There are two firms, each having the option of polluting during production or cleaning up its production process such that it doesn't pollute. Of course, polluting is cheaper than not polluting. The payoffs for each of the choice combinations are shown in the decision matrix below. Firm B Pollute Don't Pollute $75,000 $25.000 $75.000 $10,000 $10,000 $25,000 125.000 125.000 What kind of commitment strategy could keep these firms from polluting? Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the option once to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click the option twice to empty the box. The environmental protection agency conducts a study on the dangers of pollution. 7 The government recommends that the companies not pollute. 7 The government makes pollution illegal and charges a company a $10,000 fine if it is caught polluting. 7 The companies agree not to pollute 7 The government makes pollution illegal and charges a company a $75,000 fine if it is caught polluting. Fim A Pollute Don't Pollute

There are two firms, each having the option of polluting during production or cleaning up its production process such that it doesn't pollute. Of course, polluting is cheaper than not polluting. The payoffs for each of the choice combinations are shown in the decision matrix below. Firm B Pollute Don't Pollute $75,000 $25.000 $75.000 $10,000 $10,000 $25,000 125.000 125.000 What kind of commitment strategy could keep these firms from polluting? Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the option once to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click the option twice to empty the box. The environmental protection agency conducts a study on the dangers of pollution. 7 The government recommends that the companies not pollute. 7 The government makes pollution illegal and charges a company a $10,000 fine if it is caught polluting. 7 The companies agree not to pollute 7 The government makes pollution illegal and charges a company a $75,000 fine if it is caught polluting. Fim A Pollute Don't Pollute

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter17: Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9PA

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Explain all option compulsary.....you will not explain all option then I will give you down upvote...
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