What is the key assumption in the difference-in-differences method? Two groups of people should have the same potential outcomes Two groups of people should have the same time trend in their potential outcomes Two groups of people should have the same potential outcomes before the policy is in place Two groups of people should have the same potential outcomes after the policy is in place

What is the key assumption in the difference-in-differences method? Two groups of people should have the same potential outcomes Two groups of people should have the same time trend in their potential outcomes Two groups of people should have the same potential outcomes before the policy is in place Two groups of people should have the same potential outcomes after the policy is in place

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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