There is a differentiated Cournot duopoly. The inverse demand curve for firm 1 is p subscript 1 equals 18 minus 3 q subscript 1 minus 2 q subscript 2 and the inverse demand for firm 2 is p subscript 2 equals 12 minus q subscript 1 minus 2 q subscript 2. There are no costs of production. The two firms' first-order conditions are a. 18 minus 6 q subscript 1 minus 2 q subscript 2 equals 0 and 12 minus q subscript 1 minus 4 q subscript 2 equals 0 b. 18 minus 3 q subscript 1 minus 2 q subscript 2 equals 0 and 12 minus q subscript 1 minus 2 q subscript 2 equals 0 c. 18 minus 6 q subscript 1 minus 4 q subscript 2 equals 0 and 12 minus 2 q subscript 1 minus 4 q subscript 2 equals 0 d. 18 minus 3 q subscript 1 minus 4 q subscript 2 equals 0 and 12 minus 2 q subscript 1 minus 2 q subscript 2 equals 0
A monopolistic firm sells into two markets. The two inverse demand curves are and . Assume that the firm cannot charge different prices in the two markets. Then its total revenue will be
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There would be a potential market failure if a good was
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nonexcludable, but not if it was both excludable and nonrival |
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nonrival, but not if it was both rival and nonexcludable |
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both nonrival and nonexcludable, but not if it was either rival or excludable |
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either nonexcludable or nonrival |
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