Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN: 9781337106665
Author: Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 15, Problem 2MC
To determine
Nash equilibrium.
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Sam and Sarah are thinking about getting married. However if either of them cheats on the other, they would get a payoff of 10, while the other person gets zero. If neither cheat, they stay with each other and get a payoff of 7 each and if both cheat, the relationship falls apart and each get a payoff of 1.
What is the Nash equilibrium of this game?
a. Cheat, Cheat
b. Not cheat, Not cheat
Sam cheats, Sarah doesn't
Sarah cheats, Sam doesn't
Use the following extensive-form game to answer the following questions. a. List the feasible strategies for player 1 and player 2. b. Identify the Nash equilibria to this game. c. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium.
In game theory, what does the term "payoff" refer to?
a) The amount of money each player has at the beginning of the game.
b) The final outcome of the game.
c) The utility or benefit that a player receives based on the outcome of the game.
d) The number of strategies available to each player.
Chapter 15 Solutions
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
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- Answer all the questions, show all the working. Consider the following game in normal form. Not cooperate Cooperate Not cooperate 20,20 50,0 Cooperate 0,50 40,40 What is Nash equilibrium? Is it efficient? Why? What needs to be complied with so that the players would like to cooperate? What happens when one of the players does not cooperate? Why? Define trigger strategy. Calculate the discount factor (δ) that would make both players decide to cooperate.arrow_forwardi. ii. QUESTION ONE A. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that every player's strategy is the best response to all the other players. It requires that each player makes a best response and that expectations regarding the play of other players are correct. Below is the table showing strategies and payoff for Player 1 and Player 2. PLAYER 1 R1 R2 R3 R4 C1 0,7 5,2 7,0 6,6 C2 2,5 3,3 2,5 2,2 PLAYER 2 C3 7,0 5,2 0,7 4,4 CA 6,6 2,2 4,4 10,4 REQUIRED; Transform the normal form game above into an imperfect extensive game form Find the Nash equilibrium for the game above using iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Find the Nash equilibrium using brute force or cell by cell inspection.arrow_forwardGAME ZZZ B1 Player B A1 30, 30 Player A A2 20, 40 B2 40, 20 35, 35 In the Game ZZZ (see table above), all payoffs are listed with the row player's payoffs first and the column player's payoffs second. In this game, neither player has a dominant strategy. the Nash equilibrium does not maximize the total payoff. there is no Nash equilibrium. the Nash equilibrium maximizes the total payoff.arrow_forward
- 9. Little Kona is a small coffee company that is consider- ing entering a market dominated by Big Brew. Each company's profit depends on whether Little Kona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price: Little Kona Enter Don't Enter High Price Kona makes $2 million Kona makes zero Big Brew Brew makes $3 million Brew makes $7 million Kona loses $1 million Low Price Kona makes zero Brew makes $1 million Brew makes $2 millionarrow_forwardAny parts appreciated the more the better.arrow_forwardThis table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs in the table are shown as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B). B Right (2, 2) (1, 3) Left (3, 1) (0,0) Up A Down Which outcome is the Nash equilibrium in this game? (Up, Right) (Up, Left) (Down, Right) (Down, Left)arrow_forward
- The bimatrix represents a simultaneous move game between Rowena and Colin. Rowena's payoff is the left number in each cell. ROWENA Up Down 0.25Left +0.75Right 0.65Left +0.35Right Find Colin's mixed strategy that makes Rowena indifferent between a pure strategy of playing Up and a pure strategy of playing Down. 0.5Left +0.5Right Left 1,16 2,20 0.45Left +0.55Right COLIN Right 4,6 3,40arrow_forwardConsider the following game in normal form. Not cooperate Cooperate Not cooperate 20,20 50,0 Cooperate 0,50 40,40 What is Nash equilibrium? Is it efficient? Why? What needs to be complied with so that the players would like to cooperate? What happens when one of the players does not cooperate? Why? Define trigger strategy. Calculate the discount factor (δ) that would make both players decide to cooperate.arrow_forwarda. Consider the following sequential game. Player 1 A B Player 2 Player 1 a a B Player 2 (4) () y i. Determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibria and their outcomes. ii. Determine the Nash equilibria of the game. For each of the Nash equilibria, argue why no player has a profitable deviation. ii. Determine which parts of the Nash equilibrium strategies involve uncredible threats.arrow_forward
- Use the following payoff matrix to answer the following questions Suppose this is a one-shot game: a. Determine the dominant strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not. b. Determine the secure strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not. c. Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game. If such an equilibrium does not exist, explain why not.arrow_forwardWhich of the following correctly characterizes a Nash Equilibrium: a. The players could not be jointly better off if they cooperated. b. There is no incentive for either player to deviate from their strategy because the outcome maximizes the combined payoff of all players. c. Neither player has incentive to deviate from their strategy given the other player's strategy d. Neither player can have a dominant strategy..arrow_forwardTucker and Eddie are playing the following game. Tucker can choose A or B and Eddie can choose C or D. The first payoff is for Tucker, the second for Eddie. Eddie Tucker C D A 3, 2 4, 3 B 4, 5 3, 4 Identify the Nash equilibrium(s) in this game. What rational game theoretic advice would you offer Tucker and Eddie on how to play this game? If Tucker and Eddie follow your advice, what payoff should each expect? Show your work.arrow_forward
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