a)
Whether oligopolists will behave noncooperatively or engages in tacit collusion when it is difficult for a firm to detect whether another firm has raised output.
a)
Explanation of Solution
No, in this case, there would be no possibility of tacit collusion of firms because each firm is making output individually. And, each firm uses its resources according to the requirement of its production which depends on its capacity to produce. Therefore, there would be no existence of uncooperativeness and no collusion between firms.
Introduction: Competitors who collude covertly to coordinate their conduct by agreeing to share information but not explicitly exchanging it are said to be acting in collusion.
b)
Whether oligopolists will behave noncooperatively or engages in tacit collusion when firms in the industry coexist at the time of fixing prices for a long time.
b)
Explanation of Solution
Yes, there is a possibility of tacit collusion because when firms decide about price in the industry by coexisting then they need high coordination and cooperation. But it is possible that there would be no cooperation among firms while they maintain high prices in the long run because they can disagree with the decision.
Introduction: Competitors who collude covertly to coordinate their conduct by agreeing to share information but not explicitly exchanging it are said to be acting in collusion.
c)
Whether oligopolists will behave noncooperatively or engages in tacit collusion when each oligopolist firm assumes that new firms can enter the market in the future.
c)
Explanation of Solution
No, there is no possibility of tacit collusion in this case because business firms in the sector can make assumptions of entry and exist as there is no need for cooperation for this assumption. Each firm is free to assume the entry and exist as this assumption cannot affect the strategies of other firms in the market, therefore there would be no collusion between firms.
Introduction: Competitors who collude covertly to coordinate their conduct by agreeing to share information but not explicitly exchanging it are said to be acting in collusion.
Chapter 66 Solutions
Krugman's Economics For The Ap® Course
- 3. Consider the market for paper. The process of producing paper creates pollution. Assume that the marginal damage function for pollution is given by: MDF = 3E where damages are measured in dollars and E is the level of emissions. Assume further that the function describing the marginal abatement cost of emissions is given by MAC 120-E where benefits are measured in dollars and E is the level of emissions. a. Graph the marginal damage function (MDF) and the marginal abatement cost function (MAC). b. What is the unregulated level of emissions Eu? What is the social welfare of this emissions level? c. Assume an existing emission quota limits emissions to E = 60. Show on the graph why this policy is inefficient. What is the deadweight loss caused by this policy?arrow_forwardshow written calculation for Barrow_forwardProblem 1: 1. If a stock is expected to pay an annual dividend of $20 forever, what is the approximate present value of the stock, given that the discount rate is 5%? 2. If a stock is expected to pay an annual dividend of $20 forever, what is the approximate present value of the stock, given that the discount rate is 8%? 3. If a stock is expected to pay an annual dividend of $20 this year, what is the approximate present value of the stock, given that the discount rate is 8% and dividends are expected to grow at a rate of 2% per year?arrow_forward
- d-farrow_forwardG please!arrow_forward4. Consider two polluting firms, with the marginal abatement costs of polluters 1 and 2, respectively, equal to MAC₁ = 20-E1 MAC2 = 12-E2 a. What is the unregulated level of pollution for each firm? b. Assume policymakers have decided to cut the level of pollution in half. The way they intend to accomplish this goal is to require both firms to cut their pollution in half. What are the total costs of abatement from the policy? And how are these costs distributed between the firms? c. Is this uniform quota on emissions across firms the most cost-effective manner in which to reduce emissions by 50%?arrow_forward
- Don't used hand raiting and don't used Ai solutionarrow_forwardThanks in advance!arrow_forwardI need help figuring this out. I'm pretty sure this is correct?If Zambia is open to international trade in oranges without any restrictions, it will import 180 tons of oranges.I can't figure these two out: 1) Suppose the Zambian government wants to reduce imports to exactly 60 tons of oranges to help domestic producers. A tariff of ???? per ton will achieve this. 2) A tariff set at this level would raise ????in revenue for the Zambian government.arrow_forward
- 16:10 ← BEC 3701 - Assignments-... KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY TEACHING FOR EXCELLENCE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE ADVANCED MICRO-ECONOMICS (BEC 3701) Assignments INSTRUCTIONS: Check instructions below: LTE 1) Let u(q1,q2) = ln q₁ + q2 be the (direct) utility function, where q₁ and q2the two goods. Denote P₁ and P2 as the prices of those two goods and let M be per period money income. Derive each of the following: a) the ordinary or Marshallian demand functions q₁ = d₂ (P₁, P₂, M) for i = 1,2 [3 Marks] b) the compensated or Hicksian demand functions q₁ = h₂ (P₁, P2, M) for i = 1,2 [3 Marks] c) the Indirect Utility Function uº = v(P₁, P2, M) [3 Marks] d) the Expenditure Function E(P1, P2, U°) [3 Marks] e) Draw a diagram of the solution. There should be two graphs, one above the other; the first containing the indifference curves and budget constraint that characterize the solution to the consumer's choice problem; the second characterizing the demand…arrow_forwardHow would you answer the question in the News Wire “Future Living Standards”? Why?arrow_forwardal Problems (v) T (ix) F 1. Out of total number of 2807 women, who were interviewed for employment in a textile factory, 912 were from textile areas and the rest from non-textile areas. Amongst the married women, who belonged to textile areas, 347 were having some work experience and 173 did not have work experience, while for non-textile areas the corresponding figures were 199 and 670 respectively. The total number of women having no experience was 1841 of whom 311 resided in textile areas. Of the total number of women, 1418 were unmarried and of these the number of women having experience in the textile and non-textile areas was 254 and 166 respectively. Tabulate the above information. [CA. (Foundation), May 2000 Exactly (14) of the total employees of a sugar mill were these were married and one-halfarrow_forward
- Principles of Economics (12th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134078779Author:Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. OsterPublisher:PEARSONEngineering Economy (17th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134870069Author:William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick KoellingPublisher:PEARSON
- Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)EconomicsISBN:9781305585126Author:N. Gregory MankiwPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-...EconomicsISBN:9781259290619Author:Michael Baye, Jeff PrincePublisher:McGraw-Hill Education