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Research Paper
Was Truman presented with realistic non-nuclear alternatives to nuclear war with Japan and what
were the factors that ultimately could have influenced his decision?
HIST501
Kimberly Perez
3/28/2023
1
Numerous and complex factors, biases, and individuals are involved in researching the
events that led to the decision to drop the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It
would be inaccurate to say that Harry S. Truman made a straightforward decision, because he did
not arrive at this conclusion without difficulty. However, since this decision has already been
made, it is essential to deconstruct and verify that it was based on accurate premises and not
erroneous data, and that all pertinent factors were considered. Ultimately, this was the
irreversible decision that would result in a massive loss of Japanese lives and that it was arguably
the “biggest decision”
1
in human history. Since the historiography of the decision has changed
over the past 78 years, many now criticize the decision. Critics disparage the estimated number
of casualties, but they ignore the numerous other factors that led to this decision. After all,
Truman "had a duty to the men under his command that those sitting in moral judgment decades
later did not share."
2
In this study, I will evaluate whether Truman was offered with viable non-
nuclear alternatives, as well as the political and ethical issues that may have impacted his
ultimate decision.
Russia and United States Relationship
While the atomic bomb wasn’t dropped until 1945 the issue of a nuclear weapon came
across the desk of then President Roosevelt in 1939. In a letter from Albert Einstein which came
to be known as the Einstein-Szilard letter, Einstein explains to Roosevelt that it would be in the
best interests of the United States to develop a nuclear weapon since he believed that the Nazis
were already working on one. This “call for watchfulness”
3
ignited the race for an atomic
weapon and propelled the US into a nuclear arms race.
This also ignited the political pressure
that Truman experienced when dealing with Russia and Stalin. In Harry S Truman’s memoirs, the
President recalls the moment he shared the information with Stalin that the US had just
developed and successfully tested a “"new weapon of unusual destructive force."
Stalin showed
1 Maddox, Robert. “The Biggest Decision: Why We Had To Drop The Atomic Bomb” May, Vol. 46.
American
Heritage
(1995)
2
Einstein, Albert,
Einstein Szilard letter
. Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Selected
Documents on the Topic of the Atomic Bomb, 1935-1976.
3
Ibid
2
little interest”,
4
In that moment it was clear that the Soviets were frantically racing to develop
one of their own.
This unspoken nuclear arms race was a large influence on the development
and use of the atomic weapon by the United States. In addition, our allies influenced the nuclear
arms push as well. Churchill, a proponent of using the nuclear bomb on Japan “thought that this
“supernatural weapon” might be able to end the war in “one or two violent shocks.””
5
On July
16, 1945, the world’s first successful nuclear explosion took place
6
. With the completion of a
successful test in Los Alamos, New Mexico it was clear that the path towards using the weapon
against the Japanese was becoming much clearer. There was little trust between Russia and the
United States at that time. Truman shared very little information and trust with Stalin further
showing the fragility of their relationship. Truman was well aware of the broken promises Stalin
made at the Yalta conference just a few months prior
7
.It was a case of being united against Nazi
Germany but in the end, Russia was looking to regain world power
8
. In reverse Russia also
shared very little with the United States.
With Russian power now about to enter the war against
Japan Truman couldn’t have power hungry Russia be the hero of WW2. If Russia was successful
in ending the war with Japan, they could potentially become territorial with China and demand
certain lands be returned to them.
“
I was extremely anxious, I told him, to avoid setting up
tinderboxes either in the Far East or in Europe which might cause future trouble and wars . . .”
9
In addition the US military intelligence was successful in decrypting messages between enemies
and allies and in July 1945 it was clear that Japan was trying to broker a peace deal with Russia.
By essentially eliminating the US as the leader in a peace deal Japan was attempting to
circumvent the demands of complete capitulation and that included removal of Emperor
4 Truman, Harry S
., 1884-1972 Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Year of decisions
(vol. 1) New York :
Doubleday 1955.
5
Wallace, Chris.
Countdown 1945 : The Extraordinary Story of the Atomic Bomb and the 116 Days That
Changed the World,
Simon & Schuster, 2020.
6 National Park Service.
Manhattan Project Science at Los Alamos National Park
.
https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/manhattan-project-science-at-los-alamos.htm
7
National Archives, Cold War on File.
Yalta Conference
. February 1945.
8
Rosenberg, David Alan. “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision.”
The Journal of
American History
66, no. 1 (1979): 62–87.
9
Geselbracht, Raymond H.,
The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: A Reader's Edition
, edited by University of
Missouri Press, 2020.
3
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Hirohito.
It was a back door move that the US couldn’t let happen. Like it or not Truman and
Churchill believed a show of the U.S. nuclear might could solve this issue.
A Non-Military Demonstration Option
On June 12
th
, 1945, the Members of the Metallurgical Society of the University of
Chicago an arm of the Manhattan Project that studied the chemical elements of the atomic bomb
wrote a letter to the US Secretary of War.
The letter was an attempt to recommend that the
power of the nuclear weapon be demonstrated over an unpopulated area in other words “to make
a technical but not military demonstration”
10
. These concerns were presented to the Scientific
Panel that advised Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s Interim Committee, which was the
deciding board on US nuclear policy. The members on this board were Manhattan Project
Scientists including Robert Oppenheimer.
The collective view of the board decided against the
technical demonstration for various non-specified reasons. “"we can propose no technical
demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct
military use.”
11
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were already as far as can be from mainland Tokyo as
possible
12
. Without much more explanation than this the bomb inched closer to detonation.
Warning the Japanese About the Bomb Option
10 Compton, Arthur B.,
Memorandum from Arthur B. Compton to the Secretary of War
, Memorandum on
Political and Social Problems from Members of the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, National
Security Archives.
June 12, 1945
11 Fumihiko Yoshida, Frank Von Hippel, “Why the United States Did Not Demonstrate the Bomb's Power,
Ahead of Hiroshima”.
Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists
, August (2016).
12 Ibid
4
In July 1945 just days before the events at Hiroshima and Nagasaki a group of Manhattan
project scientists led by Leo Szilard wrote a petition to the President.
13
The petition urged the
President to notify the Japanese people before using the atomic weapon with the hopes of their
immediate surrender.
The scientists were aware of the responsibilities that went with owning and
harnessing such power and that the US would “bear the responsibility of opening the door to an
era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.”
14
But there were huge problems with this approach.
One,
the Japanese would never surrender.
There was one scientist that refused to sign the petition Oppenheimer himself, the leader
of the Manhattan Project. He was a man devoted to his work and felt that “scientists should stay
out of political decisions.”
15
.
In addition, there was skepticism in Washington and among some
of the scientists that the bomb would even work. The atomic bomb was still viewed by many
military leaders as an ““ordinary” weapon”
16
. After all no one had ever seen the power of atomic
energy displayed until the Trinity test. The work at the Manhattan project was highly secretive
and only a few eyes were present at the Trinity test in July 1945, and they weren’t allowed to
disclose what they observed outside their trusted circle.
With Truman away at the Potsdam
conference he could only rely on the description from Lt. General Leslie Groves.
“the American
scientists, politicians, and soldiers who participated in the atomic bombings made assessments of
the atomic bombs as unique and special weapons, but they did not make the same kinds of
assessments we make today.”
17
With all of these factors taken into account Truman had to decide
if warning the Japanese was a viable option to ending the war and preventing the drop of the
13Fiege, Mark. “The Atomic Scientists, the Sense of Wonder, and the Bomb.”
Environmental History
12,
no. 3 (2007): 578–613.
14 Szliard, Leo,
A Petition to the President of the United States
. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. July
17, 1945.
15 Wallace,
Countdown 1945 : The Extraordinary Story of the Atomic Bomb and the 116 Days That
Changed the World.
16
Gordin, Michael D.
Five Days in August How World War II Became a Nuclear War.
Princeton:
Princeton
University Press, 2015.
17
Ibid
5
atomic bomb. I think it is safe to say that knowing the resolve of the Japanese people this would
be a futile effort.
However, Truman did it anyway.
The One Last Warning
The Potsdam declaration was just that warning.
Although it never mentioned the atomic
bomb it was a last attempt at warning the Japanese people that the might of the United States and
its combined allies would succeed in the “complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces”
18
On July 26
th
, 1945, the Potsdam declaration was delivered to Japan and rejected
19
.
Okinawa was
a testament to the Japanese resolve when 100,000 troops were killed in one night without a
single surrender
20
. Truman knew that he had to make good on his threat and drop the bomb and it
wasn’t until after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that Japanese would finally accept the
Potsdam terms.
Japanese Resolve to Fight and Rumored Troop Build Up
It was known that the entire country of Japan was at war with the Americans.
Surrenders
were few and by August 1945 they had added some estimated 2 million troops to their militia
largely because they conscripted “every single man and single woman from age 17-40”
21
into
their war effort.
These soldiers weren’t uniformed, hiding in plain sight and were loyal to their
country. The Japanese had just mobilized a quarter of their entire population. This was a
dangerous and demoralizing situation for American troops. “one must consider the gradual
downward creep of the American military’s moral standards of what constituted a “legitimate”
18Rose A. Conway Papers,
Log of President Harry S. Truman's Trip to the Berlin Conference
, President
Truman's Travel Logs, 1945, subject file, 1943-1980, President Harry S. Truman Presidential Library.
19
Kawai, Kazuo. “Mokusatsu, Japan’s Response to the Potsdam Declaration.”
Pacific Historical Review
19,
no. 4 (1950): 409–14.
20 Frank, Richard B., “No Recipe for Victory” (2020).
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/there-are-no-civilians-japan
21 Ibid
6
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objective to include every conceivable target, military or civilian.”
22
Sending American troops
into a continued ground war with a loyal and completely mobilized nation was one of the only
options Truman had to end the war with Japan and even then, it wasn’t guaranteed. The Japanese
were loyal soldiers often opting for suicide rather than surrender.
Truman new that the Japanese
and their Emperor would not go down easy.
Continued Ground War Option and Casualty Estimates
Without the atomic bomb and due to the geography of Japan a continued ground war and
takeover of Tokyo was necessary. After the blood bath at Okinawa America had little appetite for
a bloody ground war.
Casualty estimates for an attack on Kyushu ranged anywhere from
34,000
23
to 500,000
24
Truman himself provided varied casualty and fatality estimates after the
war
25
. When Truman had to make the very important decision of dropping the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki it was apparent through records such as firsthand accounts, government
records, etc., that this was analyzed, discussed, and not taken lightly. While President Truman
received high and low casualty estimates from several different agencies even one loss of
American life was enough justification.
A country weakened from a long war the American
public grew impatient. A continued ground war attack in General Mac Arthur’s opinion was
necessary and not without a significant loss of American lives. Mac Arthur, Eaker, Eishenhower
and King all agreed that the next move against Japan would be “more difficult than Normandy.”
26
The calculated casualties on both sides would be considered politically unacceptable. “The
country was tired of war. More than three years after the Pearl Harbor attack, every aspect of
American life continued to revolve around the conflict”
27
22 Gordin,
Five Days in August How World War II Became a Nuclear War
.
23
JCS Secretary, “Minutes of Meeting held at the White House, June 18, 1945” CCS File, RG218, US National
Archives (1945).
24
Truman,
1884-1972 Memoirs by Harry S. Truman : Year of decisions
.
25
Giangreco, D. M. “‘“A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas”’: President Truman and Casualty
Estimates for the Invasion of Japan.”
Pacific Historical Review
72, no. 1 (2003).
26
JCS Secretary, “Minutes of Meeting held at the White House, June 18, 1945”.
27
7
Conclusion
Many variables impacted Harry S. Truman's decision to fire the first atomic bomb on
Japan as demonstrated by an examination of the event's primary sources. What we cannot learn
directly from the sources is what eventually determined this decision. Truman was tasked with
making the most significant decision of any US President in world history. Casualty estimates
were uncertain and varied depending on who was providing them. The relationship with Russia
was precarious. Allies who knew about the bomb desired its use against the enemy. Several
experts advocated for the bomb, while others did not, and the American populace was exhausted
after a long, violent conflict. Truman appears to have been aware that he had to drop the bomb
and that there would be blood on his hands, the significant part is that he was willing to shoulder
the guilt and accept the responsibility.
Bibliography
Compton, Arthur B.,
Memorandum from Arthur B. Compton to the Secretary of War
,
Memorandum on Political and Social Problems from Members of the Metallurgical
Laboratory of the University of Chicago, National Security Archives.
June 12, 1945
Wallace,
Countdown 1945 : The Extraordinary Story of the Atomic Bomb and the 116 Days That Changed
the World.
8
Einstein, Albert,
Einstein Szilard letter
.
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum,
Selected Documents on the Topic of the Atomic Bomb, 1935-1976.
Fiege, Mark. “The Atomic Scientists, the Sense of Wonder, and the Bomb.”
Environmental
History
12, no. 3 (2007): 578–613.
Frank, Richard B., “No Recipe for Victory” (2020).
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/there-are-no-civilians-japan
Fumihiko Yoshida, Frank Von Hippel, “Why the United States Did Not Demonstrate the Bomb's
Power, Ahead of Hiroshima”.
Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists
, August (2016).
Geselbracht, Raymond H.,
The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: A Reader's Edition
, edited by
University of Missouri Press, 2020.
Giangreco, D. M. “‘A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas”’: President Truman and
Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan.”
Pacific Historical Review
72, no. 1 (2003)
Gordin, Michael D.
Five Days in August How World War II Became a Nuclear War.
Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2015.
JCS Secretary, “Minutes of Meeting held at the White House, June 18, 1945” CCS File, RG218,
US National Archives (1945).
Kawai, Kazuo. “Mokusatsu, Japan’s Response to the Potsdam Declaration.”
Pacific Historical
Review
19, no. 4 (1950): 409–14.
Maddox, Robert. “The Biggest Decision: Why We Had To Drop The Atomic Bomb” May, Vol.
46.
American Heritage
(1995)
Szliard, Leo,
A Petition to the President of the United States
. Harry S. Truman Presidential
Library. July 17, 1945.
National Archives,
Yalta Conference
. Cold War on File, February 1945.
National Park Service.
Manhattan Project Science at Los Alamos National Park
.
https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/manhattan-project-science-at-los-alamos.htm
Rose A. Conway Papers,
Log of President Harry S. Truman's Trip to the Berlin Conference
,
President Truman's Travel Logs, 1945, subject file, 1943-1980, President Harry S.
Truman Presidential Library.
9
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Rosenberg, David Alan. “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision.”
The
Journal of American History
66, no. 1 (1979): 62–87.
Truman, Harry S.,
1884-1972 Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Year of decisions
(vol. 1) New York
: Doubleday 1955.
Wallace, Chris.
Countdown 1945 : The Extraordinary Story of the Atomic Bomb and the 116
Days That Changed the World
, Simon & Schuster, 2020.
10