/12/2023). Israel’s attempt to immobilize Iraq’s nuclear development is an act of
preventative war. Instead of idling by waiting for Iraq to gain the weapons necessary to pose a serious threat, Israel chose to prevent that scenario through preventive war. The first-strike advantage is another example of when a country may be more inclined to engage in war rather than bargain. “A First-strike advantage exists when there is a considerable benefit to being the first to launch an attack” (FLS p. 127). When a state's military technology, strategy, and/or geography offer an advantage to offensive actions as opposed to defensive ones, the upper hand gives new incentives to war (FLS p. 127). The United States' increased presence and abundance of allies in the eastern Pacific give them a first-strike advantage if they were to declare war on China (Lecture, 9/25). Because of this, preemptive wars occur. Preemptive wars happen because one state expects an attack from another is impending (FLS p. 130). In June of 1967, Israel fought the Six-Day War with the Arab nations of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. This preemptive
war was a result of longstanding tensions and disputes over territorial boundaries, water
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resources, and political ideologies in the region (FLS p. 130). Lack of trust in the usage of military power caused both sides to be extremely anxious about the other's next move, finally causing the delicate peace bubble to burst and war to follow. A war between the United States and China could be avoided through bargaining and relations, however, both sides need to demonstrate better diplomacy before any peace can be found. China’s growing formidability towards the United States has led scholars to believe that engagement with them was a disastrous mistake in U.S. foreign policy. Realist scholar John Mearsheimer went as far as to write, “The United States' strategy of engagement with China ranks as one of its worst foreign policy disasters and that an alternative strategy, containment, would have prevented or at least delayed the emergence of China as a threat” (Ikenberry 172). While Mearsheimer is correct in that a containment approach would have slowed the rapid growth of China, he fails to realize that the United States’ approach to foreign policy towards China “was just one piece of a broader approach” aimed at reinforcing the pillars of the post-
Cold War liberal international order
led by the U.S. This comprehensive approach yielded significantly more advantages than drawbacks (Ikenberry 172). History exhibits how containment methods have resulted for the U.S. in the past. In the entirety of the Cold War, the United States used a containment method with the Soviet Union. While the United States eventually won due to the Soviet Union's economic collapse, the same scenario will not play out in China. China’s strong economy was accelerated by the United States' engagement, but its rise was not reliant on it (Lecture, 9/27). Regardless if the United States had taken a containment or engagement approach, China would have still risen to become an international superpower. This being the case, there is no reason why the U.S. should not benefit from China’s rise if it is inevitable. “Mutual interests trump conflicting interests” (Mearsheimer ARAM 183). A
proponent of containment, Mearsheimer disagrees with this statement. In his view, “Cold War II is already here” and “the U.S.-Chinese rivalry is more likely to lead to a shooting war than the U.S.-Soviet rivalry was” (Mearsheimer ARAM 183). Mearsheimer could not be any further from
the truth. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, China and the United States engage in abundant trade as
well as superior diplomacy. In 2022, the U.S. exported 151 and imported 505 billion dollars worth of goods to and from China (Class handout 9/27). Realists fail to understand that the more countries engage with one another through trade, the more peaceful and symbiotic their relations become. Realists who use the ‘engagement has failed’ argument believe “that engagement failed to turn China into a supporter of the U.S.-dominated liberal world order” (Johnston 100). Engaging with a nondemocratic state is not something to be looked down upon from the United States perspective. While the U.S. ultimately hoped that their engagement with China would end in their government becoming democratic, their failure to spread liberal international order
was still more beneficial than a containment approach. Approaching China with a containment method would have resulted in a more hostile government towards the U.S. along with a less democratic economy. The Trans-Pacific Partnership
or TPP
consisted of twelve developed and developing states, the U.S. being one of them, hoping to increase trade amongst themselves. China, not being a member, saw this as the U.S. trying to expand its presence in the Pacific. Ultimately, the United States pulled out of TPP
, but it was clear that their increased presence in the Pacific was an attempt to build stronger alliances with China’s neighbors rather than ally with China itself (Lecture, 9/25). Soon after the United States withdrew from TPP
, the U.S.-
China trade war began. The U.S.-China trade war, which started under the Trump administration,
was aimed at giving the U.S. fairer terms in future trade deals with China. So far, the trade war has slowed economic growth for both states and significantly strained their relations. Americans
thought the trade war would end under President Biden, but his policies have been for the most part unchanged from Trump’s (Johnston 100). The debate of engagement versus containment in the United States' foreign policy toward China is extremely complicated, to say the least. While containment offers a sense of security, it restricts growth and collaboration. In the case of the U.S. and China, engagement is the best choice between the two states. As the two sides work closer together, they will naturally be drawn closer, improving their relations and remaining peaceful with one another. The debate regarding whether the United States should take a containment or engagement
approach towards China appropriately fits with the realist versus liberal debate. Actors approach international relations wanting a plethora of different things from other states. From a realist perspective, states like the U.S. and China are primarily concerned about their strength and security. This goes hand in hand with containment because the United States is worried about China’s rapid expansion of power and influence. The United States’ goal should be to maintain or enhance its power so it can protect its and its ally's national interests (FLS p. 52). On the other
hand, liberals argue that cooperation is mutually beneficial to both states. The United States’ engagement approach to China has resulted in the promotion of trade and diplomacy (McDonald 12). Liberals argue that both sides can reach common goals when actors actively seek to build partnerships (FLS p. 53). Another way for states to cooperate is through institutions. Institutions are a great way for actors to bargain with one another to gain their desired outcome (FLS p. 77). The downside to institutions is that bargaining almost always leaves one state a winner and one a
loser. The reality of international relations is that actors cannot always get what they want. Realists realize that in the anarchic international system, states face competition and security dilemmas. Even if the U.S. wants to contain China’s power, it would still be extremely costly to
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both sides. China’s countermeasures, alliances with other states, and pursuit for power pose a serious threat to any containment actions taken by the U.S. Furthermore, the incomplete information
the U.S. has on China and vice versa is extremely dangerous when trying to size up the other power. States could have entirely different ideas on what the bargaining range
should be simply based on their uncertainty
about the opposing state. Liberals always propose cooperation, but they recognize that it is not always achievable. Conflicting interests, distrust, and domestic politics are a few reasons why liberals see cooperation between states failing (FLS p. 75). Liberals will always strive for engagement whenever it is possible. Realists and Liberals heavily disagree on whether or not rules in international politics matter (Mearsheimer BTF 24). Realists are always skeptical as to the effectiveness of international organizations and institutions. In these large organizations, realists believe that the biggest power can act unitarily when need be, and all the organization does is demonstrate power relations. Realists would argue
that containment is not determined by the rules and regulations of politics, but rather by whichever state has the most power (FLS p. 80). On the complete opposite side of the spectrum, liberals are very keen on the idea of international rules and institutions. Engagement would not be possible without international agreement and rule-following (FLS p. 81). Engagement between states creates stability and connectivity that drastically dwindles the prospect of war (FLS p. 80). While the U.S. and China are in very few institutions with one another, which would be a realist approach to international relations, they have heavily engaged with one another for trade. This combination of realist and liberal ideas has led both countries' relations to sour over the years and it is understandable why. The U.S. should take an entirely liberal approach to China and foster more institutions with them to better their relations not only through economic engagement but strong diplomacy.
The United States and China can avoid a hegemonic war
through diplomacy, economic interdependence, and conflict prevention mechanisms. Cold War II does not have to be a reality so long as the United States and China take a more liberal approach to their relations. Increased diplomacy will give both states a better understanding of the wants and needs of the other so that they can better resolve their issues. Economic engagement has been the strength of the two countries' relationship over the past 40 years but the trade war put that all into question. Removing tariffs imposed by the trade war will help both economies and bring the states closer together through interdependence. The good news is that the U.S. and China do not have to be best friends for collaboration to play out. China’s authoritarian government should not be feared or seen as a failure to spread democracy by Americans. So long as China and the U.S. continue to engage with one another, a war between the two is unlikely.