PHIL 1104 Final exam study guide Fall 19

docx

School

University Of Connecticut *

*We aren’t endorsed by this school

Course

1104

Subject

Philosophy

Date

Dec 6, 2023

Type

docx

Pages

10

Uploaded by LieutenantEnergy12590

Report
For the final, you are responsible for 5 main topics: 1. Social contract theory (Hobbes and Locke) 2. Distributive justice (Nozick, Rawls) 3. Taxes (Anderson) 4. The care perspective, and the need for more than justice (Baier) 5. Reparations (Corlett) 6. Climate change and climate justice (Gardiner, Broome, Singer, Posner & Sunstein) You are also responsible for the following readings: • Hobbes “Leviathan” • Locke “Second Treatise on Government” (especially the section on property, discussed also by Nozick and Singer) • Rawls “A Theory of Justice” • Nozick “The entitlement theory” • Anderson “How not to complain about taxes” • Corlett “Reparations to Native Americans?” • Baier “The need for more than justice” • Gardiner “A perfect moral storm” • Broome “Justice and fairness” (to p. 64, the rest optional) • Posner & Sunstein “Climate change justice” • Singer “One atmosphere” (p. 187 to end; the rest optional) 1. Social contract theory (Hobbes and Locke) (a) What is political authority? How does it differ from political power? Political authority is the right to make/enforce law Political power is the ability to make and enforce law (b) What is Hobbes’ strategy for justifying the existence of the State (i.e., of political authority)? Hobbes’ strategy is to ask what life would be like without the existence and authority of the State in the ‘state of nature’ (c) What is the so-called “state of nature” in social contract theory? What role does it play in Hobbes’s account of political authority? What would the state of nature be like, according to Hobbes, and why? The state of nature depends on: equality of human need, relative scarcity of goods, equality of human power, and psychological egoism. According to Hobbes, the state of nature is one where cooperation is impossible. Additionally, it is governed by the laws of nature, and thus by general self-preservation/self-interest. (d) What limits does Hobbes place on political authority? In other words, how much authority should the State have, on his view? Hobbes states that we should give up our natural freedom in exchange for security, agree to rules that make cooperation possible, give someone the power/authority to enforce those rules, all on the condition that others do the same. (e) Explain the scenario known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and illustrate with an example. What options must the parties choose between? How do the outcomes depend on their choices? Is it ever rational for self-interested individuals in a PD to cooperate with each other? Two criminals are arrested, but the prosecutor doesn’t have enough evidence to secure
both of their convictions. The prosecutor has enough to nail them on a lesser charge, so they make each prisoner the same offer: -if you agree to confess and testify against your friend, you get parole and friend gets life -if you keep quiet and friend testifies against you, he gets parole and you get life -if you both confess, prosecutor nails you both and you both get 20 years No matter what the other player does, each is better off defecting, but if both defect, both wind up worse off than if both had cooperated (f) Locke, too, appeals to the idea of a ‘state of nature’, but his description is different from Hobbes’. What would the state of nature be like, according to Locke? According to Locke, people in the state of nature are in a state of perfect freedom to act as they want and dispose of their possessions/people as they see fit, within the bounds of the law of nature without depending upon the will of any other person. (g) What is the ‘law of nature’, according to Locke? What rights does it give people by nature? Law of nature: since everyone is equal and independent, nobody should harm another in life, health, liberty, or possessions. All people are restrained from invading others rights. The execution of the law of nature is put into man’s hand, whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. People in a state of nature have certain rights (natural rights) 1. To life and to basic necessities of life 2. To one’s own body, and the labor thereof 3. To enforce the law and punish violators 4. To seek reparations for wrongs done to one (h) What are rights? What does it mean to characterize them as entitlements? Having a right vs being right There are two notions of having a right -weak: S has a right to X just in case it is not wrong for S to X -strong: S has a right to X just in case it is not wrong for S to X and it would be wrong for others to prevent S from Xing (i) How does Locke justify the State (or ‘commonwealth’, in his terms)? What limits does he place on state authority? (j) Explain Locke’s theory of property acquisition. (See also Nozick, p. 345 of Shafer-Landau.) How is it that property is a natural right? How do/can a person gain a property right in some part of nature? According to Locke, property is a natural right. Every man has a property right in his own person, i.e. the labor of his body and the work of his hands are his. Thus, whatever he mixes his labor with is his property. Acquisition principle : if S owns X, and Y is unowned or owned in common, and S mixes X with Y, then S gains ownership of Y Self-ownership argument : initially, the earth is owned by all in common. But everyone owns her own body and labor (by the self-ownership thesis). Then acquisition principle. Thus, people gain property rights in the state of nature via their labor. (k) What limit is there on our ability to take property, according to Locke? (What is the“Lockean proviso”?) There are two limits on property-taking (Lockean proviso ): -only take as much as one can use before it spoils -must be as much and as good left in common for others
(l) How does Nozick propose to understand the Lockean Proviso? Nozick states that although every appropriation of property is a diminution of another’s rights to it, it is acceptable as long as it does not make anyone worse off than they would have been without any private property. 2. Distributive justice (Rawls and Nozick) (a) What is the main question that distributive justice deals with? Is it focused on pattern or process (or both)? How should the benefits and burdens of society be shared or distributed? 1. Which goods matter? 2. By what processes should goods be distributed? 3. What pattern should the distribution take (b) What is the (strict) egalitarian view of distributive justice? What is the utilitarian view? What is the libertarian view? What is the liberal egalitarian view? (You should be able to characterize the main idea in one sentence each.) Strict egalitarian : Goods should be distributed equally, but this requires limitations on individual liberty to maintain equality and is often criticized for inefficiency. Utilitarian : Benefits/burdens should be distributed so as to maximize welfare, and if an unequal distribution will create more total welfare, then U will reject SE (however, U is egalitarian in that everyone’s interests count equally) Libertarian: benefits/burdens should be distributed via free trade of property rights to maximize individual liberty, so there should be no constraints on the pattern of distribution, only on the process, and in principle, any distribution, no matter how unequal, could be perfectly just. Egalitarian liberalism : benefits and burdens should be distributed in such a way as to benefit everyone, including the least well off (c) What does Rawls view as the “object” of the “original agreement” (that is, what is the agreement about)? The object is the principles of justice. They are principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. (d) What does Rawls mean by the “basic structure of society”? Those abiding institutions (legal, political, economic, social) which: -frame all our interactions in society -determine the distribution of primary goods, which are rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth (e) Describe the position Rawls calls “justice as fairness”. In what respect(s) is it a social contract theory of justice? In “justice as fairness” the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract (f) Describe the situation Rawls calls “the original position”. What is the purpose of the so-called “veil of ignorance”? In the “original position”, no one knows one’s place in society. Behind the “veil of ignorance”, no one knows their race/gender/class/social status, natural assets and abilities, occupation, religion, conception of the good life (bc this would affect lawmaking) (g) What two principles of justice would people in the original position adopt, according to Rawls, and why would they choose those two principles in particular? 1. The liberty principle : each person is to have a basic right to the most extensive set
Your preview ends here
Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version
  • Access to all documents
  • Unlimited textbook solutions
  • 24/7 expert homework help
of liberties compatible with the same liberties for others 2. The difference principle : socioeconomic inequalities (if any) are to be: a. To everyone’s advantage b. Attached to offices and positions open to all Rawls’ main argument for the two principles is that principles of justice are correct if they would be agreed to in the OP, and people in the OP would agree to the two principles over all others, so they are correct. (h) Why does Rawls think that agents in the Original Position would prefer his two principles to strict egalitarian principles? To utilitarian principles? To libertarian principles? Rawls says that utilitarianism is risky, and agents in the original position would not agree to be satisfied for the greater good. Libertarianism is even riskier because it allows some to amass huge fortunes and leaves others in abject poverty. Who gets rich depends largely on luck. Also no to strict egalitarianism because some inequalities can make the “have nots” better off, and since one might be a “have not”, agents in OP want them to be as well off as possible. (i) What is maximin? What role does it play in Rawls’ arguments? Maximin is the idea that we should maximize the minimum outcome: ie we should choose so we get the alternative with the best worst outcome, and it’s highly risk averse. In the original position, it makes sense to be risk-averse, so agents in the original position would use the maximin rule. Rawls’ 2 principles ensure that the worst off are as well off as possible. Therefore, agents in OP would choose Rawls’ two principles. (j) What is proceduralism? How does Rawls’ view exemplify proceduralism? Proceduralism is the idea that correct moral principles are those determined by the right procedure or process. Rawls is a pure proceduralist and says that the idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. (k) What is Nozick’s Entitlement Theory? How are entitlements determined, according to Nozick? Nozick’s Entitlement Theory : a distribution is just if and only if everyone is entitled (i.e. has a right to) their “holdings”. Perxon A has an entitlement to item X if and only if A acquired X via an approved process -original acquisition: X was unowned and A took it out of the state of nature (ex by laboring) -voluntary transfer: someone else B had an entitlement to X and voluntarily transferred that right to A -rectification of injustice: A is owed X due to some past injustice (l) Explain Nozick’s distinctions (i) between end-state principles and historical principles of justice, and (ii) between patterned and unpatterned principles. What type of principle is the Entitlement Theory? What type of principle is Rawls’ Difference Principle? Historical principle : claims that whether or not distribution is just depends on how it came about (entitlement theory) End-state principle : claims that whether or not a distribution is just (at t) depends only on the structure of the distribution (at t) Ex: egalitarianism, utilitarianism, the difference principle Patterned principle : a distribution, to be just, must conform to some natural pattern (need, merit, effort, IQ, etc) Unpatterned principle : otherwise (entitlement theory)
(m) How does Nozick argue that end-state and patterned principles require “continuous interference in people's lives”? Is that a problem? According to Nozick, if you acquired your goods in a way that violated no rights, then you justly possess them. This implies that you cannot look at a distribution of resources and tell, just by its shape, whether it is just or not. Thus, patterned/end-state principles are mistaken because we will have to violate people’s rights in order to enforce them. So long as people acquired their holdings in a just way, it would be wrong to take their resources in order to redistribute them and ensure that the relevant pattern is preserved. (n) What is the difference between entitlement and desert? If a person is entitled to some piece of property, does it follow that she deserves it? If she deserves it, is she necessarily entitled? Desert is the condition of being deserving of something, whether good or bad. To say someone deserves X is to say that X is in some sense an appropriate or fair award in light of that person’s morally virtuous qualities or conduct. To say that someone is entitled to X is just tos ay that the person has a jus claim to X, without any implied commitment to some deeper claim about their moral merit. Basically, if soeone makes a heroic effort to stop a purse snatcher might deserve a reward without being entitled to any particular amount. (o) What is the “monopoly problem” for the Entitlement Theory? (p) What is the “stolen land” problem for the Entitlement Theory? What are the implications for the Entitlement Theory if the current distribution of wealth resulted from unjust practices? Suppose that A inherits property (approved process) from B, who stole it (unapproved process) from C. Then, according to the Entitlement Theory, A is not entitled to that land, and someone else (C or C’s heirs) may be entitled to it (rectification of past injustice) 3. Taxes (Anderson) (a) What two arguments (“complaints”) about taxes does Anderson consider? Can you formulate them as arguments against redistributive taxation? Anderson addresses the following two complaints: 1. Taxation takes what is rightfully mine (i.e. violates entitlements) 2. Taxation takes income which I deserve (b) If I have a property right in something (i.e., if it’s my property), does that mean that other people do not have rightful claims to some portion of it? Why or why not? One is not entitled to all of one’s property--it can have conditions. So, other people can have claims to your property. (c) What is the so-called “minimal state”? What types of things does it do? In what respect is it minimal? Why do libertarians favor such a state? The minimal state protects people’s rights, enforces contracts, keeps the peace, and leaves allocations of goods/services to the free market. The minimal state does not protect adults from themselves, legislate morals, redistribute income/wealth to help the less fortunate, or interfere with the operation of markets. (d) How, according to Anderson, did Locke go beyond the “minimal state”? According to Locke, the first natural law is the preservation of society and of every person in it. (e) Why is it, according to Anderson, that markets “cannot, and should not, track claims of individual moral desert.” (381). What is their function? The basic function of free market prices is to be informational because they send signals to
producers as to where their products are most in demand, and to consumers as to the opportunity costs of their options. Free market prices are forward-looking, so individuals cannot count on their virtue being rewarded because capitalism is inherently dynamic. If we try to regulate factor prices so that they do track public moral desert, you would be fixing prices on a backward-looking standard, which would mean that producers would produce what was demanded last quarter, which creates enormous waste and generates huge opportunity costs. Additionally, any attempt to regulate people’s rewards according to judgments of how much they morally deserve would destroy liberty. 4. Care and justice (Baier) (a) What is the care perspective? How does it relate to the justice perspective, according to Baier? Care is a felt concern for the good of others and for community with them. Baier argues that philosophers (men) have fetishized the “cold, jealous” virtue of justice and have ignored warmer/communitarian virtues. According to her, ethics needs both perspectives. (b) Why, according to Baier, is the justice perspective on its own inadequate as a moral theory? What is missing from it? Traditional moral theory contains significant male bias, and as a result, it has trouble capturing many aspects of morality including parental duties and friendship. The four shortcomings of the justice perspective are: excessive individualism (seeing people as atoms w no essential connections to each other and don’t have nonreciprocal responsibilities to other), overemphasis on relationships between equals (ignores often more important relationships between unequals, like parent-child), exaggerates scope of choice (fits freely-chosen relationships, but most morally important relationships are not freely-chosen), and excessive rationalism/intellectualism (based on picture of the rational will in control of unruly emotions, but ignores the importance of emotions like love, and virtues like caring, which are essential to parenting, public service, patriotism, etc) (c) What is Kohlberg’s theory of moral development? What is wrong with it, according to Gilligan and/or Baier? Kohlberg theorized that people go through up to 6 stages of moral development: preconventional, conventional, and post-conventional. Preconventional: punishment/obedience, individual instrumental purpose. Conventional: interpersonal relations/conformity, social system and conscience maintenance. Postconventional: prior rights and social contract/universal ethical principles. Gilligan argued that Kohlberg’s theory was androcentric because it assumes that the typically male style of moral thinking is more advanced. (d) What are some of the differences between the “orthodox” Kantian liberals and their care-perspective critics regarding the importance of (i) individualism, (ii) relationships between equals, (iii) freedom of choice and (iv) the emotions? 5. Reparations (Corlett) (a) What are reparations? How does Corlett define the term? Should they be thought of as a form of punishment? Why or why not? Reparations are compensatory payments for past injustice, to repair the relationship and/or to rectify the situation. No, they should not be thought of as a form of punishment. Reparative punishment should be reserved for those who are guilty of not paying substantial compensatory reparations. Additionally, reparative compensation should always conform to the principle of proportional compensation/punishment: compensation and/or
Your preview ends here
Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version
  • Access to all documents
  • Unlimited textbook solutions
  • 24/7 expert homework help
punishment for significant wrongdoing is always to be meted out in proportion to the wrongdoings committed. Actually jk reparations are punishments (they share features with Feinberg’s punishments). Reprations disavow the wrongs committed and charges that wrongdoers had no right to perform such evils. Reparations say publicly that wrongdoings do not represent society’s highest aims and aspirations. Reparations speak in the name of the people against the wrongdoings in question, and they uphold standards of law in the face of past failures of the legal system to carry out true justice. Reparations alienate a reasonably just society from its corrupt past, absolving society of its historic evils. (b) Explain the argument which Corlett calls the reparations argument. 1. If one party has imposed grievous harms or rights violations on another, the wrongdoer ought to provide reparations to the victim 2. The US govt has imposed grievous harms on Native Americans and African Americans 3. The US govt owes them reparations (c) What is the objection from historical complexity? History contains too many and complex situations of conflict such that it would be impossible to figure out all of the injustices that would require reparations. In cases where the perpetrators are dead, it would be idealistic to believe that respecting rights requires/permits the casework that would be required to rectify all past wrongs. To award reparations to the wronged party/descendants would end up forcing innocent parties to pay for what they themselves did not do. Assumes that past injustices should not forever burden future putatively innocent generations. Challenged premise 1 of reparations argument. (d) What is the principle of morally just acquisitions and transfers? What role does it play in Corlett’s argument? “Whatever is acquired or transferred by morally just means is itself morally just; whatever is acquired or transferred by morally unjust means is itself morally unjust”. Native American lands were forcibly taken from them by the US military. Thus, reparations are morally required even if the US wasn’t well off and the Native Americans were. Reparative justice does not depend on the ability of perpetrators of wrongdoing to enrich their lives by inflicting wrongdoing on others--it is concerned primarily with rectifying past injustices regardless of whether or not perpetrators have been enriched at all by their wrong-doings. (e) What is the objection to collective responsibility? To what two weaknesses does it fall prey, according to Corlett? It challenges the morality of reparations to Native Americans on the grounds that it is problematic to hold the current US govt and its citizenry morally accountable for wrongs committed by previous generations of people who acted or failed to act to harm Native Americans and on behalf of the US. First weakness: the fundamental documents which form the basis of the US govt are still those that govern the US, so even though they aren;t the direct responsibility of today’s citizens, the US govt still exists. Second weakness: PJMAT renders irrelevant the issue of whether or not the current govt and citizens can be legitimately held accountable for past injustices, (f) What possible reparations policies does Corlett consider? Which one does he favor, and why does he favor it? Complete restitution of lands + compensation for personal injuries/loss of personal property Complete restitution of lands (but doesn’t compensate for harms caused to them)
Complete compensation for harm to persons and properties Buffalo Commons” proposal: partial but significant restoration of lands to Native Americans that have never played an important role in the economic viability of the United States Substantial reparations tax: 25ish% tax on income to be paid to Native American nations Minimal reparations tax: 1% tax -criticisms of these proposals convey that the US citizenry does not desire to compensate Native Americans for the wrongs that the US govt has committed 6. Climate change (Gardiner, Singer, Broome, Posner & Sunstein) (a) What is the greenhouse effect? How does it relate to global warming? To climate change? The greenhouse effect is a physical process that causes the planet to warm, which causes the climate to change (b) What is meant by mitigation of climate change? By adaptation? Mitigation is limiting the extent/rate/severity of future climate change Adaptation is reducing vulnerability to associated harms (c) What does Gardiner mean by calling climate change a “perfect storm”? The features of the climate change problem pose substantial obstacles to our ability to make the choices necessary to address it. Even if the difficult ethical questions could be answered, we might find it difficult to act to reduce GHG emissions. The storm makes us extremely vulnerable to moral corruption. (d) Why, according to Gardiner, does this “perfect storm” make it difficult for us to act (i.e., to address climate change)? (e) Explain the problem which Gardiner calls “the global storm”. How does it similar to the notion of a prisoner’s dilemma (or a “tragedy of the commons”)? How does it differ? Global storm: emphasizes global, spatially dispersed nature of the problem. Impact from emissions is dispersed, not local. Causes of emissions are dispersed, not local. No responsible agent, instead many agents making small causal contributions. No institution capable of imposing costs on emitters. Tragedy of the commons: -pasture is an unowned or unregulated commons on which everyone grazes their sheep -sheep are individually owned by individual farmers -pasture has a carrying capacity, and when that is exceeded, it becomes less productive -cost of exceeding carrying capacity falls on everyone -assuming the farmers are rational and self-interested, they will add more and more sheep to the commons, quickly bringing it to ruin Global problem as prisoner’s dilemma: PD1: collectively rational to cooperate and restrict overall emissions, each agent prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting their individual emissions over the outcome produced by no one doing so PD2: individually rational not to restrict one’s own emissions--when each agent has the power to decide whether or not she will limit her own emissions, each rationally prefers not to do so, whatever the others do (f) What features of the global storm make it difficult to reach an international agreement to limit greenhouse gas emissions? The cost of reducing emissions would fall mainly on big emitters (affluent countries). The
benefits of reducing emissions would accrue mainly to poor countries. Poor countries have little leverage against rich in treaty negotiations, so rich countries would have little incentive to sign on to an agreement. (g) Explain the problem which Gardiner calls “the intergenerational storm”. How does it compare to the traditional prisoner’s dilemma? Why does Gardiner think that it’s more difficult to resolve than the traditional prisoner’s dilemma? The causes and effects of climate change are “temporal dispersed:, as anthropogenic GHGs have built up over 2 centuries, climate change will continue for centuries, and the victims of climate change haven’t been born yet. PIP1: it is collectively rational for most generations to cooperate: almost every generation prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting pollution over the outcome produced by everyone overpolluting. PIP2: it is individually rational for all generations not to cooperate: when each generation has the power to decide whether or not it will overpollute, each generation rationally prefers to overpollute, whatever the others do. PIP is worse than the tragedy of the commons because not everyone prefers to cooperate, and traditioanl solutions are unavailable (h) Why, according to Gardiner, are we susceptible to corruption in our thinking about climate change? Given the difficulties of confronting climate change, we are apt to deceive ourselves into thinking there is no problem (distraction, complacency, unreasonable doubt, self-deception, cherry-picking date, conspiracy theories, etc) (i) What, according to Broome, is the difference between duties of justice and duties of beneficence (or goodness)? (j) How does Broome argue that our greenhouse gas emissions are ordinarily unjust? Who, if anyone, do they harm? (k) What is the non-identity problem? On what assumptions does it rest? Non-identity argument: an act A harms someone S only if A makes S worse off than S otherwise would have been. If S would never have existed at all if not for A, then S does not make A worse off. In terms of climate justice: our choices re mitigation and adaptation will affect who exists in the future. If we do not mitigate climate change, those harmed by ensuing climate catastrophes will be no worse off than if we had pursued mitigation. So if we do not harm them, there is no injustice. (l) Why, according to Broome, is our failure to regulate GHG emissions not unjust to future people? Bc of the climate non-identity problem, GHG emissions are not unjust to future people. Mitigation is a duty of beneficence, not of justice. Duties of justice are owed to particular people, who then have a right against others. Duties of beneficence are not owed to particular people and are impersonal. According to beneficence, we treat people as ends by helping them advance their own goods. (m) What, according to Singer, is the relevance of Locke’s theory of property to the distribution of the atmospheric carbon “sink”? What objection(s) does the Lockean approach face? A distribution is just iff it respects individuals’ entitlements. Thanks to industrialization, the affluent have acquired an entitlement to large shares of the atmospheric sink. Therefore, the affluent are entitled to keep dumping CO2 into the atmosphere at the same rate. However, according to the Lockean proviso, one can acquire X by mixing one’s labor into it,
Your preview ends here
Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version
  • Access to all documents
  • Unlimited textbook solutions
  • 24/7 expert homework help
provided there is enough and as good left in common for others. Three problems: mixing one’s labor with X generally requires improving X, the affluent have only mixed their labor with a big part of the atmospheric sink, not all of it, so the proviso isn’t satisfied. (n) What is the Polluter Pays Principle, and how does it apply to the distribution of the atmospheric carbon sink? What objections are there to the PPP argument? According to the PPP, those who produce pollution should bear the costs of managing it to prevent damage to others. The affluent have produced most of the GHG pollution, so they should bear the cost of climate change by reducing their emissions and paying for damages. Objections: most of the polluters are already dead, and the polluters did not know until 40 years ago that CO2 was a hazard. (o) What is Singer’s “equal shares” principle? What difficulty(s) does it encounter? How does he defend it? Egalitarian argument: If no one has a better claim to X than anyone else, X should be shared equally. No one has a better claim to the atmospheric sink than anyone else. Therefore, equal per capita emissions rights. Objections: makes no allowance for population growth, exhausts the CO2 budget in 17 years, and the affluent would have to drastically cut emissions right away, which would wreak economic havok. Solution to #3: emissions and technology trading, ie Americans can buy unused emissions and provide clean tech. A nice side-effect: would redistribute wealth from rich countries to poor. (p) What is the argument from distributive justice (from Posner & Sunstein) for the conclusion that wealthy nations have a duty to reduce their carbon emissions? (q) What three questions do Posner & Sunstein raise for the argument from distributive justice? (r) What is the argument from corrective justice for the conclusion that wealthy nations have a duty to reduce their carbon emissions? (s) What problems do Posner & Sunstein raise for the argument from corrective justice?