The graph above represents a bilateral transboundary pollutant and the economics of reaching an agreement between two countries, Country A and Country B. MD; represents total damages of A and B. Answer the following discussion questions: 1. Question 1: How could one interpret the amount calculated by (MD: -MD,)? 2. Question 2: In your opinion, what point would Country A regard as efficient level of emissions without regard to the externalities it produces in Country B? Explain your answer.

The graph above represents a bilateral transboundary pollutant and the economics of reaching an agreement between two countries, Country A and Country B. MD; represents total damages of A and B. Answer the following discussion questions: 1. Question 1: How could one interpret the amount calculated by (MD: -MD,)? 2. Question 2: In your opinion, what point would Country A regard as efficient level of emissions without regard to the externalities it produces in Country B? Explain your answer.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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