Consider two firms with the following marginal abatement costs (MAC) as a function of emissions: MAC1 = 7 - E1 MAC2 = 14 - 2E2 %3D Assume that marginal external damages (MED) from the aggregate emissions of both firms (EA = E1+E2) is: MED = 0.5EA To achieve the socially efficient level of aggregate emissions EA* using a per-unit tax on emissions, the government should set the tax equal to $.

Consider two firms with the following marginal abatement costs (MAC) as a function of emissions: MAC1 = 7 - E1 MAC2 = 14 - 2E2 %3D Assume that marginal external damages (MED) from the aggregate emissions of both firms (EA = E1+E2) is: MED = 0.5EA To achieve the socially efficient level of aggregate emissions EA* using a per-unit tax on emissions, the government should set the tax equal to $.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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2. The PMB associated with a product's consumption is PMB-SMB = 360 - 4Q and the PMC = 6Q. The marginal external damage associated with this good's production is MD=2Q. To correct the externality, the government decides to impose a tax of $T per unit sold. | a) What is the level of production without pollution? b) What is the socially optimal level of production? c) What tax should the government set to achieve the social optimum? d) Explain the difference in the two values in (a) and (b)?
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To model the effects of a carbon tax on CO2 emissions, policymakers study the marginal cost of abatement B(x), defined as the cost of increas- ing CO2 reduction from x to x +1 tons (in units of ten thousand tons- Figure 4). Which quantity is represented by the area under the curve over [0, 3] in Figure 4? B(x) ($/ton) 100 75 50+ 25- 1 3 Tons reduced (ten thousands) FIGURE 4 Marginal cost of abatement B(x).
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Consider two firms with the following marginal abatement costs (MAC) as a function of emissions (E): MAC_1 = 22 - 2E_1 MAC_2 = 10 - E_2, and assume marginal external damages (MED) from the aggregate emissions of both firms (E_Agg = E_1 + E_2) is: MED = .5E_Agg. To achieve the socially efficient level of aggregate emissions (E*_Agg), the government institutes a cap and trade policy and sets the cap equal to the socially efficient level of emissions (E*_Agg). If firm 2 is initially grandfathered 2 permits, it will buy ____ more permits. (Note: your answer can be positive or negative; if it is positive, the firm is buying additional permits; if it is negative, the firm sells permits. So, for example, an answer of -10 implies that the firm sells 10 permits)
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Consider the following graph that shows the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve for a coal power plan for reducing local air pollution and the marginal damage (MD) curve for those living around the coal power plant. MD (E) MAC (E b. Emissions E-0 E EL E-Max AMax Or Abatement E A-0 What are the total abatement costs at E' (enter your answer with the letters and "+" signs as "a+b+c+d+e+f", without the quotation marks. What are the total abatement costs at E-0 (enter your answer with the letters and "+" signs as as "a+b+c+d+c+f", without the quotation marks. If the property rights were with the coal power plant how much Emissions would we see? (enter one of the following, "E-0", "E", "E1", "E-Max") If the property rights were with the people how much Emissions would we see? (enter one of the following. "E-0", "E", "E1 "E-Max") What is the socially optimal level of emissions (choose from one of the following and enter as written without the quotation marks, "E-0". "E"E1 "E-Max").
2, = 160,000 – 2000P and Qs=40,000+2000P, where Q, is the quantity demanded in 100-pound lots, Q, is the quantity supplied in 100-pound lots, and P is the price per 100-pound lot. Currently there is no attempt to regulate the dumping of effluent into streams and rivers by the paper mills. As a result, dumping is widespread. The marginal external cost (MEC) associated with the production of paper is given by the curve MEC=0.0006Qs- a. Calculate the output and price of paper if it is produced under competitive conditions and no attempt is made to monitor or regulate the dumping of effluent. b. Determine the socially efficient price and output of paper. c. Explain why the answers you calculated in parts a and b differ.
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