Macroeconomics
13th Edition
ISBN: 9781337617390
Author: Roger A. Arnold
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 19, Problem 1WNG
To determine
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In a congressional district somewhere in the U.S., a new representative is being elected. The voters all have one-dimensional political views that can be neatly arrayed on a left-right spectrum. We can define the ”location” of a citizen’s political views in the following way. The citizen with the most extreme left-wing views is said to be at point 0 and the citizen with the most extreme right-wing views is said to be at point 1. If a citizen has views that are to the right of the views of the fraction x of the state’s population, that citizen’s views are said to be located at point x. There are two candidates for the congressional seat and they are forced to publicly state their own political position simultaneously on the zero-one left-right scale.
1.a Suppose voters always vote for the candidate whose stated position is nearest to their own views and suppose each candidate cares only about getting as many votes as possible.
In equilibrium, what will be the two candidates’ positions?…
Arrow's impossibility theorem states that under certain assumptions about preferences, no voting system exists that satisfies all of the following properties:
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Unanimity
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Transitivity
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Independence of irrelevant alternatives
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No dictators
Political Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election.
Voter Id
Preference(1-9)
A
4
B
5
C
6
True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6.
Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference?
Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences?
If the tax in C induces 100%…
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