Consider the following two-player game:P2LCRU3,02,00, xP1 M1, 12,03, 4D6,24, 51, 31. Let x=0. Characterise ALL the Nash Equilibria and illustrate your answerby a clearly labeled best response graph with P1's strategy on the x-axis andP2's strategy on the y-axis.2. Now, let x be any integer.(a) Depending on the values of x, identify the set of dominated strategies.(b) Depending on the values of x, identify the set of rationalizable strategies.

1. Nash Equilibria for x=0We begin by analyzing the two-player game matrix for x=0, which gives us…

Answered: Consider the following two-player game:…

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3MC

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(d) Consider a simultaneous-move game between two firms choosing to sell their product at either £6, £7 or £8. The actions and payoffs are given in the matrix below. Firm 2's Prices £6 £7 £8 Firm 1's prices £6 4, 5 3, 5 2, 1 £7 0,4 2, 1 3,0 £8 -1, 1 4, 3 0, 2 What are the Nash equilibria of this game? Game theory is often used by firms competing under an oligopoly as a means of determining their best strategy. Why is game theory a useful tool and which characteristics of an oligopoly make it particularly useful for firms competing in this market structure? One outcome of an oligopoly is that firms may have an incentive to collude. Explain some of the conditions that make collusion more likely to occur and how game theory can explain why collusive agreements often break down.
Consider the payoff matrix below, which describes a symmetric A B A 17,17 0,14 B 14,0 8,8 (a) Find all Nash equilibria of this game, including any mixed strategy equilibria. (b) Draw the expected payoff difference diagram for this game, including all the Nash equilibria you found in (a). is (c) What would you expect to occur most frequently when this game played as a lab experiment? Justify your answer using your answers from (a) and (b).
4. You have probably had the experience of trying to avoid encountering someone, whom we will call Rocky. In this instance, Rocky is trying to find you. It is Saturday night and you are choosing which of two possible parties to attend. You like Party 1 better and, if Rocky goes to the other party, you get a payoff 20 at Party 1. If Rocky attends Party 1, however, you are going to be uncomfortable and get a payoff of 5. Similarly, Party 2 gives you a payoff of 15, unless Rocky attends, in which case the payoff is 0. Rocky likes Party 2 better, but he is likes you. He values Party 2 at 10, Party 1 at 5, and your presence at either party that he attends is worth an additional payoff of 10. You and Rocky both know each others strategy space (which party to attend) and payoffs functions.
2- Consider the following game. Player 2 Player 1 U 12, 2 | 3, 9 5, 8 4, 2 D (a) Find all the Nash equilibria, pure and mixed. (b) Suppose that the payoff of the column player u:(D, L) is reduced from 8 to 6, but all other payoffs remain the same. Again, find all the pure- and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. (c) Compare the mixed-strategy equilibria in parts (a) and (b). Did this worsening in one of player 2's payoffs change player 2's equilibrium mixed strategy? Did it change player l's? Give some intuition.
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Two workers are on a production line. They each have two actions: exert effort, E, or shirk, S. Effort costs a worker e > 0 and shirking costs them nothing. If two workers do action E a lot of output is produced and the workers earn £3 each. If only one worker chooses action E less output is produced and they both earn £1. The workers earn nothing if they both shirk. (i) Describe this situation as a strategic form game (assuming the workers do not observe each other's effort choice when making their own decision). (ii) For what values of e does this game have strictly dominant strategies? (iii) Describe the Nash equilibria of this game for e = 0,1, 2, 3. (iv) The workers now are re-arranged into a production line. First worker 1 moves and then worker 2 moves. Worker 2 can now see worker l's effort level before they choose their effort. Draw this extensive form game. (v) Find the subgame perfect equilibria of the production-line game for c = 1/2 and c = 3/2.
F G H 1 3 6 3 A 6. 8. 8 5 3 B 3 3 4 4. 9. C 5 3 a.) Find all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the above game. b.) * Prove that there is a Nash equilibrium in which Player 2 chooses H, while Player 1 chooses A with probability 0.4 and chooses C with probability 0.6. 00 2,
rock paper scissors rock 0. -3 0. раper scissors -1 -1 3. 0. (a) Show that xT= (,) and yT= (,) together are not a Nash equilibrium 3' 3 3131 for this modified game.
In the following symmetric general sum game (2, 2) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (2, 2) (0,0) (2,2) (0,0) (i) Find all pure Nash equilibria. (ii) Find all mixed Nash equilibria in which all probabilities are positive. (vi) Which of these are evolutionary stable strategies?

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