567859708_How_Could_the_Japanese_have_Exploited_the_Most_Important_U.S

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0 HOW COULD THE JAPANESE HAVE EXPLOITED THE MOST IMPORTANT U.S. MISTAKES IN WORLD WAR II PACIFIC? Student Name Course Date

1 Introduction The Pacific Theater constituted a crucial battleground in World War II, serving a critical part in determining the overall fate of the battle. World War II represented a momentous conflict that altered the path of history. On December 7, 1941, the general Japanese military conducted an unforeseen assault on Pearl Harbor, fulfilling its relentless expansionist strategy. This strike resulted in the United States remaining involved in the conflict. In the following decades that ensued, leaders on both ends of the dispute made essential choices that would ultimately determine how the battle would play out. 1 This study investigates how significantly these Japanese could have used errors committed by the American army within the Pacific Theater to achieve a different outcome to World War II. During World War II, America made many mistakes inside the Pacific Theater. These included some of the most major strategic gaffes, intelligence failures, and logistical deficiencies. 2 Assuming the Japanese had considered America's early strategic blunders in the Pacific Theater, as well as their logistical failings and underestimating Japanese capacities, they could have been able to win World War II. WWII, which began in 1939 and continued until 1945, evolved into an international dispute that profoundly influenced the progression of historical events and left an indelible mark on the planet. 3 It entailed a complicated web of economic, political, and social-based factors that ultimately led to a cataclysmic war in which key powers spanning all over the globe were involved. This conflict led to the destruction of an essential percentage of the global population. In 1939, Germany began annexing Poland, ultimately resulting in the UK and France going to 1 Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, 146. 2 Dower, John. Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays. New York: New Press, 1993, 257-285. 3 Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, 447.

2 war with Germany. This action sparked the events that led to World War II. 4 As the war continued, the Axis powers—Japan, Italy, and Germany—increased their attempts to subjugate and control enormous regions. Hitler's broad expansionist goals looked to be driven by the beliefs of the Nazi party, resulting in the conquest of a vast portion of Europe. In addition, the war has been held accountable for horrendous atrocities like the Holocaust, whereby the Nazis murdered millions of defenseless people, mostly Jews. Furthermore, it was a bystander to the development and use of dreadful firearms, like atomic bombs that were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. At this moment, it represented the first time nuclear bombs had ever been used in combat. 5 The Axis countries remained opposed by a coalition of nations known as the Allies, which included the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the United States of America, Northern Ireland, the Communist Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China. World War II produced unprecedented destruction, with tens of thousands of souls lost and entire cities reduced to rubble. On the contrary, it triggered massive changes in international politics, such as establishing the legendary United Nations after 1945. 6 Therefore, to reduce the likelihood of future conflicts, this group has stayed in operation to foster more international cooperation. The aftermath of the war ushered the Cold War, an era of heightened tension between America and the overall Soviet Union. As a result, it led to the creation of separate Westernized and Eastern-based blocs inside Europe. 4 Garon, Sheldon. “On the Transnational Destruction of Cities: What Japan and the United States Learned from the Bombing of Britain and Germany in the Second World War.” Past and Present. No. 247 (2020), 235. 5 Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. “The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: Which was more important in Japan's decision to surrender?” In The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, 144. 6 James, D. Clayton. “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Peter Paret, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, 57.

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3 Many countries made varied decisions on the military, government, and economic fronts throughout World War II, making it a complex and multifaceted battle. Though pivotal to the Allies' eventual success, the United States did make inevitable missteps and encountered some unique difficulties during the war. 7 The next part analyzes how the Japanese could have exploited Submarine American shortcomings during World War II. Failure to Destroy American-based Carriers at Pearl Harbor (Argument 1) After the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the United States failed to attack and eliminate Japanese aircraft-based ships stationed in American seas. This act represented the biggest and most critical mistakes that the United States made at the beginning of WWII. The continued existence of the carriers, which served as the foundation of the American forces stationed in the region, made it possible for the nation to come back quicker after incurring a first defeat. Because of this oversight, the Japanese might have boosted their surveillance attempts to locate the warships and carry out targeted assaults, which would have been to their considerable advantage. 8 It is possible that a successful hit on aircraft carriers would have significantly crippled the American Navy's operations throughout the Pacific, so prolonging any retaliatory measures which could have previously remained planned. Insufficient Submarine Warfare Strategies (Argument 2) The final victory of the Allied was contingent on several factors, one of the most important of which was the victorious conduct of American submarines across the Pacific. On the other hand, the Japanese initially failed to recognize the severity of the danger of the American-based submarines; therefore, they could not implement adequate precautions to 7 Larrabee, Eric. Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, reprint, 2004, 411. 8 Larrabee, Eric. Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, reprint, 2004, 305.

4 safeguard their commercial vessels. The Japanese might have attempted to take advantage of this silly mistake made by the Americans by investing more excellent resources into anti-submarine conflicts, which would have allowed them to employ escort ships and strengthen their convoy techniques. 9 If the Japanese had had a more robust defense against American submersibles, they could have stopped the shipment of overall supplies and additional troops to the Pacific- based theater, which would have hampered the counteroffensive capacity of the United States. Neglecting the Aleutian Islands (Argument 3) Therefore, following the Second World War, the Aleutian Islands appeared overlooked, representing a strategic error that would have led to a different outcome of the battle throughout the Pacific. It was a once-in-a-lifetime chance for all Japanese to put significant strain on the American nation when they conquered the Aleutian Islands within Alaska during the early phases of the conflict. However, because they needed to capitalize on this overall position of authority appropriately, the potential it presented to them was ultimately lost. 10 The Aleutian Islands stood in a prime place because of their isolated and rocky location and proximity to the Alaskan Peninsula’s west coast. Therefore, it would have been possible for these Japanese to pose an immediate danger to the western coastline of the United States, provided they had built up a more significant presence and strengthened their bases there. This hypothetical threat may have 9 Lee, Bradford A. “A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific.” In Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare. Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds. London and New York: Routledge, 2011, 98. 10 Lee, Lee. “Strategy and Policy Department Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island.” Strategy and Policy, 1942. https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Strategy%20and %20Policy%20Department/SLC%20Syllabus-2021-Final.pdf? sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=CJHGw1maZoe1GFsl3VrPC3m%2BgOvkFmX4mJH8zhkHbkU %3D, 56.

5 caused America to be obliged to redirect essential assets to safeguard its northern-based flank, which would have weakened its overall aggressive capability throughout the Pacific theater. Moreover, from a military point of view, the Aleutian Islands were vital because they provided the Japanese with a possible launching point for invasions upon the mainland of Alaska and, further down the line, the Pacific Northwest. This move could have remained complicated for the United States to launch a counteroffensive across this far-flung theater of the conflict due to the hostile environment, hazardous terrain, and logistical hurdles that were present there. Because of this general diversion of available resources and attention, the overall Allied advance throughout the Pacific might have slowed or derailed entirely. 11 The Japanese could not fully appreciate the value surrounding the Aleutian Islands, which was lucky for the Allied forces. Their control of this region appeared never followed by significant measures to strengthen their presence or availability in the area or to extend it. Because of this, the United States could not undertake a successful or effective campaign to recover the islands in 1943, which eliminated the danger and stopped any future growth of Japanese territory across the North Pacific. The Japanese made a severe error in their strategy when they disregarded the Aleutian Islands. 12 They blew an excellent opportunity to put more strain on America and change the direction of the conflict across the Pacific by missing to take advantage of their superior position and not capitalizing on it. Following the Second World War, especially across the Pacific Theater front, the Japanese military’s decision to ignore the use of psychological warfare turned out to be an expensive error in judgment. Not only did they break international norms with their ruthless conduct toward imprisoned individuals of war and communities under occupation, but it also 11 O’Brien, Phillips. How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 429. 12 O’Brien, Phillips, 429.

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6 made it more difficult for them to form alliances and garner support from societies nearby. 13 The governing body of Japan did not understand the importance of psychological conflict in capturing their citizens, which had the potential to play a significant part throughout their war operations, but did not do so. Their severe tactics did not encourage cooperation and allegiance from the citizens they seized; instead, they provoked discontent and opposition from the occupied population. Therefore, it remains possible that the Japanese could have garnered backing from ethnic minorities and dissidents across conquered territory if they had utilized a more deliberate and compassionate strategy regarding the area’s inhabitants. This step might have led to a rise in the amount of intelligence gathered, an improvement in how military goals remained concealed, and the possibility of slowing down the unrelenting march of American forces. 14 Throughout the long record of armed forces’ past times, the repercussions of abandoning the emotions and thoughts of individuals residing in the thick of combat are brought into striking relief by ignoring the overall psychological components of warfare acts as a vivid reminder of this fact. It shows the crucial relevance of technical skill and diplomatic elegance in accomplishing tactical objectives during the conflict. Specifically, it emphasizes the significance of achieving strategic goals. The Japanese military’s inability to devise a consistent, prospective strategy during the Pacific Theater throughout World War II is an important historical reminder of the adverse outcomes of a lack of proper forecasting and preparation. Initially, the Japanese successfully extended their geographical possessions throughout the Pacific. They did this by employing sneak attacks and quickly advancing to take crucial regions. However, their initial achievement 13 Paine, Sarah C. M. The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pages 3- 11, 220. 14 Warner, Denis, and Peggy. “The Doctrine of Surprise”; Miller, Edward S. “Kimmel’s Hidden Agenda”; and Cohen, Eliot A. “The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor.” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 4, no. 1 (autumn 1991), 25.

7 could have been better in their methods. There existed a need for a carefully planned method for maintaining and protecting their advantages. 15 This step was a fundamental error within their strategy that must remain addressed. The inability of the Japanese-based military to make investments in the construction of overall fortifications and barriers of defense on the lands they had conquered was among the most egregious omissions in their overall strategy. Because of this absence, it was straightforward for America to conduct counterattacks and recapture the ground they had previously lost. The result of the war throughout the Pacific Theater could have been quite distinct if these Japanese had built more significant barriers to render it more difficult for the United States to regain these territories by increasing the amount of labor and assets that were required. In addition, the Japanese might have followed a more successful diplomatic approach by forming powerful partnerships alongside other Axis nations, such as Italy and Germany. This step would have increased their chances of success. It would have been possible for Japan to enhance its dominance across the Pacific and lessen the obstacles it encountered from the forces of the Allied Union, particularly the Americans, if it had formed deeper ties with these nations, secured additional backing and assets, and secured more support from those countries. In basic terms, the Japanese approach to the Pacific missed the long-term perspective and coherence essential for sustained victory in an area of war. 16 This act prevented Japan from achieving its goals throughout the Pacific. The Japanese early accomplishments needed to be improved by their incapacity to defend lands they seized successfully and their inability to create strong 15 Warner, Denis, and Peggy. “The Doctrine of Surprise”; Miller, Edward S. “Kimmel’s Hidden Agenda”; and Cohen, Eliot A. “The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor.” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 4, no. 1 (autumn 1991), 43. 16 Warner, Denis, and Peggy. “The Doctrine of Surprise”; Miller, Edward S. “Kimmel’s Hidden Agenda”; and Cohen, Eliot A. “The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor.” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 4, no. 1 (autumn 1991), 73.

8 relationships with other influential groups. A clear strategy could have contributed to their loss in the region. This move highlights the significance of extensive preparation and adaptability in response to the ever-changing conditions of war. The Japanese-based military’s steadfast dedication to their mission throughout World War II was demonstrated by their emphasis on their “Bushido” standard of loyalty and kamikaze techniques. These tactics, however, were untenable and ineffectual against the relentlessly advancing Allies. Therefore, grounded in Japanese tradition, the Bushido code enjoined a rigid set of behaviors prioritizing honor, devotion, and sacrifice. Although these ideals prompted extraordinary displays of courage and gallantry, they additionally hampered Japan’s capacity to adjust to the novel challenges posed by contemporary conflict. 17 The Japanese refused to adopt conventional and pragmatic military techniques due to their unyielding dedication to Bushido. As mentioned earlier, the kamikaze strikes were a striking illustration of the overreliance. Pilots conducting these self-destructive missions would purposefully crash their planes on Allied vessels. Kamikaze strikes caused casualties for the Allied nations, but they could not have remained as a long-term tactic. Because of their superior manufacturing capabilities, the Allies were only temporarily held back by the demise of talented airmen and important airplanes on single-dire missions. Taking advantage of this strategic blunder would have required a shift in Japanese strategy toward more traditional conflict and operational agility. 18 They may have been more successful in their extended operations if they had used more armed forces tactics like guerrilla-based warfare, hit-and-run activities, and defensive constructions. In addition, the Japanese strengthened their position by producing arms and supplies by effectively utilizing their 17 Wylie, J. C. Appendix A, “Excerpt from ‘Reflections on the War in the Pacific.’” In Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, reprint, 1989, 121. 18 Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, 272.

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9 available industrial assets. While their dogged dedication to Kamikaze and Bushido techniques was admirable, it ultimately hurt the Japanese armed forces or military’s chances of victory. Agility and practicality are essential in modern combat, and their inability to adjust and broaden led to their loss in the Second World War. The failure of Japan to gain allies throughout its territorial expansion throughout Asia has far-reaching effects. Its violent conquests of several Asian countries caused immense misery and planted a foundation of distrust among the local populations. Perhaps things would have turned out differently if Japan had taken a more conciliatory approach, actively seeking collaboration and forming partnerships with Asian states. 19 Japan would have rendered it much more difficult for the United States and other Western-based nations to mobilize worldwide opposition over its acts throughout the area had it fostered friendliness and cooperation. An increasingly tranquil and prosperous Asia would now exist if this tactical adjustment had appeared earlier. However, in a different view, Japan’s Second World War approach remained characterized by a striking need for more efficiency in utilizing its financial resources. Japan should have used its financial assets more effectively despite acknowledging the United States’ preeminent industrial might. Japan should have done better with its resources elsewhere and not relied on this mistake. This act would have necessitated heavy spending on military-related areas such as infrastructure, information technology, and management of resources. 20 A more robust economy would have allowed Japan to keep up with its military operations for longer, maybe even through the financial blockade imposed by the United States. Unfortunately, they lost a war in which industrial strength was a deciding factor mainly due to their incapacity to maximize economic resources. 19 Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, 221. 20 Dower, John. Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays. New York: New Press, 1993, 285.

10 Absence of Comprehensive Anti-Submarine Strategies (Counter Argument) In contrary opinion, the absence of a well-developed plan to combat submarines was one of Japan’s most significant problems in the Pacific amid the Second World War. Therefore, the Japanese needed to put more resources into improved sonar equipment or create specialized anti- submarine warships as America’s submarine campaign heated up. As a result of this lapse of judgment, American submarines were able to inflict devastation on Japanese military supply routes and infrastructure. 21 The Japanese prospects of successfully repelling the submarine danger increased if they understood the seriousness of the imminent threat and devoted additional funds towards anti-submarine operations. Submarine strikes on crucial supply lines must have remained prevented at all costs. The Japanese could have continued their Pacific- based campaign for much longer if they had employed a more effective anti-submarine tactic. Japan’s ultimately devastating defeat throughout the Pacific region of the Second World War remained greatly aided by the country’s absence of a coherent anti-submarine plan. However, in this argumentative essay, the crucial error in military planning appeared when the United States' mobilization capacity remained underestimated. The Japanese, particularly during WWII, needed to prepare for the enormity of American manufacturing and personnel resources. They paid a high price for their faulty estimate. U.S. factories went from making household goods to mass-producing weapons, aircraft, and battleships in record time. 22 At the same time, it had an unmatched capacity for drafting and training soldiers. As a result of 21 Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, 486. 22 Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. “The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: Which was more important in Japan's decision to surrender?” In The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, 145.

11 this underestimation and other strategic blunders, Japan seemed undone. It is a constant reminder of how dangerous it is to underestimate an enemy’s ability to mobilize on the battlefield. Conclusion The United States of America and Japan made several judgments and variables throughout World War II across the Pacific, which complicated how things turned out. In retrospect, it is easy to see how the Japanese could have capitalized on mistakes made by the United States. Still, the larger historical framework, limited resources, and fog of war all played significant roles in the outcome of the conflict. The Japanese struggled to dominate the Pacific, and failing to exploit or capitalize on the United States’ blunders became only one part of their Second World War battle.

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12 Bibliography Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 146-189, 206-221, 231-272. Dower, John. Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays. New York: New Press, 1993. Pages 257- 285. Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 447-486. Garon, Sheldon. “On the Transnational Destruction of Cities: What Japan and the United States Learned from the Bombing of Britain and Germany in the Second World War.” Past and Present. No. 247 (2020). Pages 235-271. Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. “The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: Which was more important in Japan’s decision to surrender?” In The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. Pages 113-144. James, D. Clayton. “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Peter Paret, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Larrabee, Eric. Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, reprint, 2004. Pages 305-411. Lee, Bradford A. “A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific.” In Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare. Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, eds. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 84-98.

13 Lee, Lee. “Strategy and Policy Department Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island.” Strategy and Policy, 1942. https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Strategy%20and %20Policy%20Department/SLC%20Syllabus-2021-Final.pdf? sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=CJHGw1maZoe1GFsl3VrPC3m %2BgOvkFmX4mJH8zhkHbkU%3D. O’Brien, Phillips. How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pages 374-429. Paine, Sarah C. M. The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pages 3-11, 123-220. Warner, Denis, and Peggy. “The Doctrine of Surprise”; Miller, Edward S. “Kimmel’s Hidden Agenda”; and Cohen, Eliot A. “The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor.” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 4, no. 1 (autumn 1991). Pages 20-25, 36-43, 72-73. Wylie, J. C. Appendix A, “Excerpt from ‘Reflections on the War in the Pacific.’” In Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, reprint, 1989. Pages 117-121.

567859708_How_Could_the_Japanese_have_Exploited_the_Most_Important_U.S

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