U2. Agroup has 100 members. Each person can choose to participate or not participate in a common project. If n of them participate in the project, then each participant derives the benefit p(n) = n, and each of the (100 – n) shirkers derives the benefit s(n) = 3n -180. %3D (a) Is this collective-action problem an example of a prisoners' dilemma, a game of chicken, or an assurance game? (b) Write the expression for the total social payoff of the group. (c) Show, either graphically or mathematically, that the maximum total social payoff for the group occurs when n = 100.

U2. Agroup has 100 members. Each person can choose to participate or not participate in a common project. If n of them participate in the project, then each participant derives the benefit p(n) = n, and each of the (100 – n) shirkers derives the benefit s(n) = 3n -180. %3D (a) Is this collective-action problem an example of a prisoners' dilemma, a game of chicken, or an assurance game? (b) Write the expression for the total social payoff of the group. (c) Show, either graphically or mathematically, that the maximum total social payoff for the group occurs when n = 100.

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter1: The Role And Method Of Economics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10P

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