
a)
Whether the practice supports the conclusion that there is tacit collusion in the industry when the
a)

Explanation of Solution
Because companies set their prices in accordance with the published proposed price of the biggest firm in the industry, therefore there is a chance of tacit collusion. In this case, there is the possibility of tacit collusion because when the price is selected by the largest firm in the industry, then there is no appropriate coordination between all firms in the industry which cause a collision.
Introduction: Competitors who collude covertly to coordinate their conduct by agreeing to share information but not explicitly exchanging it are said to be acting in collusion.
b)
Whether the practice supports the conclusion that there is a tacit collusion in the industry when over time, considerable variation occurs in the market shares of the firms in the industry.
b)

Explanation of Solution
There is not any possibility of tacit collusion because when there is an availability of considerable variations in the market share then it is a sign of any kind of competition between different firms that belong to the industry. This case does not provide any evidence of collusion as market share differences or variations do not impact the coordination of firms in the industry.
Introduction: Competitors who collude covertly to coordinate their conduct by agreeing to share information but not explicitly exchanging it are said to be acting in collusion.
c)
Whether the practice supports the conclusion that there is a tacit collusion in the industry when companies in the sector incorporate pointless features into their products, making it difficult for customers to transition from one brand to another.
c)

Explanation of Solution
There is no possibility of tacit collusion in this case because business firms in the sector make it difficult for customers to switch products. As incorporating features into products and services will encourage customers to buy from any firm in the same industry then there will be no collusion.
Introduction: Competitors who collude covertly to coordinate their conduct by agreeing to share information but not explicitly exchanging it are said to be acting in collusion.
d)
Whether the practice supports the conclusion that there is a tacit collusion in the industry when firms meet to discuss their annual sales forecasts yearly.
d)

Explanation of Solution
Yes, there would be a possibility of tacit collusion because firms can collude or disagree when they meet to decide their annual sales
Introduction: Competitors who collude covertly to coordinate their conduct by agreeing to share information but not explicitly exchanging it are said to be acting in collusion.
e)
Whether the practice supports the conclusion that there is a tacit collusion in the industry when firms frequently raise their prices at the same time.
e)

Explanation of Solution
Yes, in this case, there would be tacit collusion because the companies must collaborate if they are all raising their prices at the same time and not doing so in order to grow their market share. Therefore, if firms are not collaborating while deciding prices then there would be tacit collusion in the industry.
Introduction: Competitors who collude covertly to coordinate their conduct by agreeing to share information but not explicitly exchanging it are said to be acting in collusion.
Want to see more full solutions like this?
Chapter 66 Solutions
Krugman's Economics For The Ap® Course
- Question Seven There are specific applications of the hidden-action or moral hazard model. Consider employment contracts signed between a firm's owners and a manager who runs the firm on behalf of the owners. The manager is offered an employment contract which they can accept and decide how much effort, e ≥ 0, to exert. Suppose that an increase in effort, e, increases the firm's gross profit, not including payments to the manager, but is personally costly to the manager and the firm's gross profit, Пg, takes the following form: Пg = e +ε, ε~N(0,2). Let s denote the salary, which may depend on effort and/or gross profit, depending on what the owner can observe, offered as part of the contract between the owner and manager. Suppose that the manager is risk averse and has a utility function with respect to salary of the form: Aσ² U(W)=μ- 2 a) Derive the optimal result of the owner's expected net profit where there is full information and state what it implies. b) Suppose now that the…arrow_forward1. The IS/MP model assumes that the Fed sets the real interest rate at a given level Rt. Suppose the Fed adopts a monetary policy rule that instructs it how to change the real interest rate in response to short-run output. Let's call this a monetary policy rule (MPR): The parameter x is positive. Rt=+xY a) Redraw the IS/MP diagram replacing the MP curve with the MPR curve. Show how an aggregate demand shock affects output and interest rates in the short run. Use the IS and MPR equations to solve for the changes in output and the real interest rate. b) How does the change in a affect investment in the IS/MPR model? Explain how a tax cut affects short-run output and investment in this version of the short-run model. The effect on investment is called crowding out. c) Add the Phillips curve to complete the short-run model. Illustrate how the Fed's choice of large it makes reveals its trade off between inflation and output in the short run.arrow_forwardnot use ai pleasearrow_forward
- Fems A and B are duopolist producers of widgets. The cost function for producing widgets C(Q)-Q² The market demand function for widgets i Q-192P Qmeasures thousands of widgets per year, Competition in the widget market is described by the Coumot model Instructions: Round your answers to 2 decimal places a What are the firms' Nanh equbrium output? b. What is the resulting price? c. What do they each emp How does the price compare to marginal cost? Price is ck to marginal cost How do the price and the two fems' joint profit compare to the monopoly price and prof Compared to the monopoly price, the Cournot price is to sed. Compared to the monopoly profit, the joint profit of the two fems to selectarrow_forwardSuppose the marginal social cost of television sets is $100. This is constant and equal to the average cost of television sets. The annual demand for television sets is given by the following equation: Q = 200,000-500P, where Qis the quantity sold per year and P is the price of television sets. a) If television sets are sold in a perfectly competitive market, calculate the annual number sold. Under what circumstances will the market equilibrium be efficient? b) Show the losses in well-being each year that would result from a law limiting sales of television sets to 100,000 per year. Show the effect on the price, marginal social benefit, and marginal social cost of television sets. Show the net loss in well-being that will result from a complete ban on the sales of television sets. (show with graphs.)arrow_forwardrefer to exhibit 8.12 and identify each curve in the grapharrow_forward
- Q1. (Chap 1: Game Theory.) In the simultaneous games below player 1 is choosing between Top and Bottom, while player 2 is choosing between Left and Right. In each cell the first number is the payoff to player 1 and the second is the payoff to player 2. Part A: Player 1 Top Bottom Player 2 Left 25, 22 Right 27,23 26,21 28, 22 (A1) Does player 1 have a dominant strategy? (Yes/No) If your answer is yes, which one is it? (Top/Bottom) (A2) Does player 2 have a dominant strategy? (Yes/No.) If your answer is yes, which one is it? (Left/Right.) (A3) Can you solve this game by using the dominant strategy method? (Yes/No) If your answer is yes, what is the solution?arrow_forwardnot use ai pleasearrow_forwardsubject to X1 X2 Maximize dollars of interest earned = 0.07X1+0.11X2+0.19X3+0.15X4 ≤ 1,000,000 <2,500,000 X3 ≤ 1,500,000 X4 ≤ 1,800,000 X3 + XA ≥ 0.55 (X1+X2+X3+X4) X1 ≥ 0.15 (X1+X2+X3+X4) X1 + X2 X3 + XA < 5,000,000 X1, X2, X3, X4 ≥ 0arrow_forward
- Principles of Economics (12th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134078779Author:Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. OsterPublisher:PEARSONEngineering Economy (17th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134870069Author:William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick KoellingPublisher:PEARSON
- Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)EconomicsISBN:9781305585126Author:N. Gregory MankiwPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-...EconomicsISBN:9781259290619Author:Michael Baye, Jeff PrincePublisher:McGraw-Hill Education





