The Upstream Nukem Co. uses a technology that produces pollutants as a by-product. The company dumps these pollutants into Radiant River. The only way that Nukem can reduce pollution is by cutting output. Nukem's profits, expressed as a function of the amount x (in tons) of pollutants per day, is IIN(x) = 80x - 5x² The pollution adversely affects the performance of Downstream Glowing Fisheries. Glowing's profit, as a function of the quantity of pollution, is given by IIG(x) = K - 5x² where K is a constant relating to all factors other than pollution. (i) If there are no restraints on pollution and no negotiations between the two companies, how much pollution will Nukem produce per day? * =. O 10 08 O 6 O 4 02 (ii) What is the socially optimal quantity of pollution? * = 02 O 4 O 3

The Upstream Nukem Co. uses a technology that produces pollutants as a by-product. The company dumps these pollutants into Radiant River. The only way that Nukem can reduce pollution is by cutting output. Nukem's profits, expressed as a function of the amount x (in tons) of pollutants per day, is IIN(x) = 80x - 5x² The pollution adversely affects the performance of Downstream Glowing Fisheries. Glowing's profit, as a function of the quantity of pollution, is given by IIG(x) = K - 5x² where K is a constant relating to all factors other than pollution. (i) If there are no restraints on pollution and no negotiations between the two companies, how much pollution will Nukem produce per day? * =. O 10 08 O 6 O 4 02 (ii) What is the socially optimal quantity of pollution? * = 02 O 4 O 3

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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