Firms in a polluting industry can be classified in two groups: newer firms with a cleaner technology that can abate pollution at a lower marginal cost M CLA L = (1/2) aL  and older firms with dirtier M CAH  = aH  , where ai  is the level of abatement undertaken by firms of type i = L,H. The social marginal benefit of abating pollution from this particular industry is MBA = 120 - A, where A is the aggregate level of abatement in that industry: 1. What Pigouvian tax t will implement the efficient allocation (aL; aH )? Is the resulting allocation an efficient allocation? What is the government’s tax revenue?   2. Suppose that in order to avoid the costly obtention of disaggregate information about individual firms cost, the government just implements a uniform standard aui = A*/2. Is this allocation efficient? If not, what is the deadweight loss?   3. Suppose instead that the government uniformly allocates tradable emission’s permits. What abatement allocation will prevail after the permits are traded among firms? Is this allocation efficient?

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Firms in a polluting industry can be classified in two groups: newer firms with a cleaner technology that can abate pollution at a lower marginal cost M CLA L = (1/2) aL  and older firms with dirtier M CAH  = aH  , where ai  is the level of abatement undertaken by firms of type i = L,H. The social marginal benefit of abating pollution from this particular industry is MB= 120 - A, where A is the aggregate level of abatement in that industry:

1. What Pigouvian tax t will implement the efficient allocation (aL; aH )? Is the resulting allocation an efficient allocation? What is the government’s tax revenue?

 

2. Suppose that in order to avoid the costly obtention of disaggregate information about individual firms cost, the government just implements a uniform standard aui = A*/2. Is this allocation efficient? If not, what is the deadweight loss?

 

3. Suppose instead that the government uniformly allocates tradable emission’s permits. What abatement allocation will prevail after the permits are traded among firms? Is this allocation efficient?

(b) What Pigouvian tax t will implement the efficient allocation (a, , a4)?
Is the resulting allocation an efficient allocation? What is the gov-
ernment's tax revenue?
*
(c) Suppose that in order to avoid the costly obtention of disaggregate
information about individual firms' costs, the government just im-
plements a uniform standard a = A* /2. Is this allocation efficient?
If not, what is the deadweight loss?
(d) Suppose instead that the government uniformly allocates tradable
emission's permits. What abatement allocation will prevail after the
permits are traded among firms? Is this allocation efficient?
Transcribed Image Text:(b) What Pigouvian tax t will implement the efficient allocation (a, , a4)? Is the resulting allocation an efficient allocation? What is the gov- ernment's tax revenue? * (c) Suppose that in order to avoid the costly obtention of disaggregate information about individual firms' costs, the government just im- plements a uniform standard a = A* /2. Is this allocation efficient? If not, what is the deadweight loss? (d) Suppose instead that the government uniformly allocates tradable emission's permits. What abatement allocation will prevail after the permits are traded among firms? Is this allocation efficient?
Firms in a polluting industry can be classified in two groups: newer firms
with a cleaner technology that can abate pollution at a lower marginal
cost MCk
a; is the level of abatement undertaken by firms of type i
social marginal benefit of abating pollution from this particular industry
is MBA
(1/2)aL and older firms with dirtier MCH
ан, where
L, H. The
120 – A, where A is the aggregate level of abatement in that
industry.
Transcribed Image Text:Firms in a polluting industry can be classified in two groups: newer firms with a cleaner technology that can abate pollution at a lower marginal cost MCk a; is the level of abatement undertaken by firms of type i social marginal benefit of abating pollution from this particular industry is MBA (1/2)aL and older firms with dirtier MCH ан, where L, H. The 120 – A, where A is the aggregate level of abatement in that industry.
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