We now focus on one country. Assume that the society is composed of two individuals A and B. The total income available in the society is $550,000. The utility of individual A is given by UA = VIA and individual B ones is given by UA = 0.5/IB. b) What should the income distribution be for the individuals to have the same utility level? c) Find the income distribution that maximizes social welfare in the case of an additive social welfare function. Now imagine that in reality, individual A has an income of $500,000 and individual B's income is $50,000. d) How far from the optimal income distribution defined in question c) are we? What redistri- bution should be chosen to reach the optimal social welfare calculated in c)?

We now focus on one country. Assume that the society is composed of two individuals A and B. The total income available in the society is $550,000. The utility of individual A is given by UA = VIA and individual B ones is given by UA = 0.5/IB. b) What should the income distribution be for the individuals to have the same utility level? c) Find the income distribution that maximizes social welfare in the case of an additive social welfare function. Now imagine that in reality, individual A has an income of $500,000 and individual B's income is $50,000. d) How far from the optimal income distribution defined in question c) are we? What redistri- bution should be chosen to reach the optimal social welfare calculated in c)?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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