Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P-600-3Q Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Instruction: Do not round intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm 25 O Cournot profits for each firm: $ 3750 Stackelberg leader output: 5625 O Stackelberg follower output: Stackelberg leader profits: $ Stackelberg follower profits: $ Bertrand market-level output Bertrand profits for each firm: $ Collusive market-level output: Collusive industry-level profits: $

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P-600-3Q Each firm produces at a
constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings
characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior.
Instruction: Do not round intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values.
Cournot output for each firm
25 O
Cournot profits for each firm: $ 3750
Stackelberg leader output: 5625 O
Stackelberg follower output:
Stackelberg leader profits: $
Stackelberg follower profits: $
Bertrand market-level output
Bertrand profits for each firm: $
Collusive market-level output:
Collusive industry-level profits: $
Transcribed Image Text:Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P-600-3Q Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Instruction: Do not round intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values. Cournot output for each firm 25 O Cournot profits for each firm: $ 3750 Stackelberg leader output: 5625 O Stackelberg follower output: Stackelberg leader profits: $ Stackelberg follower profits: $ Bertrand market-level output Bertrand profits for each firm: $ Collusive market-level output: Collusive industry-level profits: $
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