Final Case Paper
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Flint Water Crisis
MAPA-5300-010: Public Administration
Dr. Tracy Rickman
May 7, 2023
Brief summary of the case:
In 2014, Flint city officials made the decision to change the city water supply from the Detroit Municipal water supply to the Flint River, due to need to reduce costs. Flint had a projected $25 million deficit and leaders celebrated the fiscal prudence of the decision, unknowing of the havoc this decision had set into motion. The water from the Flint River contained high levels of chloride, which was very corrosive to the city’s aging water-delivery infrastructure. After the initial switch, residents of Flint noticed a change in the taste, color, and odor of the water (Sanburn, 2016).
A few months into the switch, E. Coli was detected in the water by the city and sent out an advisory notice urging residents to boil water before consuming. Going into 2015 more and more citizens complained, concerned about potential hazards of the water. One resident had their
water tested and it was found to exceed the acceptable level of lead. Yet officials held fast to their original statements, claiming that the water was safe. Officials also stated that any issues or problems that were being found were isolated incidents and dismissed residents’ fears of a larger problem (Sanburn, 2016).
Finally, after persistence from some residents and bypassing the state, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was brought in to do some testing. Staggering results were found and were even dismissed by Michigan state agencies (Sanburn, 2016). A local pediatrician began questioning lead levels from children in Flint and presenting research in late 2015, but state officials still were slow to react, even downplayed and discredited the results (Kaffer, 2015). Overall, the Flint water crisis involved several lawsuits, some of which were class-action suits, being filed against the city of Flint and the state of Michigan, as well as other state and city
officials that were involved in making the decision to switch the source of water and those
responsible for monitoring the quality of the water. What began as a cost-saving move ended up as one of the major crisis in national history.
Cast of Characters:
The cast of characters for this case study would be the following individuals, groups, or entities: The residents of Flint Michigan, the appointed emergency manager for Flint, the State of
Michigan officials, the Governor of Michigan, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), Lee-Anne Walters, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, and the children of Flint. III. Sequence of events:
Flint, Michigan was the birthplace of General Motors in the mid-20
th
century. It flourished and prospered for many years with many of the residents being employed by the automobile industry. With economic downturns and raising oil prices, after the 1980s, Flint was no longer the prosperous city it had once been. Between 1955 and 1987, there were over 34,000 jobs lost. The population had dropped from nearly 200,000 to below 100,000 between 1960 and 2015 (Sadler and Highsmith, 2016). During the time of the Flint water issues, there was an appointed emergency manager to run the city. This appointment was one a few over the years starting in 2011 from Governor Rick
Snyder. These manager’s powers superseded those of local elected officials (Sanburn, 2016).
Due to rising costs of receiving water from the Detroit Water and Sewage Department (DWSD), Flint officials found an alternative and in 2013 they decided to join the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA) which was to transmit raw water from Lake Huron (Masten et al., 2016). This switch would potentially save the city $19 million over the next several years. The
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city council voted in April 2013 to switch to the KWA. There however were issues with this plan, the pipeline to connect to KWA would not be ready until 2016. Detroit then provided another issue, starting in April of 2014 they would no longer sell water to Flint (Sanburn, 2016).
Acting emergency manager proposed the use of the Flint River as the interim water source until they could connect to KWA. In June of 2013, a decision was made without any city council vote or public referendum, and a contract was signed to utilize the Flint River as the primary source of municipal water (Sanburn, 2016). Within weeks of the switch, residents were raising concerns and voicing complaints about the smell, taste and color of the water they were drinking and using. There was also an increase of water main breaks, red water and discoloration
was observed through out the entire service area (Masten et al., 2016). Water from the Flint River had very concentrated levels of chloride. This chemical is so corrosive that it often leads to rust in automobiles if left untreated. The city’s water pipes were aging and lead, leading to the toxin being absorbed into the water supply (Sanborn, 2016). By April of 2014, residents were complaining and even protesting by lugging jugs of the discolored water around. However, city officials dispelled any concerns and maintained that the water was safe, to drink and use daily (Denchak, 2018).
In October of 2014, GM announced that the water was so corrosive it would no longer be using the municipal water supply at the plant due to the issues the water was causing to the production and engine parts. All the while officials still ignored citizen complaints (Sanburn, 2016). In January 2015 Flint resident, Lee-Anne Walters was able to get the city to test the orange-brown water from her tap. Unfortunately, they claimed it was an isolated incident and suggested she hook up to a neighbor’s line as a work around. She persisted and eventually bypassed the state by contacting the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The results
were dangerously over the federally accepted levels of lead to be present in water. This lead to a memo at the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) being written expressing the concern of the levels of lead in the water. It stated concerns for the toxic levels of lead in the water because the state had failed to properly treat for corrosion (Sanburn, 2016).
Another study conducted by researchers at Virginia Tech revealed that in samples from 252 homes in the area, more than 40 percent had over 5 part per billion (ppb) of lead and nearly 17 percent of samples registering over 15 ppb which is the federal “action level”. More findings from Flint pediatrician, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha showed that blood-lead levels in the children citywide had doubled since 2014 (Denchak, 2018). Dr. Hanna-Attisha presented her findings and
was criticized and even ridiculed for speaking out. There was no sense of urgency with all of these facts, and was even downplayed by MDEQ and the Michigan Governor spokesperson. MDEQ finally acknowledged the fact that Flint’s water supply was compromised in September of 2015 ( Kaffer, 2015).
For nearly 18 months residents of Flint were supplied lead contaminated water. Nearly 9,000 children were consuming highly toxic water that is very damaging to their overall health. Due to the exposure of the toxic water, there was also on outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease, which is a severe form of pneumonia. It sickened at least 87 people and killed 12. All likely a result of a failure to maintain a sufficient amount of chlorine into the water to disinfect.
IV. Major issues:
There are a few major issues in this case. The first and foremost is the failure for the government officials to be accountable. Once there was an initial concern for the safety and wellbeing of the residents of Flint, there should have been accountability. However, all parties
seemed to dismiss all concerns and even in the case of Dr. Hanna-Attisha, questioned her expertise. No one wanted to admit any wrongdoing and try to come to the rescue of an entire community. There should have been immediate action by the state agencies in seeking solutions and care for all effected. Though MDEQ is supposed to oversee the compliance of environmental regulations statewide, it failed to do so. There should have been better preparations to connect to the river source and better oversight of such a vital resource. That is the purpose of entities such as MDEQ, to protect the citizens. Pauli argues that the Flint water crisis was “result of intersecting technical, political, and historical factors that caused improperly treated water to be distributed to residents of a city that was politically disempowered and structurally vulnerable.” And I would have to agree.
Overall, Flint residents were failed by the city, state and federal agencies. During this crisis they had to band together and fight the fight themselves when their government failed them.
Alternative solutions:
Alternate solutions for this case are for the federal government to have a better oversight of all natural resources such as water and air. There should be a more heightened concern when issues of potential contamination are brough forward. Recommendation (s):
After considerable thought on the Flint water crisis, I fell that this should be a training case used for all government agencies on how to serve our citizens better. There should be better
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oversight of funds for situations like the one Flint found itself in. When economies are declining,
basic infrastructure should not go without improvements. Time after time funding shortfalls have
created instances of shortcuts or workarounds that have ultimately cause loss of life or even life altering damages. We need to find a solution to the problem where money is not more important than human life.
References
Baum, R., Bartram, J., & Hrudey, S. (2016). The Flint water crisis confirms that US drinking water needs improved risk management.
(Baum et al., 2016)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2021, November 3). Flint lead exposure registry
. Centers for Disease Control and Prevenion. Retrieved March 22, 2023, from https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/programs/flint-registry.htm (CDC, 2021)
Denchak, M. (2018, November 8). Flint water crisis: Everything you need to know. Be a Force for the Future. Retrieved May 3, 2023, from https://www.nrdc.org/stories/flint-water-
crisis-everything-you-need-know#summary
(Denchak, 2018)
Kettl, D. F. (2021). Politics of the Administrative Process (8th ed.). CQ Press.
(Kettl, 2021)
Kaffer, N. (2015, November 8). Year before water change, state knew of risks in Flint
. Detroit Free Press. Retrieved April 2, 2023, from https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-kaffer/2015/11/07/flint-lead-
water/75268692/ (Kaffer, 2015)
Masten, S.J., Davies, S.H. and Mcelmurry, S.P. (2016), Flint Water Crisis: What Happened and Why?. Journal - American Water Works Association, 108: 22-34. https://doi.org/10.5942/jawwa.2016.108.0195
(Masten, 2016)
Pauli, B. J. (2019). Flint fights back: Environmental justice and democracy in the Flint water crisis. mit Press.
(Pauli, 2019)
Pauli, BJ. The Flint water crisis. WIREs Water. 2020; 7:e1420. https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1420
(Pauli, 2020)
Sanburn, J. (2016, January 21). The poisoning of an American city. Time. Retrieved April 20, 2023, from https://time.com/magazine/us/4188304/february-1st-2016-vol-187-no-3-u-s/
(Sanburn, 2016)
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