Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $10 per unit. Firm 1 faces a demand function of where q, is Firm 1's output, p, is Firm 1's price, and p, is Firm 2's price. Similarly, the demand Firm 2 faces is Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium. in equilibrium, p, equals $ and P₂ equals $ (Enter numeric responses using integers.) q, = 160 – 2P, + 1P2, q2 = 160-2p₂+1p₁.

Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $10 per unit. Firm 1 faces a demand function of where q, is Firm 1's output, p, is Firm 1's price, and p, is Firm 2's price. Similarly, the demand Firm 2 faces is Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium. in equilibrium, p, equals $ and P₂ equals $ (Enter numeric responses using integers.) q, = 160 – 2P, + 1P2, q2 = 160-2p₂+1p₁.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

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ISBN:9780190931919

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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Question

Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $10 per unit. Firm 1 faces a demand function of
where q, is Firm 1's output, p, is Firm 1's price, and p., is Firm 2's price. Similarly, the demand Firm 2 faces is
Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium.
In equilibrium, p, equals $ and p2 equals $ (Enter numeric responses using integers.)
9₁-160-2p₁ + 1P2
92 = 160-2p₂+1P1-

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