Two hotels are considering a location along a newly constructed highway through the esert. The highway is 500 miles long with an exit every 50 miles (including both ends). he hotels may choose to to locate at any exit. These will be the only hotels for any traveler sing the highway. Each traveler has their own most preferred location along the highway t some exit) for a hotel, and will choose to go the hotel closest to that location. Travelers ost preferred locations are distributed evenly, so that each exit has the same number of avelers who prefer that exit. If both hotels are the same distance from a traveler's most referred location, then that traveler flips a coin to determine which hotel to stay at. A otel would each like to maximize the number of travelers who stay at it.

Two hotels are considering a location along a newly constructed highway through the esert. The highway is 500 miles long with an exit every 50 miles (including both ends). he hotels may choose to to locate at any exit. These will be the only hotels for any traveler sing the highway. Each traveler has their own most preferred location along the highway t some exit) for a hotel, and will choose to go the hotel closest to that location. Travelers ost preferred locations are distributed evenly, so that each exit has the same number of avelers who prefer that exit. If both hotels are the same distance from a traveler's most referred location, then that traveler flips a coin to determine which hotel to stay at. A otel would each like to maximize the number of travelers who stay at it.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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