There are two towns, A and B, each with a plant emitting pollution. The emission from plant Ais uniformly distributed across both town A and B. The emissions from plant B are local to town B. Despite the difference in affected area, the marginal benefit to either town of abating one unit of pollution from either source is the same, MB(Qi) = 17 − Qi per person, where Qi is total emissions abated from town i’s air. The marginal cost of abatement at plants A and B are MCA(qA) = 200qA and MCB(qB) = 100qB, respectively. If town A has 300 citizens and town B has 200, what is the efficient tax to set at each plant?

There are two towns, A and B, each with a plant emitting pollution. The emission from plant Ais uniformly distributed across both town A and B. The emissions from plant B are local to town B. Despite the difference in affected area, the marginal benefit to either town of abating one unit of pollution from either source is the same, MB(Qi) = 17 − Qi per person, where Qi is total emissions abated from town i’s air. The marginal cost of abatement at plants A and B are MCA(qA) = 200qA and MCB(qB) = 100qB, respectively. If town A has 300 citizens and town B has 200, what is the efficient tax to set at each plant?

Microeconomics

13th Edition

ISBN:9781337617406

Author:Roger A. Arnold

Publisher:Roger A. Arnold

Chapter17: Market Failure: Externalities, Public Goods, And Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13QP: Economists sometimes shock noneconomists by stating that they do not favor the complete elimination...

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