The market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 113 - 2.2Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2 (Firm 1 and Firm 2), and the costs functions for each firm are: TC1 = 25 + 16.3Q1 and TC2 = 29 + 27.7Q2. Instructions: Use no decimals. Use the average cost to calculate monopoly profits. Do not round if values are used to complete other calculations. Complete the following table. Q1 Q2 P Profits F1 Profits F2 Duopoly competition Collusion

The market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 113 - 2.2Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2 (Firm 1 and Firm 2), and the costs functions for each firm are: TC1 = 25 + 16.3Q1 and TC2 = 29 + 27.7Q2. Instructions: Use no decimals. Use the average cost to calculate monopoly profits. Do not round if values are used to complete other calculations. Complete the following table. Q1 Q2 P Profits F1 Profits F2 Duopoly competition Collusion

Survey Of Economics

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337111522

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter9: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18SQ

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The market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 100 - 2Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2 (Firm 1 and Firm 2), and the costs functions for each firms are: TC1 = 12Q1 and TC2 = 20Q2. Instructions: Use no decimals. Use the average cost to calculate monopoly profits. Do not round if values are used to complete other calculations. Complete the following table. Q1 Q2 P Profits F1 Profits F2 F1 colludes, F2 cheats w/ QDC F1 colludes, F2 cheats w/ QBRF
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