Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN: 9781305506381
Author: James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 15A, Problem 1E
To determine

To Explain: The auction design features that reduce the winner’s curse and thus reduces the strategic underbidding.

Expert Solution & Answer
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Answer to Problem 1E

The features that reduce the winner’s curse have been explained.

Explanation of Solution

In an auction the winner would be the one who submits the highest bid and the winner’s curse happens when the bidder overestimates the asset and overpay for it. While bidding, if the winner’s curse is also considered and factored in, then the actual overpayment would not occur generally.

In order to avoid the winner’s curse the following guide lines may be followed:-

  1. It needs to be analyzed as to whether the asset has a common value element.
  2. A comparison of capabilities should be done between the bidders.
  3. While placing each bid, the consequences after winning the bid, should be analyzed by the bidder.
Economics Concept Introduction

Introduction: When the winning bid in an auction is more than the true worth of the item, then this tendency is called the winner’s curse.

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