Exam 3 Questions Intro Phil 1

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University of California, San Diego *

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Philosophy

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Jan 9, 2024

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1. a) State Descartes’ view about the nature of mind and body (what are they and how they are different or similar?) - Descartes' view about the nature of mind and body is that the mind and body are distinct and separate entities. - He argues that the mind is a non-extended thinking substance, while differently the body is an extended non-thinking substance, leading to the concept of mind-body dualism. (b) Explain his argument for mind-body dualism - Descartes' argument for mind-body dualism is based on the certainty of his own existence as a thinking thing (cogito, ergo sum). - He concludes that the mind and body have distinct natures, as the mind is indivisible, thinking, and lacks extension, while the body is divisible, extended, and lacks consciousness. - Since he can clearly and distinctly perceive the mind and body as separate entities, he posits that they are distinct substances. - This establishes mind-body dualism, where the mind (or soul) is an immaterial, thinking substance, and the body is a physical, extended substance, existing independently of each other. (c) What is Elisabeth of Bohemia’s objection to Descartes’ dualism? - Elisabeth of Bohemia had a concern about Descartes' idea of the mind and body being separate. - She couldn't understand how an immaterial mind (soul) could actually control a physical body to make it move or take actions. - In the physical world, we see movement and actions happen through direct physical contact or forces, which doesn't seem possible with an immaterial mind. - She wanted a clearer explanation of how the mind and body interacted to solve this puzzle in Descartes' theory. (d) Is there a convincing response on behalf of Descartes available? Why/why not? - Descartes' response to Elisabeth's objection is not entirely convincing. - While he proposed that the mind and body interact through the pineal gland, his explanation remained somewhat speculative and lacked empirical evidence. - The problem of how an immaterial mind can causally influence a material body remains a challenging issue in his dualistic framework, and no definitive resolution was provided by Descartes. 4. a) Why does Smart believe that dualism has to be rejected? - J.C. Smart believes that dualism has to be rejected because it fails to provide a coherent and satisfactory explanation of the mind-body relationship. - Smart argues that dualism cannot account for the interactions between mental states and brain processes.
- Smart advocates for a materialist and more scientific approach, where mental states are identified with brain processes, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of consciousness and its connection to the physical world. (b) What is smart’s view of the nature of sensations? - J.C. Smart's view of the nature of sensations is that they are not separate, non-physical entities but rather identical to specific brain processes. - He subscribes to the identity theory of mind, which posits that mental states, such as sensations, are identical to certain neural processes occurring in the brain. - According to Smart, there is a one-to-one correspondence between mental states and brain states, eliminating the need for dualism or any non-physical aspects to explain sensations. (c) Does Smart’s view entail that if one knows about a sensation then one in fact knows about a brain process? Explain. - Yes, according to Smart's view, if one knows about a sensation, then one does, in fact, know about a brain process. - This is because Smart's identity theory asserts that sensations are identical to specific brain processes. - Therefore, any knowledge or understanding of a sensation must ultimately pertain to the corresponding brain process, as there is a direct one-to-one relationship between the two. (d) Consider this objection to Smart’s view: if a is b (i.e., ‘a’ and ‘b’ are two names for the same thing), then every property that a has, b must have that property too and vice versa. But brain processes and sensations have different properties. Therefore, sensations could not be brain processes. Is this a successful objection? Explain. - This objection to Smart's view is not successful because it misunderstands the nature of identity theory and its claim that sensations are identical to brain processes. - In the identity theory, when it is stated that sensations are identical to brain processes, it means that they are the same thing, not just two different names for the same thing. - The objection mistakenly assumes that if two things are identical, they must have precisely the same properties, which is not the case in identity theory. 1a: - Descartes view - Descartes argues 1b: - Descartes’s argument bases on existence - He concluded (distinct natures) - Since he can perceive - This establishes dualism immaterial 1c: - Elizabeth's Concern - She couldn't understand
- In the physical world - She wanted a clearer exclamation 1d: - Descartes’s response (not very convincing) - While he proposed - The problem 4a) Why does Smart believe that dualism has to be rejected? - Smart believes that dualism has to be rejected because it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the relationship between mind and body - Smart argues that dualism cannot account for the interaction between mental state and brian processes. - Smart advocates for a materialist and scientific approach, where mental states are identified with brain processes 4b) What is smart’s view of the nature of sensations? - Smart believes that the nature of sensations are not separate but identical to brain processes. - Smart view on sensations is known as the identity theory of mind, which portrays the state of mind like sensations are identical to certain processes occurring in the brain. - According to Smart, subjective experiences are the exact same as the neurons firing in your brain that tell your body how to react to these things in specific ways 4 (c) Does Smart’s view entail that if one knows about a sensation then one in fact knows about a brain process? Explain. - Yes, according to Smart's view, if one knows about a sensation, then one does, in fact, know about a brain process. - This is because Smart's identity theory asserts that sensations are identical to specific brain processes. - Therefore, any knowledge or understanding of a sensation must ultimately pertain to the corresponding brain process, as there is a direct one-to-one relationship between the two.
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