not use ai please There are two players. Each player is given an unmarked envelopeand asked to put in it either nothing or 300 of his own money or 600 of his own money. Areferee collects the envelopes, opens them, gathers all the money, then adds 50% of thatamount (using his own money) and divides the total into two equal parts which he thendistributes to the players.(a) Suppose that Player 1 has some animosity towards the referee and ranks the outcomesin terms of how much money the referee loses (the more, the better), while Player 2 isselfish and greedy and ranks the outcomes in terms of her own net gain. (For example,if player 1 selects 0 and player 2 selects 300, then player 1's pay-off is 150 and player2's payoff is -75.) Describe this game in a matrix.(b) What is the best response correspondence for the above game?(c) Find the Nash equilibria of the above game.

a. Describing the game in a matrix:We are given that:1.Each player can contribute 0, 300 or 600 of…

Answered: There are two players. Each player is…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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A game is played as follows: First Player 1 decides (Y or N) whether or not to play.If she chooses N, the game ends. If she chooses Y, then Player 2 decides (Y or N) whetheror not to play. If he chooses N the game ends. If he chooses Y, then they go ahead and playanother game with the payoffs shown below. A player who opts out by choosing N gets 2 andthe other player gets 0. Draw the tree of this game and then find the two subgame-perfect Nashequilibria.
Please no written by hand and no emage Two classmates A and B are assigned a group project. Each student can choose to Shirk or Work. If one or more students chooses Work, the project is completed and provides each with credit valued at 4 payoff units each. The cost of completing the project is that 6 total units of effort (measured in payoff units) is divided equally among all players who choose to Work and this is subtracted from their payoff. If both Shirk, they do not have to expend any effort but the project is not completed, giving each a payoff of 0. The instructor can only tell whether the project is completed and cannot determine which students contributed to the project. A. Write down (draw) the normal form game, with payoff in the format of (player A payoff, player B payoff). Note that we assume students choose to Shirk or Work simultaneously. B. Does either player have a dominant strategy? C. Find the Nash equilibrium or equilibria. D. Explain ‘Prisoners’ dilemma’ using the…
Economics The trust game is a two player game with three stages, often used in economics exper- iments to measure trust and trustworthiness. Player 1 starts off with 10 Dollars. She can send an amouh 0 SI S 10 to player 2. The experimenter triples the sent amount such that player 2 receives 3r. Player 2 can then send an amount 0
sub= 24
which one is the correct answer
Player Rhas a $2, a $5, and a $10 bill. Player Chas a $1, a $5, and a $10 bill. Each player selects and shows (simultaneously) one of his or her three bills. If the total value of the two bills shown is even, Rwins Cs bill; if the value is odd, Cwins Rs bill. (Which player would you rather be?) (A) Set up the payoff matrix for the game. (B) Solve the game using the simplex method discussed in this section. (Remove any recessive rows and columns, if present, before you start the simplex method.)
Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.
10
Example 1: Zero Sum Game Game Table 2 Game Table 1 Player 2 Player 2 S1 S2 Si S2 RI (3,-3) (-5,5) Player 1 R1 3 -5 RI (0,0) (7,-7) R1 7 Player 1 All players payoff shown =) Fnd Nasn ewwliLtlun> zero sum shorthand
0 E F 3 2 FIGURE 2 23 D G 2 H 0 1 (2) Two friends, Albert (A) and Berta (B), have to decide on going to one of three bars, Xenia's (X), Yara's (Y), or Zana's (Z). They decide to select a bar by alternatively vetoing bars until one remains. First Albert vetoes a bar. If at least two bars remain, then Berta vetoes another bar. That process continues until a single bar remains unvetoed. Suppose Albert prefers Xenia's to Yara's to Zana's and Berta prefers Zana's to Yara's to Xenia's. Assume that, for each of the two, going to their most preferred bar gives a utility of 2, going to their next preferred bar gives a utility of 1, and going to their least preferred bar gives a utility of 0. Model this as an extensive form game and find its Nash equilibria. Which of the Nash equilibria are subgame perfect?

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