Continuing with inverse demand p = 50 - Q, if each firm has marginal cost of 0, what is the difference between the equilibrium price under Cournot competition and under Bertrand competition? The Cournot price is higher than the Bertrand price by 50. The Cournot price is lower than the Bertrand price by 25. The Cournot price is higher than the Bertrand price by 50/3. Equilibrium prices under Cournot and Bertrand are the same, so the difference is zero.

Continuing with inverse demand p = 50 - Q, if each firm has marginal cost of 0, what is the difference between the equilibrium price under Cournot competition and under Bertrand competition? The Cournot price is higher than the Bertrand price by 50. The Cournot price is lower than the Bertrand price by 25. The Cournot price is higher than the Bertrand price by 50/3. Equilibrium prices under Cournot and Bertrand are the same, so the difference is zero.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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