wo firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P=600-3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. nstruction: Do not round intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm: 33.33 Cournot profits for each firm: Stackelberg leader output[ Stackelberg follower output: Stackelberg leader profits: $ Stackelberg follower profits: $[ Bertrand market-level output Bertrand profits for each firm: S

wo firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P=600-3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. nstruction: Do not round intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm: 33.33 Cournot profits for each firm: Stackelberg leader output[ Stackelberg follower output: Stackelberg leader profits: $ Stackelberg follower profits: $[ Bertrand market-level output Bertrand profits for each firm: S

Survey of Economics (MindTap Course List)

9th Edition

ISBN:9781305260948

Author:Irvin B. Tucker

Publisher:Irvin B. Tucker

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20SQ

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Please show work for: Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 600 − 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior.Instruction: Do not round intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values.Cournot output for each firm: Cournot profits for each firm: $ Stackelberg leader output: Stackelberg follower output: Stackelberg leader profits: $ Stackelberg follower profits: $ Bertrand market-level output: Bertrand profits for each firm: $ Collusive market-level output: Collusive industry-level profits: $
Please solve all the parts and only typed answer The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 16,000 – 4Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 4,000QL and CF (QF) = 6,000QF. What is the follower’s reaction function? Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower. Leader output: Follower output: Determine the equilibrium market price. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower. Leader profits: Follower profits:
The inverse market demand eurve for a Covid-19 mask is given by P(y) = 120 – 2y , and the total cost function for any firm in the industry is given by TC(y) = 4y • What will be the total output and price if there are two Cournot firms competing in the industry? • What would be the total output and price if two firms have decided to collude?
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(I) Duopoly with homogeneous product: quantity and price competition Consider a market with two firms (firms 1 and 2). The (inverse) demand curve is: p = 30 - 2q where q= q1 + q2 Suppose Firm 1 has a marginal cost (c1) of 6 and Firm 2 has a marginal cost (c2) of 12. Assume neither firm has a fixed cost. (1) Suppose firms choose quantities sequentially: Firm 1 chooses q and after that decision is known Firm 2 chooses q2. Calculate the SPNE. (2) Suppose firms choose prices sequentially: Firm 2 chooses its price first and after that decision is known Firm 1 chooses its price. What is the SPNE? Justify.
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only typed answer The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 26,000 −4Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 2,000QL and CF (QF) = 4,000QF. a. What is the follower’s reaction function? QF = − QL b. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower. Leader output: Follower output: c. Determine the equilibrium market price. $ d. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower. Leader profits: $ Follower profits: $
total cost function for this market is TC = 500 + 10Q2 1. What are the profit-maximizing quantity, price, and profit for this market? 2. If there are two firms Atlas and Bowden in this market with the same earlier total cost function and they engage in Cournot competition, what is each firm's equilibrium quantity, price, and profit? [NB: round quantities to nearest integer to find equilibrium quantity, price, and profit] Is this a long run equilibrium? Why or why not?
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