Answered: Warren says it comes from the "logic of…

Warren says it comes from the "logic of domination" – the principle that for any X and Y, if X is superior to Y, then X is justified in dominating Y. What do you think of this?

Social Psychology (10th Edition)

10th Edition

ISBN:9780134641287

Author:Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers

Publisher:Elliot Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers

Chapter1: Introducing Social Psychology

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1RQ1

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please if you can teach explain