2. An accident costs $1000 if it occurs. If neither party takes precaution, the chance of an accident is 10%. If the injurer takes precaution, the probability of an accident de- creases by 4%. If the injuree takes precaution, the probability of an accident decreases by 2%. These differences are cumulative and independent. (I.e., if both take precau- tion, the probability of an accident is 4%.) The cost of precaution is $30 for each party which takes precaution. (a) What is the efficient amount of precaution from each party? (Precaution is a yes-or-no event here, for each party.) (b) Consider a rule of simple negligence. Does this result in the efficient outcome? Show directly if this is the case; i.e., by finding the Nash equilibrium. (c) Consider instead a rule of negligence with a defense of contributory negligence. Consider very carefully what the payoffs are, and show what is the equilibrium. Hint: You are only negligent if you fail to meet the burden of due care, not for failing to take inefficient precaution.
2. An accident costs $1000 if it occurs. If neither party takes precaution, the chance of an accident is 10%. If the injurer takes precaution, the probability of an accident de- creases by 4%. If the injuree takes precaution, the probability of an accident decreases by 2%. These differences are cumulative and independent. (I.e., if both take precau- tion, the probability of an accident is 4%.) The cost of precaution is $30 for each party which takes precaution. (a) What is the efficient amount of precaution from each party? (Precaution is a yes-or-no event here, for each party.) (b) Consider a rule of simple negligence. Does this result in the efficient outcome? Show directly if this is the case; i.e., by finding the Nash equilibrium. (c) Consider instead a rule of negligence with a defense of contributory negligence. Consider very carefully what the payoffs are, and show what is the equilibrium. Hint: You are only negligent if you fail to meet the burden of due care, not for failing to take inefficient precaution.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Question
3

Transcribed Image Text:2. An accident costs $1000 if it occurs. If neither party takes precaution, the chance of
an accident is 10%. If the injurer takes precaution, the probability of an accident de-
creases by 4%. If the injuree takes precaution, the probability of an accident decreases
by 2%. These differences are cumulative and independent. (I.e., if both take precau-
tion, the probability of an accident is 4%.) The cost of precaution is $30 for each party
which takes precaution.
(a) What is the efficient amount of precaution from each party? (Precaution is a
yes-or-no event here, for each party.)
(b) Consider a rule of simple negligence. Does this result in the efficient outcome?
Show directly if this is the case; i.e., by finding the Nash equilibrium.
(c) Consider instead a rule of negligence with a defense of contributory negligence.
Consider very carefully what the payoffs are, and show what is the equilibrium.
Hint: You are only negligent if you fail to meet the burden of due care, not for
failing to take inefficient precaution.
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