Bundle: Principles Of Economics, Loose-leaf Version, 8th + Lms Integrated Mindtap Economics, 1 Term (6 Months) Printed Access Card
8th Edition
ISBN: 9781337607650
Author: N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 36, Problem 9QR
To determine
Double taxation on income from capital.
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Students have asked these similar questions
The table below provides the total revenues and costs for a small landscaping company in a recent year.
Total Revenues ($)
250,000
Total Costs ($)
- wages and salaries
100,000
-risk-free return of 2% on owner's capital of $25,000
500
-interest on bank loan
1,000
- cost of supplies
27,000
- depreciation of capital equipment
8,000
- additional wages the owner could have earned in
next best alternative
30,000
-risk premium of 4% on owner's capital of $25,000
1,000
The economic profits for this firm are
○ A. $83,000.
B. $82,500.
OC. $114,000.
OD. $83,500.
○ E. $112,500.
Output TFC ($)
TVC ($)
TC ($)
(Q)
2
100
104
204
3
100
203
303
4
100
300
400
5
100
405
505
6
100
512
612
7
100
621
721
Given the information about short-run costs in the table above, we can conclude that the firm will minimize the average total cost of production when Q = (Round your response to
the nearest whole number.)
The following data show the total output for a firm when specified amounts of labour are combined with a fixed amount of capital. Assume that the wage per unit of labour is $20 and
the cost of the capital is $100.
Labour per unit of time
0
1
Total Output
0
25
T
2
3
4
5
75
137
212
267
The marginal product of labour is at its maximum when the firm changes the amount of labour hired from
○ A. 0 to 1 unit.
○ B. 3 to 4 units.
OC. 2 to 3 units.
OD. 1 to 2 units.
○ E. 4 to 5 units.
Chapter 36 Solutions
Bundle: Principles Of Economics, Loose-leaf Version, 8th + Lms Integrated Mindtap Economics, 1 Term (6 Months) Printed Access Card
Ch. 36.1 - Prob. 1QQCh. 36.2 - Prob. 2QQCh. 36.3 - Prob. 3QQCh. 36.4 - Prob. 4QQCh. 36.5 - Prob. 5QQCh. 36.6 - Prob. 6QQCh. 36 - Prob. 1CQQCh. 36 - Prob. 2CQQCh. 36 - Prob. 3CQQCh. 36 - Prob. 4CQQ
Ch. 36 - Prob. 5CQQCh. 36 - Prob. 6CQQCh. 36 - Prob. 1QRCh. 36 - Prob. 2QRCh. 36 - Prob. 3QRCh. 36 - Prob. 4QRCh. 36 - Prob. 5QRCh. 36 - Prob. 6QRCh. 36 - Prob. 7QRCh. 36 - Prob. 8QRCh. 36 - Prob. 9QRCh. 36 - Prob. 10QRCh. 36 - Prob. 1PACh. 36 - Prob. 2PACh. 36 - Prob. 3PACh. 36 - Prob. 4PACh. 36 - Prob. 5PACh. 36 - Prob. 6PACh. 36 - Prob. 7PACh. 36 - Prob. 8PA
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