(Variants of the Stag Hunt) Consider two variants of the n-hunter Stag Hunt in which only m hunters, with 2 ≤ m < n, need to pursue the stag in order to catch it. (Continue to assume that there is a single stag.) Assume that a captured stag is shared only by the hunters that catch it.
(Variants of the Stag Hunt) Consider two variants of the n-hunter Stag Hunt in which only m hunters, with 2 ≤ m < n, need to pursue the stag in order to catch it. (Continue to assume that there is a single stag.) Assume that a captured stag is shared only by the hunters that catch it.
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Assume, as before, that each hunter prefers the fraction 1/n of the stag to a hare. Find the Nash equilibria of the strategic game that models this situation.
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Assume that each hunter prefers the fraction 1/k of the stag to a hare, but prefers the hare to any smaller fraction of the stag, where k is an integer with m ≤ k ≤ n. Find the Nash equilibria of the strategic game that models this situation.
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