The most general form of a social welfare function (SWF ) can be written as W = W(U1; ... ; UH).
a. Explain the following properties that a SWF may satisfy: non paternalism, Pareto principle, anonymity (the names of the agents do not matter), and concavity (aversion to inequality).
b. Consider two agents h = 1; 2 with utilities U1 and U2. Depict the social indifference curve of the utilitarian SWF in (U1; U2)-space. Which of the properties in part a does it satisfy?
c. Depict the social indifference curves of the maxim in or Rawlins SWF. Contrast to the utilitarian SWF with respect to the aversion to inequality. Which properties does the Rawlins SWF satisfy?
d. The Bernoulli-Nash social welfare function is given by the product of individual utilities. Discuss the distributional properties of the Bernoulli-Nash SWF.
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